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The Composition of Thucydides' History
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
The problem of the composition of Thucydides' History, first raised by Ullrich in 1846, has evoked a mass of controversial literature. In this article I shall confine myself to the main arguments and conclusions.
Thucydides' history is unfinished, not only because it breaks off at 411 b.c., but also because the style is uneven. The history of the Archidamian War to 424 b.c. and of the Sicilian War is fully polished and complete; the remainder is lacking in stylistic finish and particularly in the set speeches which characterize the completed books. This unevenness can be explained by the circumstances of Thucydides' life. For the period 431–424 b.c. he could obtain full information at Athens and, after his exile in 424 b.c., at Sparta and elsewhere; for the Sicilian War he could obtain full information in Sicily from the Siceliotes and from the Athenian prisoners. He was thus in a position to complete his history for these two periods. During his exile from 424 b.c. to 404 or 403 b.c. he lacked the information from the Athenian side, which was necessary for the completion of the remainder of his work. Further light is shed on the unevenness of finish by Thucydides' method of composition. He informs us (i. I) that he began his work at the beginning of the war, and (v. 26. 5) that he was watching and applying his judgement throughout the Twenty-seven Years War; and the statement (v. 26. I) that he wrote the history down to the capture of the Peiraeus implies his collection of material down to 404 b.c. The working up of this material must have been conditioned partly by the circumstances of the war; in particular, the conception of the Twenty-seven Years War (v. 26) cannot have been formed until after 415 or 412 b.c.
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- Copyright © The Classical Association 1940
References
1 Summarized by Grundy, G. B., Thucydides and the history of his age (1911), pp. 387 f.Google Scholar
2 It is generally agreed that Thucydides visited Sicily shortly after 413 b.c.
3 The present participles in v. 25. 6 stress his continuous attention.
1 Schwartz, E., Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (1919)Google Scholar; it is interesting that Schwartz formed this view in 1917.
2 Op. cit., p. 407.
1 The sequel suggests that the Athenians were misguided; recent events have shown that the hint of power may not avert a hasty decision.
1 It seems to me more probable that so meticulous a writer would have published only the finished part of his work, that is covering the period prior to his exile in 424 b.c. But this is immaterial in considering Book I.
2 There are also some remarks in the speeches which have been thought to be inserted after 404 b.c. Like the Attic Tragedians, Thucydides puts into the mouth of his speakers ideas which are more significant to those who know the sequel; but it is equally a part of his art that those ideas should be appropriate to the occasion of the speech. Therefore it is almost impossible to decide whether such remarks were added after 404 b.c. or not.
1 I am indebted to Mr. G. T. Griffith, who suggested this hypothesis.
1 The undertaking was given by τὰ τέλη τ
ν Λακεδαιμονίων (58. I), which implies that the Spartan Apella had not been consulted. In the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas this undertaking, although it imposed an obligation on Sparta's ‘honour’, is not mentioned; the reason for the silence may lie in the unwillingness of the executive to emphasize its own highhanded action or in Thucydides' conception of what was fitting to a situation in which he represents the Spartan majority as already determined on going to war. The undertaking to Potidaea was known to the Corinthian envoys (71.4). In my text the remark of the Corcyraeans at a still earlier date that Sparta was eager for war (33.3) has not been used because Thucydides does not state it as a fact.
2 Thucydides does not underestimate the influence of Corinth with Sparta; but he shows that Corinth's desire for war was a parallel development with Sparta's determination on war (e.g. 33. 3). The difference between them was that Corinth wanted immediate war, because as a sea-power she suffered in the incidents of Epidamnus and Potidaea, whereas Sparta as a land-power did not suffer by a delay which was calculated to convince all her allies of the need for war (71. 4 μέχρι μὲν οὔν το
δε ὥρίσθω ὕμν
ἡ βραδντής; and Archidamus advising delay 85. I ἔξεστι δὲ ἡμ
ν μ
λλον ἔτέρων διὰ ἰαχύν Had Sparta been unwilling to go to war, the threat of Corinth to seek another alliance (71. 4) would have had no effect; after 421 b.c. Corinth was able to organize a secession from the Peloponnesian League, but Thucydides represents the League as solid behind Sparta in 431 b.c.; nor would Argos have welcomed the alliance of Corinth, which would have added the enmity of Athens to that of Sparta.
1 i. 8 in contrast to the period of piracy; 13 to Ameinocles; 18 to Sparta's early constitution; 23 to the Persian Wars; 24 to the earlier period at Epidamnus; 97 to the Persian Wars; 118 to the Persian Wars and the period of Athenian hegemony; ii. 16 to early Attica; 21 to Pleistoanax's invasion; 34 to earlier custom; vi. 17 to generalizations and the Persian Wars. vii. 44. i and 56 fin. contain an implicit contrast probably between the Sicilian War and the Twenty-seven Years War.