In the standard English-language reference work, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York and London, 1967), we find the following blunt statement on the subject of “orthodox Marxism's” theory of knowledge:

Its epistemology is naive representationism.

The use of the word “naive” will alert the reader to the unsurprising fact that the reference here is a definitely unfriendly one. More interesting is the way in which this characterization, based on an interpretation of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, has become generally accepted in English-speaking philosophical circles over the past forty years. The purpose of the present article is to explain the representationalist interpretation, challenge it in favour of an alternative reading of Lenin's text, and make some substantive comments on issues arising from the philosophical debate between the representationalist and anti-representationalist positions outlined.

There have recently appeared some studies in which Aristotle's views on science are related to modern philosophical issues and distinctions, some articles in which a return to at least some of his ideas is suggested as a solution to certain modern problems, and also some advocacy of the essentialism or modal realism that is historically associated with the Aristotelian tradition.

Dans un célèbre ouvrage sur Contemplation et Vie contemplative selon Platon, A.J. Festugière donnait de la dialectique platonicienne une interprétation selon laquelle celle-ci constituait une véritable expérience mystique possédant presque tous les traits de la contemplation chrétienne. La dialectique platonicienne y était présentée, surtout dans son acte final, comme une sorte d'extase, une union d'ordre mystique, un contact de l'âme perdue dans son objet, contact qui suscite en elle un sentiment qui dépasse tout l'ordre normal de la connaissance. Le Bien ou l'Un en tant qu'objet dernier de l'ascension dialectique y était conçu comme quelque chose d'ineffable et d'indéfinissable.

Aucune théorie n'est probablement en mesure de rendre compte systématiquement des usages que philosophes et savants ont fait et font du mot « concept», car ces usages sont divers et certains d'entre eux incohérents. Eliminons d'emblée certaines interprétations, qui, d'ailleurs, comme c'est le cas pour 1'interprétation de Hegel, entrent en conflit avec le principe de non-contradiction. On pourra alors introduire un certain ordre dans cette diversité, à condition de suivre les deux principes suivants. 1°) On assignera au concept un niveau déterminé, qui dépend de son mode de communication. 2°) Caractéres, experience et acquisition du concept sont, à leur tour, relatifs à son niveau particulier.

The recent literature has seriously challenged, and in my view defeated, the traditional representationalist interpretation of Descartes. One contributor to it, John Yolton, has recently extended its arguments to argue that the traditional representationalist interpretation of Locke must be relinquished as well, that Locke, following the Cartesian path of Arnauld, held a semiotic theory of ideas which “de-ontologized” them and construed them as signs or cues in the direct perception of physical objects. The Cartesian support for this view, especially in La Dioptrique, has been questioned by R.F. McRae, who argues that “if Locke accepts Descartes' theory of vision, then Descartes' conception of sensations as signs provides no support for the direct realist interpretation of Locke.” My aim here is not to resolve the representationalism issue, but to show the irrelevance to it of the kinds of questions the Yolton-McRae exchange raises concerning sense perception. I shall try to show that there stems from Descartes a single account of those questions the essentials of which are embedded in theories falling on both sides of the representationalism issue. That single account involves a theory of judgment and vision, especially of distance, which in the case of Malebranche and Berkeley, even involves the same confusions.