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The State Wealth-Legislative Compensation Effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2008

Peverill Squire
Affiliation:
University of Missouri

Abstract

Abstract. Legislative scholars have paid almost no attention to explanations for the level of compensation provided to legislators, either within a country or cross-nationally, despite its importance to members and institutions. I posit a simple theory based on state wealth to explain differences in legislative pay. I test this theory using two novel data sets, one on 35 national assemblies, the other on subnational assemblies in Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States. Analysis of these data reveals that national or state wealth is strongly associated with legislator compensation. This finding is consistent with an intriguing analog in the labour economics literature.

Résumé. Les érudits du monde législatif ne se sont guère penchés sur les raisons des divers niveaux de rémunération des législateurs, à l'échelle nationale ou transnationale, malgré l'importance du sujet pour les institutions et les membres des législatures. Pour expliquer cette disparité, j'avance une simple théorie fondée sur la richesse des États. J'évalue ensuite cette théorie en m'appuyant sur deux nouvelles bases de données, la première portant sur 35 assemblées nationales et l'autre sur des assemblées sous-nationales en Australie, au Canada, en Allemagne et aux États-Unis. Ces analyses statistiques démontrent qu'il existe effectivement un lien étroit entre la richesse de l'État et la rémunération des législateurs. Cette constatation est confirmée par une analogie fascinante dans la littérature sur l'économique du travail.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2008 Canadian Political Science Association

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