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Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
The text of The Tractatus supports incompatible interpretations of a number of key philosophic positions. For example, the book is neither obviously nominalistic nor obviously realistic. Another difficulty is presented by the apparent . incompatibility of Wittgenstein's theses (1) that propositions are logical pictures of facts, and (2) that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. There are several places in The Tractatus where these two doctrines meet head on, but the central one is the set of passages 5.54-5.5422. This paper is an exegesis of these passages and a sketch of Wittgenstein's theory of judgement.
In Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422, Wittgenstein argues that statements of belief, judgement, thoughts and the like are not incompatible with the principle of finite extensionality. The passages contain a brief but obscure reductio on the possibility of non-extensional contexts, and several no less obscure corollaries. In this paper I shall explicate the content of the reductio, criticise a common but mistaken view of these passages, and draw out the consequences of some major doctrines in the Tractatus for Wittgenstein's Theory of Judgement.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1976
Footnotes
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I want to thank Prof. Wilfred Sellars for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
References
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 109Google Scholar. All further references to the Tractatus will be placed parenthetically by numbered proposition in the body of the paper.
2 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's ‘Tractatus’ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 299Google Scholar.
3 In this I am in agreement with Professor Rosenberg, J.F. in his excellent paper “Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus,” Nous II (Nov.1968), pp. 341–358CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is much that is correct in this paper although I think he is lead astray near the end, as I shall note near the end of this paper.
4 Op. cit., p. 299.
5 Pitcher, George The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 149Google Scholar.
6 Anscombe, G.E.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 88Google Scholar.
7 Op. cit., p. 299.
8 Op. cit., pp. 89–90.
9 Op. cit., pp. 149–150.
10 Professor Rosenberg, Op. Cit., develops an elaborate alphabetic device to distinguish what can be said from what must be shown. His point in the paper is that difference of speaker is shown. This is perfectly correct but it obscures the fact that all the propositions of the Traetatus belong to the same speaker (5.6 - 5.6331).
11 Ramsey, Frank P. “Review of ‘Tractatus’”, reprinted in Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus', ed. Copi and Beard (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 13Google Scholar.
12 Griffin, J. Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 113Google Scholar.
13 Bergmann, Gustav “The Glory and Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein” in his Logic and Reality, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 236Google Scholar.
14 Sellars, Wilfrid “Being and Being Known” reprinted in his Science, Perception and Reality, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). pp. 41–60Google Scholar.
15 Irving M. Copi, ‘Tractatus 5.5422’ reprinted in Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus (see above), pp. 163–164.
16 Op. cit., p. 113.
17 Jaakko Hintikka, “On Wittgenstein's Solipsism” in Essays on Wittgenstein's ‘Tractatus’ (see above), pp. 157–163.
18 Rosenberg, Op. cit., is, I think, mistaken in tying Wittgenstein's views on the intentional relation to his inadequate metalinguistic doctrines. The whole of the Tractatus suffers from the inability to say metalinguisticly what can only be shown object-linguisticly. But the picture theory and with it Wittgenstein's views on the intentionality of the mental survive being transplanted into a language capable of self-mention and offer, I think, powerful hints toward the development of a consistent materialist philosophy of mind.