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Quine on Explication and Elimination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Martin Gustafsson
Martin Gustafsson*
Affiliation:
Stockholm University Stockholm Sweden
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Extract

In section 53 of Word and Object, Quine argues that the set-theoretical explications of the concept of the ordered pair of f ered by mathematicians such as Wiener and Kuratowski give us a model for the clarification of philosophically troublesome ideas. According to Quine, ordered pairs might seem indispensible in science. But at the same time they have appeared unclear to many philosophers, who have argued that an extensional treatment of the logic of relations can be satisfactory only to the extent that we can give a transparent and substantial explanation of what an ordered pair really is. Quine cites Peirce as someone who tries to meet this sort of demand. The explanation Peirce offers is mentalistic, but it is not the mentalism that Quine regards as the most fundamental problem with Peirce's account.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 57 - 70
Copyright
Copyright ©The Authors 2006

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