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Democracy, External Debt and Growth in Nigeria: An Impact Analysis under a Narrow Definition of Debt-Led Growth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2006

Godson Dinneya
Affiliation:
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Abstract

Abstract. The imposition of political conditionality for debt relief and further assistance to debtor nations presupposes that the political leadership under which borrowing and spending decisions were made could have contributed to the poor performance of external capital in debtor countries. Yet no attention seems to have been given to an empirical evaluation of the link between the level of democratization and growth of debtor economies caused by foreign capital. This paper employs two models—debt-cum-growth and democracy-debt-led growth—to investigate the contribution of external debt to the growth of the Nigerian economy, and to evaluate whether the direction of this contribution could be explained by, for instance, the process of power change among political stakeholders, the quality of governance, the political environment, and democratic dividends in the democratization process in a typical debtor nation. Although the results in the first model are mixed, Wantchekon's links between natural resource endowment and regime type on the one hand, and external capital and the nature of the host country's industry on the other, are established for Nigeria, with the implication that the gains of political conditionality for debt relief should not be expected from debt-led growth of the Nigerian economy.

Résumé. Lorsqu'on impose des conditions politiques à l'allégement de la dette et à d'autres mesures d'aide aux nations débitrices, on présuppose que les gouvernements responsables des emprunts et de leur utilisation peuvent avoir contribué à la piètre performance du capital externe dans les pays concernés. Cependant, il semble qu'on ne se soit pas préoccupé d'évaluer empiriquement le lien entre le niveau de démocratisation et la croissance économique des nations débitrices due au capital étranger. Cet article utilise deux modèles—d'abord endettement avec croissance, puis démocratie et croissance économique par endettement externe—pour étudier la contribution de la dette externe à la croissance de l'économie nigérianne et pour évaluer si la direction de cette contribution peut s'expliquer, par exemple, par le processus de changement de pouvoir entre intervenants politiques, par la qualité de la gouvernance, l'environnement politique et les dividendes démocratiques dans le processus de démocratisation d'une nation débitrice typique—le Nigéria. Bien que les résultats du premier modèle soient mitigés, les liens que fait Wantchekon entre les richesses en ressources naturelles et le genre de régime politique d'une part et le capital étranger et la nature de l'industrie du pays d'autre part sont établis pour le Nigéria, ce qui implique qu'il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que l'imposition de conditions politiques à l'allégement de la dette produise des gains politiques dans une économie nigérianne dont la croissance est alimentée par la dette extérieure.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2006 Cambridge University Press

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