Professor Macpherson is perhaps the most important living heir of John Stuart Mill and more especially of that in Mill which in the latter part of his life led him to become a socialist. Macpherson's polemics against liberalism's inheritance from possessive individualism make him the opponent of some of Mill's substantive positions and of even more of his formulations. But if we represent Macpherson as trying to rescue from Mill that which derives from his “concept of the power of a man as his ability to use and develop his uniquely human capacities” from that which derives from his “concept of a man's power as his ability to command the services of others” (Democratic Theory, henceforth DT, p. 79) we shall do him no injustice. If he disagrees with Mill and Berlin in his rejection of any purely negative concept of liberty, he agrees with them in rejecting what he calls the “Idealist or metaphysical rationalist” view of positive liberty with its “great, disciplined, authoritarian structures” (Berlin's phrase).

For more than two decades, C. B. Macpherson has waged a relentless campaign to expose and critize the ‘possessive individualist’ assumptions of classical and liberal democratictheory. This new book —a collection of essays, including several not previously published —gives a clear focus to this campaign and provides the fullest expression to date of its positive side: the elaboration of a social philosophy incorporating liberal values but free from possessive individualist assumptions. What is defective in the assumptions is less the internal theoretical problems they generate than that they have become historically outmoded. For Macpherson, liberal democracy is historically — even politically — inadequate, before it is theoretically inadequate. It is inadequate for us — now — because it rests on assumptions we no longer need, assumptions that have ceased to be historically progressive. However, liberal democracy is not, as surgeons would say, beyond operation. On Macpherson's view, nearly everything that is attractive in liberal theory can be salvaged. Democratic Theory is appropriately subtitled: Essays in Retrieval.

Donald Davidson did it. He did it slowly, deliberately, in more than a half dozen widely noted essays. What he did was to elaborate a program for the study of empirical semantics. Nor did he stop there. He went on to apply his program to some of the problems that have long bedeviled semantics: action sentences, indirect discourse and propositional attitudes.

My goal in this paper is to assess Davidson's achievement. The first step is to assemble the program from the sketches and hints scattered among Davidson's papers. This is the project of my first section where my aim is sympathetic exposition. Since Davidson sometimes seems to be playing a game of hide and seek with his reader, my reconstruction of his program and arguments is of necessity occasionally speculative. In the second section my stance turns critical. There are anomalies in the program; the sort of theory Davidson advocates is not the sort delivered. When the problems are pushed, I think the program loses whatever initial plausibility it may have had. It is my contention that Davidson has provided no serious framework for the empirical study of natural language.

Comme chacun sait, nous vivons à une époque où le changement est une donnée fondamentale de I’ action et aussi de Ia pensée. De ce point de vue, il est bizarre de penser que des hommes, disons des philosophes, aient non seulement posé l'immutabilité comme critère constitutif de Ia vérité mais en outre qu'ils aient défendu ce critère selon les règles de l'éloquence, avec un succès public notoire. En effet, dire d'un concept qu'il se définit au sein d'une rhétorique c'est dire, entre autres choses, qu'il présente, aux yeux du locuteur qui le propose avec succès, une valeur et une importance qui peuvent être montrées. Encore une fois, dans un monde où le changement est devenu banal, Ia défense efficace de l'immutabilité est non seulement un anachronisme: elle est bizarre.

The explanation of a child's discriminate responses to his environment turns on ascribing to the child a perceptual discrimination which counts certain things as more similar to one another than to some other thing. As Quine forcefully puts it:

Now for those determined to cleave to behaviourist canons, the problem is to use ‘perceptual similarity’ in explaining the subject's discriminating responses in a way which does not imply the existence of mental states and entities. What this really means is that the behaviourist must reconstruct the notion of ‘perceptual similarity', purifying it of its mentalistic dimension. So long as physicalism is a reasonable position, and while we are awaiting and abetting the neurophysiological millennium, the behaviourist's project is of significant moment. Now in Word and Object Quine does not seriously attempt to provide behavioural criteria for a subject's perceiving similarities, and he provisionally permits himself the mentalistic idiom he avows finally to eschew.

In the first section of this paper I will look briefly at one of the reasons why criteria do not provide a quick solution to the problem of other minds. I will then develop a more illuminating account (for epistemological purposes) of the relationship between the behavior and minds of others. In the final section I will attempt to supply what needs to be added to any account of this relationship to solve the epistemological problem.

By the “problem of other minds” I mean the skeptical questions as to how and whether we know that others are having certain thoughts, experiencing certain feelings or emotions, in one or another mental state, and so on. Suppose that:-

A baseball player has just been called out on strikes. The game is the most important one of the year for the team and the player's performance will have a direct bearing on the outcome of his contract negotiations for the following year.

The text of The Tractatus supports incompatible interpretations of a number of key philosophic positions. For example, the book is neither obviously nominalistic nor obviously realistic. Another difficulty is presented by the apparent . incompatibility of Wittgenstein's theses (1) that propositions are logical pictures of facts, and (2) that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. There are several places in The Tractatus where these two doctrines meet head on, but the central one is the set of passages 5.54-5.5422. This paper is an exegesis of these passages and a sketch of Wittgenstein's theory of judgement.

In Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422, Wittgenstein argues that statements of belief, judgement, thoughts and the like are not incompatible with the principle of finite extensionality. The passages contain a brief but obscure reductio on the possibility of non-extensional contexts, and several no less obscure corollaries. In this paper I shall explicate the content of the reductio, criticise a common but mistaken view of these passages, and draw out the consequences of some major doctrines in the Tractatus for Wittgenstein's Theory of Judgement.

it is easy to think that he did. Clifford certainly had one. In a celebrated essay he argued for the thesis that “it is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence“; and his title was “The Ethics of Belief.” Clifford was not alone, for Huxley, also, was of that same opinion. For him, such belief was not just wrong: it was “the lowest depth of immorality.” With that opinion, and with those advocates of it, James was locked in a struggle throughout his life; and it is a reasonable suspicion that the opponent of one ethics of belief is himself an ethicist with a rival ethics of belief of his own. That suspicion, moreover, appears to be confirmed by James's best known essay. He himself came to the view that his The Will to Believe would have been better named The Right to Believe, and it is a commonplace that “right” is a word of the ethical vocabulary. In short, there are obvious signs pointing to a positive answer to our question.

In a recent paper Robert J. Richman joins a host of doubters who question Gettier's claim that knowledge is not justified true belief. Richman's scepticism of Gettier's counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge stems from what he says are two basic defects in the examples. One defect is that Gettier employs the Principle of Deducibility for Justification (PDJ) which Richman argues is false. The second defect is based on “the obvious consideration that a belief which is justified on the basis of one set of facts or assumptions need not be justified on the basis of a different set.” I shall consider each of these alleged defects and argue that Richman has not shown that in fact they are defects and that Gettier's counterexamples (or a modified version of them) do in fact show that knowledge is not justified true belief.

The Principle of Deducibility for Justification states that for any proposition P, if P entails Q and S correctly deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then Sis justified in believing Q.