Functionalist identity theorists (functionalists, for short) argue that if physical states of the central nervous system (CNS) have the same function (the same input and output) as pain, pains should be identified with those physical states. Many objections have been raised against this position. My aim in this paper is to defend it against opponents who argue that it leads to an absurd result: the ascription of pains to things which cannot reasonably be thought to be capable of suffering, or of having any conscious states. In doing this, I will outline a version of the functionalist position which I think is plausible. It departs in several respects from versions commonly found in the literature.

Galileo and his fellowers discovered, and subsequent centuries have amply confirmed, that you get much better predictions by thinking of things as masses of particles blindly bumping each other than by thinking of them as Aristotle thought of them — animistically, teleologically, anthromorphically. They also discovered that you get a better handle on the universe by thinking of it as infinite and cold and comfortless than by thinking of it as finite, homey, planned, and relevant to human concerns. Finally, they discovered that if you view planets or missiles or corpuscles as point-masses, you can get nice simple predictive laws by looking for nice simple mathematical ratios. These discoveres are the basis of modern technological civilization. We can hardly be too grateful for them. But they do not, pace Descartes and Kant, point any epistemological moral.

In this discussion I shall argue that some fairly widely held views about human habits are mistaken. These misconceptions are important because of the pervasiveness of the habitual in human behavior and because it is the concept of habit that has served as the prototype of various conceptions of conditioned response which are used in psychological explanation. One major task of this analysis is to show that accounts in which actions are explained by reference to rules are not incompatible with accounts in which the same behavior is seen as the product of habit.

Replying to Theaetetus’ suggestion that knowledge is true opinion at Tht. 200e, Socrates remarks that ‘a whole profession’ testifies against this definition. The orator practises the art of persuasion, not to teach people, but make them believe whatever he wants. If a robbery has taken place, for example, he cannot in a short time teach adequately the truth about what happened to people who were not on the scene.

La logique intervient doublement dans les discussions sur l'identité personnelle. D'une part, certaines théories de l’identité personnelle ont été critiquées pour ne pas respecter les propriétés logiques de l’identité, d'autre part, l’identité personnelle a été présentée comme un contreexemple à Ia logique de l’identité, justifiant une révision radicale de celle-ci.

Ainsi, Ia logique de l’identité est le garde fou des théories de l’identité personnelle et l’identité personnelle est Ia pierre d'achoppement de Ia théorie logique de l’identité.

L’identité logique est caractérisée par le fait d'être une relation d'équivalence, et par le principe de substitutivité. Or certaines situations comme par exemple les cas de dedoublement de personnalité, semblent déroger à ce principe. Si l'on peut dire que a et b sont le même homme mais pas Ia même personne, alors le principe, selon lequel si deux individus sont identiques ce qui est prédicable de l'un est prédicable de l'autre, ne s'applique plus.

It seems generally agreed that a theory of sensory episodes that mentions sensory objects and a sensing relation — the ‘act-object’ theory — is unacceptable and should be replaced by some other account. A chief competitor is the Adverbial Theory, and one of its chief advocates is Wilfrid Sellars. While it is clear that there are serious difficulties for the act-object theory not facing the adverbial theory, I will argue that the latter has difficulties of its own.

One of the theses defended by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics books VII and X is that pleasure is good (VII. 13, 1153b4) or is one of the good things (X. 2, 1172b26): and Aristotle thinks that it follows from this that the best thing is a pleasure, or is pleasure in a certain way (VII. 13, 1153b26). Among his arguments for the latter we find the following:

Richard Rorty sings in the antifoundationalist chorus. His song equates the rise of foundationalist epistemology with the professionalization of philosophy. The discordant notes he finds in the foundationalist score become, as a consequence, subversive of philosophy as an autonomous discipline.

Nonetheless, the most salient feature of Rorty's recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is that it is by a professional philosopher, for professional philosophers and about the future of philosophy as a profession. The early chapters of the book are polished pieces of professional philosophical prose addressed to issues which have provoked interest in recent years among members of academic philosophy departments. They represent efforts to undermine foundationalist epistemology even in some of its currently fashionable guises as philosophy of language.

Can one mistrust one's own belief? Wittgenstein says ‘No.’ He remarks: ‘One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief.’

It is natural to think that this is not meant merely as a remark about our psychological abilities or inabilities; viz., that one can not, as a matter of psychological fact, help but trust one's own belief. Rather, one is inclined to take it as a ‘grammatical remark’ to the effect that it makes no sense to speak of trusting or mistrusting one's own belief.

According to Nicod's criterion of confirmation ([7]), a hypothesis of the form ‘All P are Q’ is confirmed by its positive instances, i.e. by entities that are P and Q. It is well known, however, that the criterion gives origin to counterintuitive results. For example, it sanctions the confirmation of ‘All nonblacks are nonravens’ by a nonblack nonraven. Since this hypothesis is logically equivalent to ‘All ravens are black,’ it follows that the criterion indirectly sanctions the counterintuitive confirmation of ‘All ravens are black’ by a non black nonraven, e.g. by a white shoe.

'Some beliefs about the world are justified, others are not.’ This seems to be a plausible, even if not completely uncontroversial, claim. The controversy most likely would center on the meaning given to the term ‘justified'. If one gives extremely strong criteria for justification, one might argue that the claim is false. None of our beliefs about the world are justified. It is possible, perhaps, to interpret Hume as taking such a position.

Whether or not Hume held this, I think that there is a sense of ‘justified’ in which Hume could have argued that some of our beliefs about the world are justified. I will try to show this by developing an analysis of justified belief that is compatible with Hume's theory of the nature of beliefs and belief formation. As a minimum criterion for success such an analysis must be able to provide a plausible basis for distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs.

In part I of this paper I argue that on his theory of the mind as the idea of an actually existing body Spinoza is unable to account for the ability of the mind to have adequate knowledge, and I suggest that his theory of the eternity of the mind can be viewed as his solution to this problem. In part II I deal with the question of the meaning of ‘eternity’ in Spinoza (i.e., whether eternity involves timelessness or not, and why), in regard both to God and the human mind, and I sketch a line of thought which I believe may have provided him with further motivation for his theory that a part of the mind is eternal.

Many utilitarians accept Bentham's view that to argue for the principle of utility is as ‘impossible as it is needless'. They take utilitarianism as a first principle which one either accepts or does not. They do, of course, defend utilitarianism against objections, and make objections to other ethical positions; but the principle of utility itself, they hold, must stand on its own merits. In this article we use a different approach. We introduce a principle, which we call ‘Weak Majority Preference', which we believe likely to be accepted by many who do not consider themselves utilitarians. We then show that from this principle it is possible to derive the general principle of utility.

In the de Anima, Aristotle outlines a theory of perception. In de Anima II, 5-12, he considers the basic kinds of sensory perception — seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. He uses a few basic elements, viz., the five senses and their proper, common and incidental objects, and a few explanatory principles to explain sensory perception. In de Anima III, 1–2, Aristotle turns to apperception, viz. perceptual selfawareness. He considers several basic cases of apperception – the selfconscious awareness of occurrent perceptions and the awareness that the objects of different senses are different.

In this paper, I will argue against a way of approaching the issue of Judicial discretion that finds its clearest exposition and highest development in recent works by Ronald Dworkin. I will argue that this approach is too narrow, and that it ignores a kind of Judicial discretion whose existence has been maintained by Jurists with discretionist sympathies, and which is philosophically significant. The kind of discretion it ignores raises the issue of the Justification of adjudication as clearly as does the kind of discretion that it recognizes. Moreover, discussion of the kind of discretion ignored is in some respects the natural starting place for a discussion of Judicial discretion in general.

We are often told that there is a striking and important difference between ancient Greek moral philosophy and modern moral philosophy. Whereas the moderns emphasize principles of right action and what a person is obligated to do, ancient moral philosophy is concerned with character and what it is to be a good, that is, a virtuous human being. For the Greeks, virtue was not a matter of making our actions conform to a specific code of conduct or to the moral law. Instead, it was a matter of being in the right psychological state. This idea is explicit in Socrates’ famous claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue: once we know that virtue is an indispensable means to the final good of eudaimonia, we will choose virtue.

Platonism, considered as a philosophy of mathematics, can be formulated in two interestingly different ways. Strong platonism holds that numerals, for example, refer to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. Weak platonism holds only that numerals uniquely apply to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. (Of course, there may even be weaker views that deserve to be called ‘platonistic.’

The distinction between referring to an object and uniquely applying to an object may be illustrated as follows. If there is a tallest person and I say, ‘the tallest person is over seven feet tall,’ without knowing who that person is, then my use of ‘the tallest person’ uniquely applies to someone, but it does not refer to anyone. The distinction is at least as old as Russell, for we might put his views in our terms by saying that for Russell only logically proper names refer to things, while ordinary proper names and definite descriptions at best uniquely apply to things.

C.A. Macdonald's incisive note, ‘On the Unifier-Multiplier Controversy', gave me fresh thoughts regarding the method of actindividuation which he defends against Jonathan Bennett's and my own misgivings. I believe a second look at the Reductive Unifying account, in light of Macdonald's apology for it, will help us size up the issues, notably those involving causation and time.

I shall follow previous debaters and dwell upon examples of mayhem, where one individual kills another by carrying out a more rudimentary action. Here is Donald Davidson's case. A queen murders her royal husband by emptying a vial of poison into his ear as he sleeps. To be exact: she rotates her wrist, and the lethal drug cascades toward his ear.