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Spinoza's Theory of the Eternity of the Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Diane Steinberg
Diane Steinberg*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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Extract

In part I of this paper I argue that on his theory of the mind as the idea of an actually existing body Spinoza is unable to account for the ability of the mind to have adequate knowledge, and I suggest that his theory of the eternity of the mind can be viewed as his solution to this problem. In part II I deal with the question of the meaning of ‘eternity’ in Spinoza (i.e., whether eternity involves timelessness or not, and why), in regard both to God and the human mind, and I sketch a line of thought which I believe may have provided him with further motivation for his theory that a part of the mind is eternal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 35 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 The material in this paper is based on a portion of the author's doctoral dissertation, “Spinoza's Theory of the Mind,” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977. An earlier version of it was presented at a colloquium at the University of Toledo in November, 1977.

2 In this paper references to the Ethics are indicated by ‘E’ followed by a capital Roman numeral designating the appropriate part of that work. Following this, an Arabic numeral standing alone designates a proposition, ‘dem.’ stands for ‘demonstration,’ ‘dfn.’ for “definition,’ ‘ax.’ for ‘axiom,’ ‘cor.’ for ‘corollary,’ ‘lem.’ for ‘lemma,’ ‘post.’ for ‘postulate,’ and ‘sch.’ for ‘scholium.’ All references are to Benedict de Spinoza, Ethic, trans. W. Hale White, trans. rev. Amelia Hutchison Stirling, 4th ed., rev. (London: Oxford University Press, 1927). All Latin quotations are from the Ethica in Spinoza Opera, ed. Gebhardt, Carl 4 vols. (Heidelburg: Carl Winter, 1925), 2.Google Scholar

3 I have characterized the relation which Spinoza holds to obtain between a thing and the idea in God of the thing (the relation between modes of different attributes which is dealt with in E II, 7 and its scholium) as correspondence rather than identity (the term by which Spinoza designates that relation in E II, 7 and its corollary and scholium) because to me the claim that two things which must be conceived as really distinct are strictly identical is obscure. Nothing, however, which follows in this paper turns on this interpretation, and I intend my use of ‘correspondence’ here to be taken in such a way as not to preclude the possibility that corresponding modes of distinct attributes might somehow be understood as identical in the strict sense. That is, if a thing and the idea of that thing in God be strictly identical, then they still may be said to correspond, although not vice-versa.

4 Harris, Errol E. “Spinoza's Theory of Human Immortality,” Monist, 55 (1971), pp. 668-85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Joachim, Harold H. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (1901; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 308-9;Google Scholar Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (1880; rpt. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Reprint Library, n. d. ), pp. 293-96.

6 Donagan, Alan “Spinoza's Proof of Immortality,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays,” ed. Grene, Marjorie (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), p. 254.Google Scholar

7 Donagan, p. 255.

8 See letter 64 in The Correspondence of Spinoza, trans. and ed. Wolf, A. (1928; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966);Google Scholar and E II, lem. 7, sch. Subsequent references to Spinoza's correspondence will be to Wolf's edition.

9 A description used by Spinoza in On the Improvement of the Understanding in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. Elwes, R. H. M. 2 vols. (1883; rpt. New York: Dover Publications, 1955), II, 32.Google Scholar

10 Steinberg, pp. 82-85.

11 Letter 60.

12 David Bidney is an exception. See his Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 61 ff.

13 It should be noted that the account of ‘human’ action in Books Ill and IV of the Ethics is an account of mental action only.

14 Hampshire, Stuart “Spinoza's Theory of Human Freedom,” Monist, 55 (1971). p. 562;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Two Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). sec. 17.

15 See Letter 32.

16 Randall, John Herman The Career of Philosophy, vol. 1Google Scholar ';From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 445-46.

17 That the phrase ‘through the essence of God itself’ (‘per ipsam Dei essentiam’) is not an accident is indicated by its recurrence in E V, 23, dem.

18 The question of whether to construe the eternity of the mind (and other ideas of things ‘under the form of eternity’) as timeless or not is dealt with in the second part of this paper.

19 If, as I maintain in the second part of this paper, the eternity which Spinoza attributes to the human mind and, mutatis mutandis, to all ideas of the essences of things ‘under the form of eternity,’ is timeless, then it seems to me that the criticism is somewhat mitigated: for, in this case, E II, 7 (and 8) can be understood as applying only to the temporal realm, and hence, as exceptionless. And while E II, 7 is no longer able to fulfill its apparent function of explaining the unity of the attributes in God, it still plays a significant role in explaining the nature of the passive (temporal) part of the mind — the part which perishes with the body.

20 Donagan, pp. 241-46; Kneale, Martha “Eternity and Sempiternity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69 (1968-69), pp. 223-38CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reprinted in M. Grene's Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays).

21 Donagan, p. 246.

22 Kneale, p. 236.

23 Thoughts on Metaphysics in Earlier Philosophical Writings: The Cartesian Principles and Thoughts on Metaphysics, trans. Hayes, Frank A. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963),Google Scholar Pt. I, ch. 4. Subsequent references to the Thoughts will be to Hayes’ translation.

24 Kneale, p. 235.

25 Kneale, pp. 227-28.

26 Kneale, pp. 228-29. Kneale gives the following references for the papers of Austin and Searle to which she refers: (Austin) “A Plea for Excuses”, P.A.5., 57 (1956-57), pp. 1-30, repr. in Philosophical Papers; (Searle) British Analytical Philosophy, ed. B. Williams and A. Montefiore, pp. 41-54.

27 See Donagan, p. 242.

28 Kneale, p. 232.

29 See above, pp. 49-53. Spinoza's conception of scientia intuitiva is explored at greater length in the author's dissertation, pp. 177-93.

30 Rescher, Nicholas Topics in Philosophical Logic (New York: Humanities Press, and Dordrecht-Holland: D. Riedel, 1968), p. 198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 Rescher, p. 200.