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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Can one mistrust one's own belief? Wittgenstein says ‘No.’ He remarks: ‘One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief.’
It is natural to think that this is not meant merely as a remark about our psychological abilities or inabilities; viz., that one can not, as a matter of psychological fact, help but trust one's own belief. Rather, one is inclined to take it as a ‘grammatical remark’ to the effect that it makes no sense to speak of trusting or mistrusting one's own belief.
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1963), p. 190.Google Scholar
2 Mayo, Bernard ‘Belief and Constraint,’ in Phillips-Griffiths, A. ed., Knowledge and Belief (Oxford U. P. 1967) 160.Google Scholar
3 Malcolm, Norman Thought and Knowledge, (Ithaca: Cornell U.P. 132).Google Scholar
4 Wittgenstein, p. 221.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 154.
7 Ibid., p. 192.
8 Ibid., p. 188.
9 Ibid., p. 190.
10 Ibid.,
11 Ibid., p. 188.
12 Ibid.,p.190.
13 In rewriting this paper I have learned from the comments of Norman Malcolm, John Hunter, John King-Farlow, Steven Patten, Trudy Govier, Steven Burns and Roger Shiner.