The Structural Analysis of law

Rules of law can be considered as “planned” orders which prescribe relations of control between social actors. From a network perspective, control is defined as constraints on the variety of social communication. It bears upon the transmission of norms, of status, of human and material resources, of informational resources, and of controls themselves. Each of these dimensions allows for a structural analysis where different types of structures can be identified from the more centralized ones to the less centralized ones. These different types are named: coarchy, stratarchy, hierarchy, and anarchy.

The electoral representation rule which was adopted by the Quebec National Assembly in 1979 is analyzed to illustrate such a method of analysis. It appears, as a result, that the structures of the more important control relations (those bearing on the transmission of norms and status) generally speaking are more centralized than the structures of less important ones (those bearing on the transmission of resources).

Such a structural analysis can be applied to other “planned” orders: for example, regulations and decrees, constitutions and statutes of organizations. It also can be applied to “live-in” orders, that is to say to operative control relations, which are subject in various degrees to the “planned” orders.

Power and Conflicts in Organizations: Strengths and Limits of the Model of Michel Crozier

Because of the manner in which they look at inter-organizational conflict and power, none of the main streams of organizational theory has been able to incorporate the three elements which compose the political dimension in an organization: strategic interaction, the integration of behaviour in the collective “system,” and the consideration given to cultural effects.

Michel Crozier claims to have solved the problem by having recourse to a systematic and hypothetical-inductive reasoning, and in making power the base for all forms of relationships where one always finds implied some negotiated influence. The different theoretical positions taken regarding the strategicanalysisthat he proposes are examined in this article. The author stresses the advantages of the procedure; suggests an improvement to understand interaction; questions the assumption of the necessity of the systematic integration; and comments on the methodological difficulties of introducing the cultural element in strategic action.

The work of C. B. Macpherson is extremely significant for those seeking to understand the cul-de-sac which liberal political theory and institutions have entered. Considering the experience of socialist societies in this century, the necessity for a nonmarket political theory to retain a positive connection to Western liberal values should be beyond dispute. Any postmarket society requires, not pious reassurances, but institutional support for individual rights that are the most vehemently defended in the liberal tradition. But of course this is not enough. Contemporary society is already undermining liberal individualism through massive organizations and manipulated consumption. The inability of liberal theory to analyze effectively and propose alternatives to the contemporary decline of the individual suggests that the cul-de-sac is rooted in the conceptual foundations of liberalism itself. Macpherson's rigorous analysis of the market assumptions of liberal theory pinpoints this conceptual inadequacy and attempts to maintain a commitment to liberal values in a postmarket society.