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Aristotle on Leisure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Joseph Owens
Joseph Owens*
Affiliation:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
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Extract

At a conference on ‘Leisure in Canada,’ held more than a decade ago at Montmorency in Quebec, a participant observed that ‘practically all writers on the subject take Aristotle as the point of departure in discussing leisure but seldom seem to move from that point.’ At first sight this statement may seem surprising. How is it to be understood? Certainly recent writers on leisure do in fact list Aristotle's conception as one of the significant positions on it.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 1981 , pp. 713 - 723
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 John Farina, ‘Towards a Philosophy of Leisure,’ in Leisure in Canada, The Proceedings of the Montmorencey Conference on Leisure, Montmorency, Quebec — September 2-6, 1969 (Ottawa: Department of National Health and Welfare 1973) 9. The aim of the conference was to ‘provide the basis for the development of a philosophy of leisure which would be meaningful for the Canadian people’ (ix). Bibliographies of recent literature on the topic of leisure may be found in Soziologie der Freizeit, ed. Scheuch, Erwin K. and Meyersohn, Rolf (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1972) 327-40,Google Scholar in Burton, Thomas L. Leisure (Toronto: Van Nostrand 1976) 88–90,Google Scholar and, on its history, in The Emergence of Leisure, ed. Marrus, Michael R. (New York: Harper & Row 1974) 144-7.Google Scholar

2 Farina, 12. Cf.: ‘As a result, the idea of leisurely labour has usually been omitted as a potential occupation of leisure.’ Ibid., 9. Cf. infra, n. 14.

3 Cf. the attitude neatly described by Russell Hann: ‘Some observers have viewed the intelligentsia as the protectors of all that is fine in western tradition; to perform this function well, it must be well insulated from society …. the social necessity of a clerisy – that group of learned men and women separated from philistinism of everyday life, who were capable of creating enlightened opinion and social leadership’ (‘Brainworkers and the Knights of Labor,’ in Kealey, Gregory S. and Warrian, Peter eds., Essays in Canadian Working Class History, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1976) 35,Google Scholar 45).

4 Metaph. 981b20-25; Oxford trans. The English word ‘leisure’ comes from the Latin licere (‘to be allowed’), implying freedom from restraint. Its Greek counterpart scholé is traced by etymologists (see Boisacq, s.v. and s.v. echó; Frisk, s.v.) to the same root as that of the Greek verb for ‘to have.’ On its background in Greek literature before Aristotle, see Welskopf, Elisabeth Charlotte Probleme der Müsse im alten Hellas (Berlin: Rütten & Loening 1962).Google Scholar Applied in the sense of ‘school’ as opposed to ordinary work, the word in the course of centuries adapted itself in chameleon fashion to the coloring of the different circumstances and came to imply the rigidity and restraint of school discipline rather than the free and pleasant atomosphere of its original setting. This occasioned Maritain's quip that Scholasticism was named from its greatest misfortune. ‘Leisure,’ though, is not a topic that is treated of just in itself by Aristotle. The longest discussion of it is given in the course of dealing with education, in Politics 1333a30-b5; 1334a11-40: 1337b29-1338a30. Although Aristotle there (1334a15; 1337b30-1) refers to his conception of it as something frequently mentioned, the other passages (see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 741Google Scholara20-50) that treat of it are neither lengthy nor numerous in comparison with those dealing with many leading Aristotelian themes. But his doctrine on it throughout is consistent and unhesitating, and is deeply involved in his major ethical issues. Cf. infra, n. 13. Quite as in modern Greek, the notion of leisure was expressed positively, as though it were regarded as normally in possession, while in relation to it ‘work’ was viewed negatively as ascholia. Correspondingly in Latin ‘business’ was negotium.

5 C. f. E.N. 1094al-b11; 1177a12-79a32. The grading is expressed by the adverb ‘secondarily’ at 1178a9.

6 See Farina, 11; Burton, 22.

7 E.N. 1176b32-1177al; Rackham trans. (Loeb Classical Library). Cf. Pol. 1337b35-42. Correspondingly the reversal of ends is expressed in Browning's Rabbi ben Ezra:

What is he but a brute

Whose flesh has soul to suit,

Whose spirit works lest arms and legs want play?

8 Cf.: ‘We should introduce amusements only at suitable times, and they should be our medicines.’ Aristotle, Pol. 1337b40-2; Oxford trans. Here, as in the use of medicines, excess tends to defeat the original purpose. Philosophically this is a leisure problem in the Aristotelian setting, for it concerns the correct understanding of the purpose of leisure time. From other standpoints it may appear differently, e.g. “ … it is probable that many people choose to expend their increasing resources in a manner injurious to themselves and their environment. … This is a very real problem, but it is obviously no leisure problem, in the sense that people do not know what to do with all their time. It is a social problem’ (Linder, Staffan Burenstam The Harried Leisure Class (New York and London: Columbia U.P. 1970) 12Google Scholar). Cf. ibid., 46 and 95. On the ‘conspicuous leisure’ theme, see Veblen, Thorstein The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: B.W. Huebsch 1918) 35–67.Google Scholar

9 Cf.: ‘The defining characteristic of leisure is choice. Choice, or freedom from obligations, is a constant theme permeating the many varied interpretations of leisure throughout history’ (Burton, 1 8). Nevertheless Burton remarks: ‘Choice, however, implies diversity; and the whole current approach to planning for leisure seems to militate against the creation of diversity’ (ibid., 86).

10 See E.N. 1095b19-31. Cf.: ‘Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation and is its end,’ Pol. 1 337b33-4; Oxford trans.

11 ‘Choice, then, is the origin of conduct,’ E.N. 1139a31. ‘The first principle of the practical sciences is in the agent, choice,’ Metaph. 1025b23-4. Cf. Pol. 1337b32.

12 ‘In conduct our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good good for each,’ Metaph. 1029b6-7; Oxford trans. Cf.: ‘Now men … should pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good for them,’ E.N. 1129b5-7; Oxford trans.

13 ‘And happiness is thought to depend on leisure,’ E.N. 1177b4; Oxford trans. Introduced as a commonly accepted notion, this view is upheld by Aristotle, ibid., 1177b16-78a8. For him, happiness is the ultimate goal of all morally good activity. Cf.: ‘Therefore, leisure is not limited to the non-work sphere, but can permeate all phases of existence, because leisure then becomes a philosophy of life …’ Leisure in Canada, Montmorency II, The Proceedings of the Second Montmorency Conference on Leisure, Montmorency, Quebec – September 7-10, 1971 (Ottawa: Department of National Health and Welfare 1973) 177. On the topic, see Stanley Parker, The Sociology of Leisure (New York: International Publications Service 1976) 65-76.

14 Cf.: ‘Leisure in this context can no longer be opposed to work,’ Leisure in Canada, Montmorency II, 150. ‘Leisure then is possible during what is generally considered work time,’ Farina, 12. But Farina's remark ‘the compulsively neurotic pursuit of free time activity is difficult to exclude from leisure as derived from Aristotle’ (9) is unjustified. For Aristotle every morally good act has to be regulated by the right reason, and the moderation of the proper mean has always to be observed in the pursuit of pleasure. On the other hand, Aristotle has been understood to exclude anything purposeful from leisure: ‘Therefore no occupation can be leisure, not even the self-employer's, whose purpose is self-chosen. Nor can leisure be anything related to an occupation,’ Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1962) 15. In this regard, one may recall John K. Galbraith's remark ‘Social philosophy, far more than nature, abhors a vacuum. Men must see a purpose in their efforts,’ The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1958) 281. On the ‘New Class’ mentality, see ibid., 340-8.

15 See E.N. 1094b14-6, 1104a1-10. Cf.: ‘Mass leisure, however, may represent an unfortunate choice of terms,’ Farina, 13.

16 ‘Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul,’ E.N. 1100b30-3; Rackham trans.

17 ‘Aristotle … stated that “the object of education is to prepare a man to occupy his leisure,”’ Farina, 8. Cf. Aristotle: ‘Now, in men rational principle and mind are the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them,’ Pol. 1334b14-7; Oxford trans. ‘It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge that are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things,’ ibid., 1338a9-13. The extent of the leisure problem today is emphasized in Kaplan, Max and Bosserman, Phillip eds., Technology, Human Values, and Leisure (Nashville: Abington Press 1971)Google Scholar – ‘the study of leisure covers all ages,’ 5. Yet the view may still be found asserted that ‘our leisure problems, compared with those of work, are secondary’ – Anderson, Nels Man's Work and Leisure (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1974) x.Google Scholar

18 See Cooper, John M. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P. 1975) 144-80.Google Scholar Cooper (115-43) sees a different view in the Eudemian Ethics, a view that for him is older and that survives in a secondary position in Nicomachean Ethics.

19 The Aristotelian term for the object of morally good activity is the same as that for the physically or aesthetically beautiful – to kalon.

20 In this wide sense one may agree with the assertion ‘The cultivation of the mind and spirit is generally accepted as being the supreme goal of human effort,’ Linder, 94. But for different mentalities it will take on different embodiment. For a Christian believer it may readily be centered in divine worship, e.g. ‘The soul of leisure, it can be said, lies in “celebration.”’ Pieper, Josef Leisure the Basis of Culture, trans. Dru, Alexander (New York: Pantheon Books 1952) 71.Google Scholar So: ‘Separated from the sphere of divine worship, of the cult of the divine, and from the power it radiates, leisure is as impossible as the celebration of a feast. Cut off from the worship of the divine, leisure becomes laziness and work inhuman,’ ibid., 75. Aristotle's Greek background does in fact leave his principles open to development in this direction; see Pieper, 78-9. Discussions of leisure vis-à-vis religion may be found in Huizinga, 14-27, and Parker, 103-13, and a survey of the topic on the U.S.A. scene in Robert Lee, Religion and Leisure in America (New York: Abingdon Press 1964). At least the Aristotelian wisdom shows that leisure, with its deep origins in human freedom, is meant for something much more important than recreation and entertainment.