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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Towards the abandonment of the fetishism of depoliticization
The problem of the politics of administration is generally badly stated. The notion of politicization is opposed to that of depoliticization, without offering a precise definition of the two terms. There is a double origin to this false problem. First, the depoliticization of the administration appears to be dictated by the progress of rationality. Secondly, political circles show a will or an assent to shield public administrators from political debate. One is thus led to conceive of the politicization of administration in a narrow and negative way, a fact which falsifies the discussion of the problem. On the other hand, if one sees politicization as a phenomenon of interpenetration and influence, in both senses, between the administrative and the political sectors of the system, one widens the full significance of the problem and is led to treat it in a positive manner. The three criteria espoused by Caiden and Raphaeli are employed in this analysis, even if they call for serious reservations. The case studies are those of Great Britain, France, and Israel. In the course of the three studies, an inventory is established of both the negative and positive effects of politicization of the administration. The phenomenon appears finally as irreducible. That is why one has to abandon the fetishism of depoliticization in order to become aware or to become conscious again of the intrinsic politicization of the administration, the effects of which are not only baleful.
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