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Benefits, Intentions, and the Principle of Fairness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Idil Boran
Idil Boran*
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, PQH3C 3P8 and York University, Toronto, ONM3J 1P3, Canada
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Extract

In its simplest form, the principle of fairness tells us the following. If a number of people are producing a public good that we benefit from, it is not morally acceptable to free ride on their backs, enjoying the benefits without paying the costs. We owe them our fair share of the costs of the production of that good. The principle of fairness, defended by Rawls in A Theory of Justice and widely discussed subsequently, is sometimes invoked in various areas of applied ethics, such as environmental ethics, social ethics, etc.

As it stands, the principle of fairness offers an account of a particular type of moral obligation that obtains if certain conditions are satisfied. For example, the good produced must be a particular type of good, the scheme in which it is produced must itself be fair, and so on. This account inspired a wave of discussions, which set the tone for the debate on the principle of fairness, about two decades ago.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 95 - 115
Copyright
Copyright ©The Authors 2006

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References

1 See Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974), 93.Google Scholar A representative response to Nozick's polemic is Richard Arneson, ‘The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems,‘ Ethics 92 616-33. Other discussions include Cullity, G. ‘Moral Free Riding,‘ Philosophy and Public Affairs 24.1 (1995) 3–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Simmons, A.J. Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1979).Google Scholar

2 Gettier, Edmund ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23 (1963) 121-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Shope, R. The Analysis of Knowledge (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press 1983).Google Scholar

3 For an interesting discussion of the parallel between problems in moral theory and epistemology, and particularly in relation to the Gettier problem, see Latus, Andrew 'Moral and Epistemic Luck,‘ Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000) 149-72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 There are nevertheless recent contributions, which have evolved from the initial debate, that are worth mentioning. See Klosko, George ‘Political Obligations and the Natural Duties of Justice,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 23.3 (1994) 251-70;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Carter, Alan ‘Presumptive Benefits and Political Obligations’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 18.3 (2001) 229-43CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Simmons, John Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).Google Scholar

5 Hart, H.L.A. ‘Are there any Natural Rights,‘ in Quinton, A. ed., Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967)Google Scholar and Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1972).Google Scholar

6 A similar, slightly larger, list is also provided by Casal, Paula ‘Environmentalism, Procreation, and the Principle of Fairness,‘ Public Affairs Quarterly 13.4 (1999) 363-76.Google Scholar For a larger list of characteristics see Cullity, ‘Moral Free Riding,‘ where he includes jointness in supply, non-excludability, jointness in consumption, nonrivalness, compulsoriness, equality, indivisibility. Philosophers are far from being univocal about which ones of these properties are definitive of publicity. Some have also derived sub-categories, and distinguish ‘collective goods’ from public goods, e.g. Miller, David ‘Social Justice and Environmental Goods,’ in Dobson, Andrew ed., Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999)Google Scholar and Beckerman, W. and Pasek, J. Justice, Posterity, and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Others refer to those public goods that have the compulsoriness feature as ‘pure public goods,’ e.g. Arneson, 'The Principle of Fairness.’ A useful guide to the public goods literature is found in the appendix of Cullity, ‘Moral Free Riding,’ 32-4.

7 Cf. Casal, ‘Environmentalism'; Klosko, George Keren, Michael Nyikos, Stacy ‘Political Obligations and Military Service in Three Countries,‘ Politics, Philosophy, Economics 2.1 (2003) 37–62;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Parijs, Philippe Van ‘Linguistic Justice,‘ Politics, Philosophy, Economics 1.1 (2002) 59–74;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Steiner, Hillel ‘Double-Counting Inequality,‘ Politics, Philosophy, Economics 2.1 (2003) 129-34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Arneson, ‘The Principle of Fairness,‘ 620.Google Scholar

9 Simmons, Cf. Justification and Legitimacy, eh. 1.Google Scholar

10 One could object that there is a fundamental difference between this example and the example of the orchid enthusiasts, for the stylish pedestrians dress well independently ofeach other whereas orchid enthusiasts put their orchids together in a green house by agreement, although not necessarily with the intention of p roducing a public good. But for the purposes of the present discussion such difference can be ignored, for the discussion is concerned with the resulting benefits.

11 Arneson, ‘Principle of Fairness,‘ 621.Google Scholar It is important to clarify here the difference between moral obligations and enforcement issues. The principle of fairness grounds a moral duty in a scheme of cooperation. However, the duty imposed on agents is constrained by the moral limits of State action, which define the scope of the applicability of the principle. As a result, any discussion of the limits of the principle's applicability, as it is the case in this paper, is concerned with the moral limits of State action.

12 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.

13 Rawls, Theory, 92-5, 407-16

14 Ronald Dworkin has worries about subsidizing the arts on similar grounds. See Dworkin, Ronald ‘Can a Liberal State Support Art?’ in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1985).Google Scholar

17 George, Rolf ‘Who Should Bear the Costs of Children?’ Public Affairs Quarterly 1 (1987) 1–42Google Scholar and Casal, ‘Environmentalism.'

18 Casal, ‘Environmentalism,‘ 367Google Scholar

19 It may be either true or false that raising children produces a public good, but if it is true it is clear that the produced good qualifies as an unintended good as I have defined it.

20 Casal, ‘Environmentalism’, 367Google Scholar

21 This assumes that the Statement ‘x is costly (or burdensome) for y’ does not necessarily mean that x has an absolute cost (or is burdensome in absolute terms), but that y's valuing or enjoying x overrides the cost or bürden entailed by x.

22 Cf. Wolff, Jonathan ‘Addressing Disadvantage and the Human Good’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 19.3 (2002), 207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 For a recent discussion, see Wolff ‘Addressing Disadvantage.'

24 Rawls, Theory, sections 5 & 6.Google Scholar

25 Cf. Martin, Mike ‘Personal Meaning and Ethics in Engineering’ Science and Engineering Ethics 8.4 (2002) 545-60.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

26 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.

27 It could be argued, for example, that these kinds ofextra benefits may be an incentive for people to continue producing the public good or contributing to it significantly, provided that the scheme is fair. Rawlsian egalitarianism certainly endorses this kind of incentive. This is not to say that such incentives always benefit the worse off. But if they did in addition to benefiting everyone generally, they could be permitted as part of a fair scheme of cooperation. Over-rewarding the agent this way might then be shown to be acceptable if the outcome furthers justice more generally.