All administrative structures are affected by their cultural, social, economic, and political environments. The daily interactions between the two sectors comprise the substance of the administrative activity. In 1973 Zaïre's local administration was subjected to a reform which centralized and standardized its structures. This article examines the reform of the administration from the perspective of social underdevelopment. The local administrative cadres appeared to emerge from the reform with more power and prestige in social planning. However, the actual outcome of the reform in terms of development was doubtful since the authorities who acquired politico-administrative functions were engaged in their own lucrative activities and the public had little control over their administrative actions. Thus the administrative structure became an instrument which the dominant class—the bourgeois politico-administration—could use to strengthen its power over the economy. It could scarcely be otherwise in a situation in which underdevelopment creates and sustains a continual crisis. The consequences are inequalityx in the distribution of public goods and inequity in public decisions. All of these factors produce real stagnation in the society, in spite of the apparently revolutionary upsets which have occurred from time to time. They permit external domination to strengthen its hand and allow internal domination to carve out a suitable empire. To change the situation and free up local administration would require a genuine revolution in the devolution of power to the whole public.

In this work we offer results drawn from a dataset of a post-provincial election survey in eight Canadian provinces to assess the impact of party system congruency on partisanship. We postulate that partisanship will be more likely and stronger in provinces that share a similar political party system to the federal level. We extend this preliminary analysis to test the underlying mechanism by examining the impact holding partisan ties at the provincial level has on the likelihood and strength of federal identification, according to party system similarity. Our results show very limited support for the party system congruency factor, raising further questions of its applicability in the Canadian context.

Abstract. In normative political theory, the position called dualism maintains that the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principle. The most influential proponent of dualism is John Rawls, and his theory of “justice as fairness” has recently been criticized by the monists Liam Murphy and G.A. Cohen. In this paper I argue that if Rawlsians are going to salvage his dualistic framework from the challenge raised by Murphy and Cohen, they will have to reject Rawls's “political conception” of justice in favour of the partially comprehensive view defended in A Theory of Justice. I contend that dualism is only a viable approach to normative political theory if both aspects of the dualistic framework are emphasized.

Résumé. Dans la théorie politique normative la position du “ dualisme ” maintient que, sur le plan pratique, les deux problèmes primordiaux de la conception institutionnelle et de la conduite personnelle, nécessitent, au niveau fondamental, deux types différents de principe pratique. L'adepte le plus influent du dualisme est John Rawls dont la théorie de “ la justice comme équité ” a été critiquée récemment par les monistes Liam Murphy et G.A. Cohen. Dans cet article, je maintiens que si les partisans de Rawls comptent sauver son schéma dualiste du défi lancé par Murphy et Cohen, il va falloir qu'ils rejettent la conception politique de la justice de Rawls en faveur de la position partiellement compréhensive défendue dans “ Une théorie de la justice ”. De plus, je maintiens que le dualisme est une approche viable en théorie politique normative uniquement si les deux aspects du schéma dualiste sont mis en valeur.

Traditionally, Canadian commentary on the Judicial Committee has focused on the effect or impact of the imperial tribunal's decisions on the nature of Canadian federalism. Numerous studies have examined the issue of whether or not the Judicial Committee strengthened the powers of provincial governments at the expense of the federal government by misinterpreting the Constitution Act, 1867 and by ignoring the intentions of the fathers of Confederation who sought to create a strong centralized government. The Canadian preoccupation with the merits of this debate has led one distinguished political scientist, David E. Smith, to suggest that “perhaps too much” has been written about the Judicial Committee. The literature examining the relationship between the Judicial Committee and Canada has not, however, addressed the significance of the imperial context in which the tribunal's decisions were written. The Judicial Committee was not only the final appellate body for Canada but was also responsible for hearing disputes from other parts of the Empire. Decisions written for one Dominion or colony could have profound legal and political effects on another.

In the original publication of ‘Riding the Orange Wave: Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Canadian Election’ (published online January 10, 2014), an error appeared. The caption for Figure 1 appears incorrectly; it should read, “Campaign Dynamics of Vote Intensions.” The publisher regrets this error.

This article shows that the timing and nature of policies hostile to foreign direct investment stem both from the transaction costs of negotiating with different host country agencies, and from changes to domestic and international coalitions. Divided agency jurisdiction is modeled as a partial property right to the use of a resource. Host industries lacking political cohesion allow foreign firms economic opportunities and a stronger political voice. Qualitative and quantitative evidence from five fisheries in the United States and Canada confirm that the costs of negotiating with a fractured government and the opportunity to form transnational coalitions lead host countries to adopt policies that will facilitate forced divestment. These policies vary in respect to their timing and format.

This article questions the relevance of the use of participatory democracy, in order to build a new theoretical frame for the understanding of the government of French cities. The nature of local actors, the way they are organized and deal with common issues, will be assumed to challenge the spreading of participatory democracy. The analysis will consider the problem of the adoption of the word “governance” from corporate and development patterns to urban ones, the structural shackles due to French municipal organization, and some special weaknesses in the way associations try to get involved in urban government.