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An Objection to the Revision of The Logical Connection Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jig-Chen Lee
Jig-Chen Lee*
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Arlington
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Extract

In a paper entitled ‘Reviving the Logical Connection Argument,’ James Otten attempts to revive the Logical Connection Argument (LCA), which is intended to refute the causal thesis. Otten distinguishes two versions of the causal thesis. The general causal thesis:

(G) W1 … Wn are certain of S's wants, and W1 … Wn cause A,

and the restricted causal thesis:

(R): W is S's want to perform A, and W causes A.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 1981 , pp. 725 - 733
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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References

1 James Otten, ‘Reviving the Logical Connection Argument,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1977) 725-43.

2 Ibid., 726.

3 lbid.,731.

4 Ibid., 738-9: my italics.

5 Ibid., 731.

6 Ibid., 731-2.

7 Ibid., 740.

8 Ibid., 739.

9 Ibid., 740.

10 Ibid., 732.

11 Ibid., 732.

12 Although I believe that there is no known genuine a posteriori causal law linking the desire to do A with the action A. I do not believe that it is logically impossible to have a genuine a posteriori causal law linking them. In my opinion, the following is a legitimate necessary condition of causation which should not be confused with condition (iM): In order for A to cause B it must be logically possible for A and B to be linked by a genuine causal law which may or may not be discoverable by us. Otten is not arguing that the desire to do A and the action A cannot meet this requirement. If he were, he would have to attack Donald Davidson's version of the weak Identity-thesis. For Davidson has argued that if the weak Identity-thesis is correct then the desire to do A and the action A could meet the above requirement. See Davidson: ‘Mental Events,’ in Lawrence Foster and Swanson, J.W. eds., Experience and Theory, (Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press 1970).Google Scholar

13 In a paper entitled ‘Must a Cause Be Contingently Related to Its Effects?’ (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1979), I have in effect argued against an- other attempt to revive the LCA. If there is de re necessity then it is tempting to modify Abelson's premise 1 to mean that there is a de re necessity between the desire to do A and the action A. Premise 2 would be modified to mean that there is no de re necessity between a cause and its effect. In the above paper I have in effect argued that premise 2 would still be false under this new interpretation.

14 Davidson, Donald ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes,’ reprinted in Care, N.S. and Landesman, C. eds., Readings in the Theory of Action (Bloomington and London: Indiana U.P. 1968) 191.Google Scholar

15 Otten, 729.

16 Cf. Melden, A.L. Free Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1961) 53.Google Scholar

17 Gean, William D. ‘The Logical Connection Argument and De Re Necessity,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975) 349-54.Google Scholar

18 Otten, 741 n.

19 I want to thank Prof. Francis W. Dauer for his comments on this paper.