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Party Structure and Backbench Dissent in the Canadian and British Parliaments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2005

Christopher Garner  and
Natalia Letki
Christopher Garner
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Natalia Letki
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Abstract

Abstract. In this paper we analyze intra-party determinants of dissenting behaviour using samples of British and Canadian government backbenchers. Controlling for the range of factors traditionally considered to be important predictors of dissenting behaviour, we find that the major factor determining cross-voting, next to MPs' tenure, is perceptions of isolation from party communication and influence channels. This effect is particularly visible among Labour MPs with long tenure, as their ideological position is more extreme than that of party leaders, which reinforces the effect of isolation. The results suggest that the difference of dissent levels between the Canadian and British Houses of Commons can be explained by the frontbenchers' approach to managing the major resource of the party, i.e., the backbenchers.

Résumé. Cet article traite des déterminants intra-partis du comportement de dissidence en examinant des groupes de députés d'arrière-ban des gouvernements britannique et canadien. En contrôlant pour la gamme de facteurs qui sont traditionnellement considérés comme étant les prédicteurs importants du comportement de dissidence, nous trouvons qu'à part la durée de service du député, la perception d'isolement des voies de communication et d'influence du parti constitue le principal facteur incitant le député à voter pour un autre parti. Cet effet est particulièrement visible parmi les députés du Parti travailliste ayant de longs états de service, car leur position idéologique est plus extrême que celle des chefs du parti, ce qui renforce l'effet d'isolement. Les résultats suggèrent que les différences de niveaux de dissidence entre les Chambres des communes canadienne et britannique s'expliquent par la façon dont les députés de premier plan gèrent la ressource principale du parti, c'est-à-dire les députés d'arrière-ban.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , June 2005 , pp. 463 - 482
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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