Speaking of Professor Geach's belief that pronouns in natural language function like the bound variables in quantification theory, Gareth Evans, in ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses - I’ (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 [1977] 467-536) says (470):

I want to try to show that there are pronouns with quantifier antecedents that function in a quite different way. Such pronouns typically stand in a different grammatical relation to their antecedents, and; in contrast with bound pronouns, must be assigned a reference, so that their most immediate sentential contexts can always be assigned a truth value. The relevant grammatical relation appears to be Klima's relation of ‘in construction with’. When the pronoun is in construction with its antecedent, as in (4) [‘Some man loves his mother’] and (5) [‘No man is happy when he is in love’] the result is a bound pronoun.

To paraphrase Freud, what do socialists really want? It is undoubtedly difficult to give a complete answer to this question that all socialists would be satisfied with, but there are some common elements that can hardly be denied. First and foremost among these is the elimination of capitalism; the elimination of capitalism would seem to require the elimination of capitalists (qua capitalists). Why might that be desirable? Well, many reasons might be offered, but one is suggested by the very nature of capitalism.

Robert Nozick has suggested that risky actions are a problem for a moral view based on rights. We ordinarily think that some actions are too dangerous to be permissible, taking into account both the harm risked and the degree of the risk. Other actions, although they run some risk of serious harm, are thought permissible. The problem is to draw this distinction in a principled way by looking to rights.

I think that Nozick's argument about risk can be answered but a different argument has convinced me that the rights view cannot handle risk in a satisfactory way. The inability is a function of the basic nature of the view.

This paper explores what could be wrong with the fact of human extinction. I first present four reasons why we might consider human extinction to be wrong: (1) it would prevent millions of people from being born; (2) it would mean the loss of rational life and civilization; (3) it would cause existing people to suffer pain or death; (4) it would involve various psychological traumas. I argue that looking at the question from a contractualist perspective, only reasons (3) and (4) are admissible. I then consider what implications this limitation on reasons has for the wrongfulness of various forms of human extinction.

Spinoza developed a highly interesting metaphysical theory of nature and individuality. In this paper, I endeavor to bring forward some ideas on how Spinozistic views on extended substance, physical world, and individuality can be approached using the concept of power as the basis of interpretation. Jonathan Bennett's ‘field metaphysical’ interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of one extended substance has generated much discussion, and forms the other starting point of my paper. I believe that the field metaphysical interpretation enables one to deal with the central questions concerning physical individuation — individuality and the persistence of individual being — in a rather novel way. My main question is this: what follows if physical individuals are seen as parts of a unified field of extended power?

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking.

James's Fairness in Trade seeks to offer an account of fair trade that is “internal” to an existing practice he describes as “mutual market reliance.” This paper distinguishes several senses of the distinction between “internal” and “external” that occur in the book and asks how, in its various senses, the distinction shapes and influences judgments about the fairness of the practice.

The use of intention in ethics has been the subject of intense debate for many years, but no consensus has emerged over whether intention is morally relevant, or even how it should be understood. In this paper I wish to make a thorough, though by no means exhaustive, examination of the concept and the concepts around it, some to be seen as near-synonyms, and some as contrasting ideas. My interest is in the ethical use of the concept, though my own analysis of it will be indebted to discussions in the philosophy of action. The most famous ethical use, which will not, however, be my direct focus here, is the ‘principle of double effect,’ which states that an agent may cause or allow something bad as long as, first, no evil is intended as an end or a means; and, second, that the foreseen bad is not out of proportion with the anticipated good. It is important to note the principle's testimony to the plausibility of prohibitions expressed in terms of intentions (indicated by the first condition), and, alongside these, a general prohibition on doing inordinate harms even without intention (indicated by the second condition).

Natural selection explains why humans have eyes: eyes are useful for getting around in an illuminated world; without them we would get around a lot less effectively, at much greater risk, and with a great deal less appreciation of potential mates. One might think, therefore, that natural selection explains why you or I—humans as we are—have eyes. But the inference has been contested by a number of able philosophers, starting with Elliott Sober and going to Joel Pust. The disputants divide as follows. Sober, Denis Walsh, and Pust hold that though natural selection explains why humans as a species have eyes, it doesn't explain why particular humans have them.

The correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld was judged by Leibniz himself to be very useful for understanding his philosophy. Historians have concurred in this judgment. Leibniz did not find any philosophy of independent interest in the letters Arnauld sent him. Historians have, for the most part, also concurred in this finding. I shall argue that on one set of issues at least — modal metaphysics and free will — Arnauld accomplished more than facilitating Leibnizian elucidations. He held his own in this dispute. Indeed, were it not for the general sophistication and superior handling of such issues as identity, unity, and the nature of body enjoyed by the Leibnizian system, the Cartesian position on modal metaphysics and free will espoused by Arnauld might have won the day in the eyes of later philosophers. A proper appreciation of the Cartesian framework should also make it of considerable interest to philosophers presently at work on the metaphysics of modality. I shall argue that Descartes and some Cartesians like Arnauld espoused a strongly actualist doctrine. This means they thought that all philosophically interesting uses of possibles were analyzable into facts about actually existing things.

If consciousness is good for something, conscious things must differ in some causally relevant way from unconscious things. If they do not, then, as Davies and Humphreys conclude, too bad for consciousness: ‘psychological theory need not be concerned with this topic.’

Davies and Humphreys are applying a respectable metaphysical idea — the idea, namely, that if an object's having a property does not make a difference to what that object does, if the object's causal powers are in no way enhanced (or diminished) by its possession of this property, then nothing the object does can be explained by its having that property. A science dedicated to explaining the behavior of such objects would not have to concern itself with that property. That is why being an uncle is of no concern to the psychology (let alone the physics) of uncles. I am an uncle, yes, but my being so does not (causally speaking ) enable (or prevent) me to do anything I would not otherwise be able to do.

We all suppose that it is sometimes reasonable to project common properties, to argue from the premise that each member of a sample possesses a certain property to the conclusion that members of a population from which the sample is drawn also have that property. Even the most ardent anti-inductivist in the philosophy classroom can be found arguing in just this way when he buys a bottle of wine, takes an aspirin or is deciding whether to wear a raincoat.

This fact constitutes a major challenge, for (as everyone knows) instantial confirmation, simple induction, the straight rule - call it what you will - faces serious philosophical difficulties. This paper is concerned with two of these difficulties, namely, the one which arises from the fact that any finite sample exemplifies indefinitely many common properties and the one which arises from terms like ‘grue’ and ‘emerose’.

I Introduction

A fundamental intuition about knowledge is that it is more valuable than mere true belief. This intuition is pervasive. We have an almost universal desire to know and nearly no desire to believe the truth accidentally. However, it turns out to be extremely difficult to explain why knowledge is more valuable. Linda Zagzebski and others have called this the ‘value problem.’ They argue that the value problem is particularly difficult to unravel for generic reliabilism. According to generic reliabilism, knowledge is true belief produced by reliable belief-forming processes or faculties. But, the critics argue, ‘the reliability of the source of a belief cannot explain the [value difference] between knowledge and true belief.’ For reliably formed beliefs allegedly are valuable only insofar as they tend to be true.

Descartes challenged himself to know that he was not dreaming, with the supposed price to be paid if he lacked that knowledge being his failure to have any knowledge at all of the contingent existence and features of an external world. And subsequent epistemologist after subsequent epistemologist has kept that Cartesian skeptical challenge alive. Recent non-skeptical responses to it — most notably, Robert Nozick's — have focussed on whether one's not knowing that one is not dreaming really does entail one's lacking all external world knowledge. Seemingly, Nozick is unworried by the prospect of one's never knowing that one is not dreaming. He does argue that no one ever has that knowledge, but he reassures us that this does not entail that people do not have a steady and satisfying supply of the more ‘Standard’ sorts of external world knowledge. As I will argue in this paper, though, I see no good reason to concede in the first place that one cannot know that one is not dreaming.

My focus in this essay is on those singular causal explanations which purport to explain the occurrence of some particular event by means of a claim of the following general sort

Examples include sentences like (Ex. 1) The short circuit caused the fire’ and (Ex. 2) The impact of the hammer caused the shattering of the glass,’ Many philosophers hold that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between singular causal explanations and those sentences (call them singular causal sentences) which simply report causal connections. While singular causal sentences are said to typically relate events, and to be extensional, singular causal explanations are held to relate items which are sentential or fact-like in structure and to be non-extensional.1 Singular causal explanations are held on this view to always be explanations of why events or other objects belong to certain kinds or possess certain properties.

1 Introduction

Numerous solutions have been proposed to the semantic paradoxes. Two that are frequently singled out and compared are the following. The first is that according to which paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gaps. The second is that according to which paradoxical sentences are both true and false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gluts (dialetheias). Calling the first of these a solution is, in fact, somewhat misleading: it is rather like calling an opening gambit a game of chess. For the solution runs into severe problems almost immediately, and so can be only the first of a series of (often ad hoc) moves made to defend the original weak opening. Nonetheless, the symmetry involved in the gap and glut solutions is obvious enough to make the comparison a natural one.

While it isn't clear that we are right to value integrity — or so I shall argue — most of us do. Persons of integrity merit respect. Compromising one's integrity — or failing completely to exhibit it — seems a serious flaw. Two influential accounts suggest why. For Bernard Williams, integrity is ‘a person's sticking by what [she] regards as ethically necessary or worthwhile.’ To this Cheshire Calhoun adds a helpful negative gloss: