All administrative structures are affected by their cultural, social, economic, and political environments. The daily interactions between the two sectors comprise the substance of the administrative activity. In 1973 Zaïre's local administration was subjected to a reform which centralized and standardized its structures. This article examines the reform of the administration from the perspective of social underdevelopment. The local administrative cadres appeared to emerge from the reform with more power and prestige in social planning. However, the actual outcome of the reform in terms of development was doubtful since the authorities who acquired politico-administrative functions were engaged in their own lucrative activities and the public had little control over their administrative actions. Thus the administrative structure became an instrument which the dominant class—the bourgeois politico-administration—could use to strengthen its power over the economy. It could scarcely be otherwise in a situation in which underdevelopment creates and sustains a continual crisis. The consequences are inequalityx in the distribution of public goods and inequity in public decisions. All of these factors produce real stagnation in the society, in spite of the apparently revolutionary upsets which have occurred from time to time. They permit external domination to strengthen its hand and allow internal domination to carve out a suitable empire. To change the situation and free up local administration would require a genuine revolution in the devolution of power to the whole public.

In an interesting and insightful article published in 1969, James Lightbody has attempted an improvement of the theoretical basis for the study of nationalism among political scientists. He suggests that the historical perspective which has characterized most previous treatments of the subject should be abandoned, and that its replacement should be a model which perceives nationalism as the result of ethnic group demands upon a functioning political system. Lightbody argues that the adoption of this sort of model would permit political scientists to determine the characteristics which distinguish “nationalist” movements from similarly configured “non-nationalist” groups. Further-more one could look beyond the “collective enumeration of the various demands that have been made by various nation-seeking groups and their self-appointed spokesmen” which serve as the focus of concern for those who see nationalism as ideology. One could examine ethnic group demands without rejecting them a priori as unnaturally disruptive, and one could make comparisons between majority and minority expressions of nationalist views. The model is an “ideal-type” model, bordering on formalism, since it abstracts the demands of ethnic groups from other similar group demands made on the political system, but it has been constructed with a view to the selection of data which could provide empirical tests of its usefulness.

Introduction

At present, little is known about the role socialization of Canadian legislators, that is, the processes by which incumbents of legislative positions acquire “a set of values, skills, loyalties and cognitive maps.” Defined in this way, legislative role socialization involves not only the acquisition of role orientations in the narrow sense of “a pattern of norms making up a particular role,” but also the development of the total set of cognitions and evaluations which, in their entirety, constitute a legislator's image of his job. To the extent that existing research is relevant for understanding the development of these job images, the normal procedure has been simply to examine relationships between narrowly defined role orientation variables (for example, representational role style or focus) and a set of socio-demographic and political characteristics the potential theoretical significance of which is often left unarticulated. Not surprisingly, these inquiries have shed little light on the role socialization of Canadian legislators.