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Reason and Motivation in Aristotle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Stephen D. Hudson
Stephen D. Hudson*
Affiliation:
Rutgers College, Rutgers University
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Extract

Everyone knows what it is to feel a conflict between a ‘non-rational’ desire and reason, as e.g., when we want a second dish of ice cream but think it would be unwise to take it. In such cases we commonly think of our desires as unreasonable: they prompt us to perform some action contrary to our deliberations. Nevertheless, most of us assume that reason can move us: that simply recognizing an act as the most reasonable thing to do gives us a motive to do it — even if in fact we do not perform that action. If we do not eat the second dish of ice cream we are disposed to think that we did not because we judged it unwise. If, on the other hand, we do eat the second dish, we are disposed to think we did because we were more strongly inclined toward eating than not eating, even though we were inclined toward refraining because we judged eating unwise. This is the position of the man on the street. It is the commonsensical notion of reason, motivation, and their relationship.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 111 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A. (Oxford U. P., Oxford, 1888), p. 458;Google Scholar cf. Book II, Part II, Sect. III.

2 I use the following abbreviations throughout this paper:

  • DA De Anima

  • EE Eudemian Ethics

  • PA Parts of Animals

  • Pol Politics

  • EN Nicomachean Ethics

  • MM Magna Moralia

  • DM De Motu

  • Rhet Rhetoric

3 In quoting De Anima I use Hamlyn's, D.W. translation: Aristotle: De Anima (Oxford U.P., Oxford 1968).Google Scholar

4 For the importance of the heart in Aristotle's physiological theory, with reference to growth, see De Generatione Animalium, 735all-26; as the basis of sensitivity, De Partibus Animalium, 650a3-652b28.

5 In D1 θϵωρητιxóς (432b28) is introduced by xαλοúμϵνος νοûς (b27). and D2 refers back to it: ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ ὅταυ θεωρή τι τοιοûτου. By contrast, διανοíα is used at 433a3; cf. EN, 1139a26-b2.

6 Behavior is a genus of which two species are (i) mere behavior and (ii) action. Teleological behavior may be understood as behavior which is purposive. As such, all actions are pieces of teleological behavior. However, one may contrast teleological behavior with action, where we understand the contrast to be between mere purposive behavior and action. On this latter interpretation actions are not pieces of teleological behavior, i.e., merely purposive. For instance, compare: (a) The cat approached the bowl because it wanted to drink; and (b) The cat approached the bowl because it thought, on the whole, it was the best thing to do. The cat's behavior is purposive, but the cat does not perform an action in approaching the bowl — which gives (b) its comic tone. For one interesting suggestion on how to construe the difference between purposive behavior and action, see Baier's, Kurt “Responsibility and Action,” in The Nature of Human Action, ed. Brand, Myles (Scott Foresman, Glenview, Ill., 1970), pp. 100–116,Google Scholar and his “Action and Agent,” The Monist, 49 (1965), pp. 183-195.

7 See Hicks, R.D. Aristotle: De Anima (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1907), pp. 553,Google Scholar 555, and 560; D.W. Hamlyn, op. cit., p. 152; Hardie, W.F.R. Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford U.P., Oxford, 1968), p. 219.Google Scholar

8 Both the continent and the incontinent man have conflicting desires. But the latter, unlike the former, acts against his better Judgement; his boulēsis is ineffective and he acts in accordance with his epithumia (EN, 1102b15f, 1111 b13, 1145b13, 1146b18f, 1148a5-11). Boulēton (the object of wish) is used to refer to an agent's conception of his good. In the Nicomachean Ethics, at 1113a15f, Aristotle states that the good is the object of wish (boulēsis) (cf. 1166a14-15), but that for each person the apparent good is the object. At 1136b7 he adds that ‘no one wishes for what he does not think to be good.’ The translations ‘wish’ and ‘object of wish,’ though conventional, seem misinformative since they tend to fix one's thoughts on a longing for some improbable thing. There are two recent papers which are helpful on the nature of boulēsis in Plato's writings and which may also serve as providing some rough parameters for understanding Aristotle: Santas, Gerasimos “The Socratic Paradoxes,” Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), pp. 147–164,CrossRefGoogle Scholar esp. ftnt. 15; Rorty, A.O. “Plato and Aristotle on Belief, Habit and Akrasia,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1970), pp. 50–61.Google Scholar

9 I have indicated a line of thinking which makes the move to combine the proposals plausible. Namely: neither reason alone nor orexis alone are adequate because there seems to be an interdependence between reason and orexis.

10 Differing from Hamlyn by translating ?πι??μ?α as ‘appetite’ instead of ‘wanting.’

11 EN, 1112b13f; EE, 1227a5f. The Greek expression translated as ‘means’ (ta pros ta telos) incorporates things that contribute to, realize, promote, or are constituents of the end. Hence the ‘means’ involved in deliberation are means in a very broad, extended sense of the term. See: Hardie, op. cit., pp. 255-256; John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, 1975), pp. 19-20.

12 cf. EE, 1226b10-12 and 29-30, 1227a5f; Rhet, 1362a18-19.

13 EN, 1094a18-22, EE, 1214b6-11; cf. EE, 1226b29-30, EN, 1113a15-b5. Aristotle identifies this ultimate end with eudaimonia (EN, 1095a14-20, 1097a22-37). Thus the single grand end which a person pursues, which is itself not subject to deliberation, will be his conception of what it is for a person to be eudaimon. It will be a plan to organize his life — what Hardie calls an ‘inclusive’ end. See: Hardie, W.F.R. “The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics,” Philosophy, 40 (1965), pp. 277–295;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cooper, op. cit., pp. 91-115.

14 cf. EN, 1140b5f. There is an analogue to the interpretation against which I am presently arguing. It maintains that moral virtue provides the desire for the right end (but only through habituation) and the contribution of practical reasoning is only to calculate the ‘means’, i.e., to deliberate correctly. But Aristotle takes moral virtue and practical wisdom to be interdependent (EN, 1144b21, 1144b30-32, 1145a3-6). Merely to deliberate correctly is insufficient: one must deliberate correctly from the right end, the end which the man of practical wisdom knows to be the correct ultimate end. See: Sorabji, Richard ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74 (1973-74), pp. 107–129.Google Scholar

15 Mere-deliberation cannot result in grasping what is the end in the unqualified sense. It corresponds, roughly, to Hume's conception of practical reasoning.

16 As we shall see in Section VI, this point may also be made by saying that the incontinent man does not act from his prohairesis: for something will be one's prohairesis only if it is a result of deliberation from one's boulēton. See: G.E.M. Anscombe, “Thought and Action in Aristotle,” in New Studies on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough, (Humanities Press, New York, 1965), pp. 143-158. Prohairesis (πρ?α?ρϵσις) is translated by Ross as ‘choice,’ though he states in a footnote to 1111 b5 that “sometimes ‘intention,’ ‘will,’ or ‘purpose’ would bring out the meaning better.” Aristotle defines prohairesis as ‘deliberate desire of things in our power’ (EN, 1112a16) and identifies it with ‘either desiderative reason (orektikos nous) or ratiocinative desire (orexis dianoētike)’ (EN 1139b4-5). I concur in Ross’ evaluation that ‘choice’ does not seem to be a completely adequate translation. But I also despair of finding one. Aristotle's usage is both philosophical and technical. It seems to me that the sense of prohairesis is best determined by its connection with other elements of Aristotle's theory (e.g., deliberation, boulēsis, the practical syllogism, etc.). One should not assume in advance that the expression must be translated by some simple English expression. Hence I generally follow the practice of transliterating.

17 Aristotle's remark that ‘many follow their imaginations against their knowledge’ (DA, 433a 12) is presumably a reference to his earlier claim that ‘because imaginations persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accordance with them, some because they lack reason, viz. beasts, and others because reason is sometimes obscured by passion, disease, or sleep, viz. men’ (DA, 429a5-7).

18 cf. DA, 403a8-10, 431a14-17, 432a8.

19 This claim is, of course, compatible with Aristotle's treatment of phantasia as a kind of noēsis. For, it is because thought and reasoning does not exist in nonhuman animals, but imagination does (DA, 433a13), that Aristotle posits phantasia as a kind of noēsis.

20 The significance of‘*’ shall be explained fully in due course. Briefly, what is indicated is that deliberation may occur after a prohairesis is reached, and this may result in yet another prohairesis. The solid arrows leading from thumos and epithumia to deliberation, but not to prohairesis, are intended to countenance Aristotle's claim that not all deliberations proceed from one's boulēton, and hence do not result in a prohairesis. One should remember, though, that only humans deliberate. Therefore the combination indicated by the solid arrows is possible only for humans.

21 Anscombe, op. cit., pp. 143-147.

22 I am most indebted to John Cooper for his encouragement and valuable criticisms of the penultimate draft of this paper, and to Stephen Darwall for his insightful and stimulating discussions about internalism, rational agency, and motivation. I also would like to thank Charles Young for his critical comments on the final version of my arguments.