Craig (1990) casts doubt upon the project of trying to give the traditional sort of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p. He interprets the inadequacy of existing analyses of knowledge as evidence that our concept of knowledge is complex and diffuse, and concludes that we should aim to understand it by thinking about the rôle the concept plays in our lives, rather than by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of knowledge ascriptions.

There is surely something right about Craig's view: we are unlikely to succeed in any attempt to analyse away the intricacies in our concept of knowledge. We cannot realistically hope to uncover a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p which are in all cases either clearly satisfied or clearly not satisfied. Nor, I suspect, is it possible to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge which are widely accepted as being more securely understood than knowledge itself.

It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times — relativising properties to spatial locations — or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times — relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission.

Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts, this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed Statements true. So what is a presentist to do?

There are at least three conditions that would ideally be met in a satisfactory solution to this problem:

• a) It must preserve our views about which Statements are true and which false

• b) It must be transparent what the truthmakers are for those Statements

• c) It must accommodate the truth-value links between various times.

It is a suggestive feature of English and other languages that an indicative sentence such as ‘Premarital sex is wrong’ can be described not only as an expression of the belief that premarital sex is wrong, but also as an expression of disapproval of premarital sex. Disapproval is plausibly regarded as an attitude that is distinct from belief, in that it does not have truth conditions. What sort of attitude, then, should we take ‘Premarital sex is wrong’ to express: disapproval, belief, or perhaps both? One group of contemporary philosophers advocates the first Option. They hold that evaluative claims serve essentially to express positive and negative attitudes that are more like desires than beliefs, and that cannot be said to be true or false — at least in the robust way in which claims about the ages of trees (for example) can be true or false. Call these philosophers ‘expressivists.’ Seemingly opposed to expressivists are those who hold that evaluative claims express beliefs, and can be true or false.

In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Hammer horror or pulpy science fiction. These days it is unusual to encounter a major philosophical work on the mind that is not populated with bats, homunculi, swamp-creatures, cruelly imprisoned genius scientists, aliens, cyborgs, other-worldly twins, self-aware Computer programs, Frankenstein-monster-like ‘Blockheads,’ or zombies. The purpose of this paper is to review the role in the philosophy of mind of one of these fantastic thought-experiments — the zombie — and to reassess the implications of zombie arguments, which I will suggest have been widely misinterpreted. I shall argue that zombies, far from being the enemy of materialism, are its friend; and furthermore that zombies militate against the computational model of consciousness and in favour of more biologically-rooted conceptions, and hence that zombie- considerations support a more reductive kind of physicalism about consciousness than has been in vogue in recent years.

Suppose Figure 1 depicts Stimuli from an experiment on shape discrimination, where the subjects are asked to point out the best circle.

Now suppose that Figure 2 shows Stimuli from a color-discrimination experiment where the subjects’ task is to pick the purest green — green that is neither yellowish nor bluish — in other words, is unique green.

In both these tasks there are individual differences between different subjects. However, notice that in the shape-discrimination case there is exactly one correct response: the best circle is the fourth from the left. In the color case it is not obvious, to put it mildly, that there is exactly one correct response. One color-normal subject may find that the purest green is the third from the left, whereas another may choose the fifth from the left, and still another may pick the fourth. Who is right, and who is wrong? More importantly, why is there this difference between shape perception and color perception?

Much recent discussion in the aesthetics of nature has focused on Scientific cognitivism, the view that in order to engage in a deep and appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, one must possess certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The most pressing difficulty faced by this view is an apparent tension between the very notion of aesthetic appreciation and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this essay, I describe this difficulty, trace some of its roots and argue that attempts to dismiss it fail. I then develop a response to the problem, drawing on the notion of the theory-ladenness of observation. I conclude by considering the relationship between this response and one common approach to the problem, the appeal to expressive qualities in nature.

I Introduction

A fundamental intuition about knowledge is that it is more valuable than mere true belief. This intuition is pervasive. We have an almost universal desire to know and nearly no desire to believe the truth accidentally. However, it turns out to be extremely difficult to explain why knowledge is more valuable. Linda Zagzebski and others have called this the ‘value problem.’ They argue that the value problem is particularly difficult to unravel for generic reliabilism. According to generic reliabilism, knowledge is true belief produced by reliable belief-forming processes or faculties. But, the critics argue, ‘the reliability of the source of a belief cannot explain the [value difference] between knowledge and true belief.’ For reliably formed beliefs allegedly are valuable only insofar as they tend to be true.

Frege's views on identity continue to provoke scholars, and rightly so. In particular his view in Begriffsschrift (Bs) of 1879, and its relation to his view in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (SB) of 1892 deserve careful attention. The issues involved have a wider significance than Frege's specific views on identity in different periods, though these are important enough. They concern also the move from what I call below ‘thin’ semantics, which is exhausted in signs being assigned content, to a ‘thick’ semantics, in which ‘modes of determining their content’ (Bs), or Sinne (SB) are also concerned.

In section 53 of Word and Object, Quine argues that the set-theoretical explications of the concept of the ordered pair of f ered by mathematicians such as Wiener and Kuratowski give us a model for the clarification of philosophically troublesome ideas. According to Quine, ordered pairs might seem indispensible in science. But at the same time they have appeared unclear to many philosophers, who have argued that an extensional treatment of the logic of relations can be satisfactory only to the extent that we can give a transparent and substantial explanation of what an ordered pair really is. Quine cites Peirce as someone who tries to meet this sort of demand. The explanation Peirce offers is mentalistic, but it is not the mentalism that Quine regards as the most fundamental problem with Peirce's account.

The use of intention in ethics has been the subject of intense debate for many years, but no consensus has emerged over whether intention is morally relevant, or even how it should be understood. In this paper I wish to make a thorough, though by no means exhaustive, examination of the concept and the concepts around it, some to be seen as near-synonyms, and some as contrasting ideas. My interest is in the ethical use of the concept, though my own analysis of it will be indebted to discussions in the philosophy of action. The most famous ethical use, which will not, however, be my direct focus here, is the ‘principle of double effect,’ which states that an agent may cause or allow something bad as long as, first, no evil is intended as an end or a means; and, second, that the foreseen bad is not out of proportion with the anticipated good. It is important to note the principle's testimony to the plausibility of prohibitions expressed in terms of intentions (indicated by the first condition), and, alongside these, a general prohibition on doing inordinate harms even without intention (indicated by the second condition).

One of the deepest and most abiding of Pierre Bayle's philosophical preoccupations concerns the possibility of rational theology, or more specifically, the extent to which unaided reason is competent to secure the fundamental tenets of orthodox Christianity. Doubtless the most familiar aspect of this intellectual ‘obsession’ is his tenacious criticism of traditional Solutions to the problem of evil. Yet these discussions represent only one facet of Bayle's engagement with the complex issues involved in the question of rational theology. Throughout the Historical and Critical Dictionary and in subsequent works, three issues in particular figure prominently in Bayle's discussions: the existence of a transcendent, immaterial God, the immortality of the soul, and mind-body dualism. These topics are, of course, interrelated, and Bayle rarely treats them in complete isolation. Although his official position is explicitly fideistic, there is reason to believe that Bayle was a reluctant skeptic, who was naturally sympathetic with the metaphysical dogmatism of Descartes and Malebranche.

When someone presents an argument on a charged topic and it is (credibly) alleged that the arguer has a strong personal interest and investment in the conclusion, the allegation, directed to the reception or evaluation of the argument, typically gives rise to two seemingly conflicting reactions:

I. The allegation is an unwarranted diversion (a species of argumentum ad hominem or genetie fallacy). The prejudices or biases of the arguer are irrelevant to the cogency of the argument. ('Cogency’ is used broadly to refer both to correct support relations, validity, in the case of deductive arguments, and to the soundness, warrant, and relevance of the premises.) In particular, it is a distraction from the crucial judgment of whether the argument is cogent to press the question of whether the arguer truly holds his conclusion on the grounds that he offers, or whether he believes it on some illicit or suspect basis (prejudice, ideology, self-interest, wishful thinking, bias).

A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person's belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Traditional Foundationalism says that, first, if a human being has a nonbasic belief, then, at bottom, it owes its justification to at least one basic belief, and second, there are basic beliefs. Call the second thesis Minimal Foundationalism. In this essay, we assess three arguments against Minimal Foundationalism which we find in recent work of Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.

It is part of our notion of moral properties (certain forms of relativism to the contrary) that they are in some sense independent of our moral beliefs. A murderer cannot make his action moral simply by believing that it is so. Slavery was immoral even if a large number of people once believed that it was permissible, and it would remain so in the future even if every person came to believe that it was morally acceptable. But views that take moral properties to be objective and thoroughly mind-independent constituents of reality face familiar metaphysical and epistemological obstacles.

A view of truth that gained prominence among early logical positivists, what A.J. Ayer called the ‘redundancy theory of truth,’ has had a renaissance over the last few decades. The fundamental thought behind this theory is that the truth predicate is a device of disquotation. Redundancy, or disquotationalism, is seen by its advocates as providing a definitive answer to the perennial question ‘what is the nature of truth?’ The answer, says the disquotationalist, is to reject the idea that truth has some underlying nature. The terms true and false, as Ayer put it, connote nothing (Ayer, 1936/1946,88). They do not correspond or refer to some elusive ingredient of reality. Truth, he argued, must be deflated from its exalted metaphysical Status — but the notion should not be dispensed with altogether. Disquotationalists like Ayer think that the truth predicate has an essential role to play in logic. Indeed, disquotationalism, in its purest form, sees the sole function of the truth predicate as fulfilling this logical need, that is, as a device that aids generalization by permitting infinite conjunction and disjunction.

Knowing that p requires being able to ‘rule out’ the relevant not-p alternatives. Such is the core claim of the Relevant Alternatives (RA) theorist. Of course, to endorse the core claim is not to have a complete and satisfactory account of knowing: any RA theorist has some explaining to do. Most obviously, anyone who endorses the core claim must ultimately provide an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’. And some who‘ve been critical of the whole RA approach have done so because of a scepticism about the prospects of cashing these notions out in a satisfactory way.

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).

Introduction

J. Howard Sobel devotes seventy pages of his wide-ranging analysis of theistic arguments to a critique of the cosmological argument. The focus of that critique falls on the argument a contingentia mundi; but he also offers in passing some criticisms of the argument ab initio mundi, or the kalam cosmological argument.

Sobel provides the following Statement of the argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence [that did not begin to exist].

Sobel will accept the causal premiss (1) only if ‘begins to exist’ means ‘has a first instant of its existence,’ and he disputes the arguments and evidence for (2).

Traditional proponents of the kalam argument sought to justify (2) by means of philosophical arguments against the infinity of the past, while contemporary interest in the argument arises from the empirical evidence of physical cosmology for the truth of (2).

In its simplest form, the principle of fairness tells us the following. If a number of people are producing a public good that we benefit from, it is not morally acceptable to free ride on their backs, enjoying the benefits without paying the costs. We owe them our fair share of the costs of the production of that good. The principle of fairness, defended by Rawls in A Theory of Justice and widely discussed subsequently, is sometimes invoked in various areas of applied ethics, such as environmental ethics, social ethics, etc.

As it stands, the principle of fairness offers an account of a particular type of moral obligation that obtains if certain conditions are satisfied. For example, the good produced must be a particular type of good, the scheme in which it is produced must itself be fair, and so on. This account inspired a wave of discussions, which set the tone for the debate on the principle of fairness, about two decades ago.