Objectives: US hospitals are expected to function without external aid for up to 96 hours during a disaster; however, concern exists that there is insufficient capacity in hospitals to absorb large numbers of acute casualties. The aim of the study was to determine the potential for creation of inpatient bed surge capacity from the early discharge (reverse triage) of hospital inpatients at low risk of untoward events for up to 96 hours.

Methods: In a health system with 3 capacity-constrained hospitals that are representative of US facilities (academic, teaching affiliate, community), a variety (N = 50) of inpatient units were prospectively canvassed in rotation using a blocked randomized design for 19 weeks ending in February 2006. Intensive care units (ICUs), nurseries, and pediatric units were excluded. Assuming a disaster occurred on the day of enrollment, patients who did not require any (previously defined) critical intervention for 4 days were deemed suitable for early discharge.

Results: Of 3491 patients, 44% did not require any critical intervention and were suitable for early discharge. Accounting for additional routine patient discharges, full use of staffed and unstaffed licensed beds, gross surge capacity was estimated at 77%, 95%, and 103% for the 3 hospitals. Factoring likely continuance of nonvictim emergency admissions, net surge capacity available for disaster victims was estimated at 66%, 71%, and 81%, respectively. Reverse triage made up the majority (50%, 55%, 59%) of surge beds. Most realized capacity was available within 24 to 48 hours.

Conclusions: Hospital surge capacity for standard inpatient beds may be greater than previously believed. Reverse triage, if appropriately harnessed, can be a major contributor to surge capacity. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S10–S16)

Objective: The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is the United States’ laboratory system for detecting, confirming, and reporting potential bioterrorism agents. The first tier—sentinel laboratories—is composed principally of hospital-based laboratories and is tasked with ruling out potential biological threat agents in clinical specimens or the identification of suspicious specimens for further testing in higher tiers of the LRN system. The aim of the present study was to broadly describe preparedness of the first tier of the hospital LRN, the sentinel laboratories, with a specific focus on training, personnel, and communications.

Methods: A semistructured cross-sectional survey of US sentinel laboratories was designed and conducted. Hospitals with greater than 250 beds and an emergency department were considered eligible for inclusion. A geographically weighted sample of 201 hospitals was selected for inclusion. The survey was administered by telephone to the microbiology managers (or designees) at the selected hospitals. The survey contained questions related to drill frequency, proficiency survey participation, personnel training, personnel responsibilities, procedures for biological threat response, and overall confidence in preparedness.

Results: Overall, 179 hospitals (89.1%) identified themselves as sentinel laboratories and participated in the survey; 11.7% reported that they had had an emergency alert within the last 2 years. Although rates of internal drills were low (20.7%), participation in some form of bioterrorism proficiency evaluation was high (79.9%). In all, 83.8% of laboratories reported that they had personnel designated to coordinate response to acts of bioterrorism. More than 73% of respondents indicated that they had sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to respond to a biological terrorism event. By multivariate analysis, sentinel laboratories were 3.4 times more likely to feel confident that they had sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to respond to a biological terrorism event if they had designated personnel for bioterrorism roles.

Conclusions: This pilot study of sentinel laboratory bioterrorism preparedness demonstrated that hospital laboratory personnel, training, and communication preparedness were not universal, despite designation as sentinel laboratories. A need for unified monitoring of sentinel laboratories exists, and efforts should be made to develop standardized metrics for sentinel laboratory preparedness. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S17–S23)

Objectives: The southern California wildfires in autumn 2007 resulted in widespread disruption and one of the largest evacuations in the state’s history. This study aims to identify unmet medical needs and health care–seeking patterns as well as prevalence of acute and chronic disease among displaced people following the southern California wildfires. These data can be used to increase the accuracy, and therefore capacity, of the medical response.

Methods: A team of emergency physicians, nurses, and epidemiologists conducted surveys of heads of households at shelters and local assistance centers in San Diego and Riverside counties for 3 days beginning 10 days postdisaster. All households present in shelters on the day of the survey were interviewed, and at the local assistance centers, a 2-stage sampling method was used that included selecting a sample size proportionate to the number of registered visits to that site compared with all sites followed by a convenience sampling of people who were not actively being aided by local assistance center personnel. The survey covered demographics; needs following the wildfires (shelter, food, water, and health care); acute health symptoms; chronic health conditions; access to health care; and access to prescription medications.

Results: Among the 175 households eligible, 161 (92.0%) households participated. Within the 47 households that reported a health care need since evacuation, 13 (27.7%) did not receive care that met their perceived need. Need for prescription medication was reported by 47 (29.2%) households, and 20 (42.6%) of those households did not feel that their need for prescription medication had been met. Mental health needs were reported by 14 (8.7%) households with 7 of these (50.0%) reporting unmet needs. At least 1 family member per household left prescription medication behind during evacuation in 46 households (28.6%), and 1 family member in 48 households (29.8%) saw a health care provider since their evacuation. Most people sought care at a clinic (24, 50.0%) or private doctor (11, 22.9%) as opposed to an emergency department (6, 12.5%).

Conclusions: A significant portion of the households reported unmet health care needs during the evacuations of the southern California wildfires. The provision of prescription medication and mental health services were the most common unmet need. In addition, postdisaster disease surveillance should include outpatient and community clinics, given that these were the most common treatment centers for the displaced population. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S24–S28)

Objectives: To describe current syndromic surveillance system response protocols in health departments from 8 diverse states in the United States and to develop a framework for health departments to use as a guide in initial design and/or enhancement of response protocols.

Methods: Case study design that incorporated in-depth interviews with health department staff, textual analysis of response plans, and a Delphi survey of syndromic surveillance response experts.

Results: All 8 states and 30 of the 33 eligible health departments agreed to participate (91% response rate). Fewer than half (48%) of surveyed health departments had a written response protocol, and health departments reported conducting in-depth investigations on fewer than 15% of syndromic surveillance alerts. A convened panel of experts identified 32 essential elements for inclusion in public health protocols for response to syndromic surveillance system alerts.

Conclusions: Because of the lack of guidance, limited resources for development of response protocols, and few examples of syndromic surveillance detecting previously unknown events of public health significance, health departments have not prioritized the development and refinement of response protocols. Systems alone, however, are not effective without an organized public health response. The framework proposed here can guide health departments in creating protocols that will be standardized, tested, and relevant given their goals with such systems. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S29–S36)

During the past decade, hospital emergency preparedness has become a focus of local, state, and federal governments seeking to address emergencies or disasters that affect the public health. Integral to hospital emergency preparedness are numerous legal challenges that hospitals and their health care personnel face during declared states of emergencies. In this article, we evaluate legal requirements for hospital emergency preparedness, key legal concerns that hospitals should consider in emergency preparedness activities, and how the changing legal landscape during emergencies necessitates real-time decision making. We then analyze legal issues including negligence, discrimination, and criminal culpability that may arise during or after medical triage. Finally, we examine the legal risks of evading preparedness, specifically asking how a hospital and its personnel may be held liable for failing to plan or prepare for an emergency. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S37–S44)

There is no widely accepted, validated framework of health care emergency management capabilities (HEMCs) that can be used by facilities to guide their disaster preparedness and response efforts. We reviewed the HEMCs and the evaluation methods used by the Veterans Health Administration, The Joint Commission, the Institute of Medicine Metropolitan Medical Response System committee, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services to determine whether a core set of HEMCs and evaluative methods could be identified.

Despite differences in the conceptualization of health care emergency management, there is considerable overlap among the agencies regarding major capabilities and capability-specific elements. Of the 5 agencies, 4 identified occupant safety and continuity of operations as major capabilities. An additional 5 capabilities were identified as major by 3 agencies. Most often the differences were related to whether a capability should be a major one versus a capability-specific element (eg, decontamination, management of resources). All of the agencies rely on multiple indicators and data sources to evaluate HEMCs. Few performance-based tools have been developed and none have been fully tested for their reliability and validity. Consensus on a framework and tools to measure HEMCs is needed. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S45–S51)

Particularly since 2001, the health care industry has witnessed many independent and often competing efforts to address mitigation and preparedness for emergencies. Clinicians, health care administrators, engineers, safety and security personnel, and others have each developed relatively independent efforts to improve emergency response. A broader conceptual approach through the development of a health care emergency management profession should be considered to integrate these various critical initiatives. When based on long-standing emergency management principles and practices, health care emergency management provides standardized, widely accepted management principles, application concepts, and terminology. This approach could also promote health care integration into the larger community emergency response system. The case for a formally defined health care emergency management profession is presented with discussion points outlining the advantages of this approach. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S52–S58)

Health care facility surge capacity has received significant planning attention recently, but there is no commonly accepted framework for detailed, phased surge capacity categorization and implementation. This article proposes a taxonomy within surge capacity of conventional capacity (implemented in major mass casualty incidents and representing care as usually provided at the institution), contingency capacity (using adaptations to medical care spaces, staffing constraints, and supply shortages without significant impact on delivered medical care), and crisis capacity (implemented in catastrophic situations with a significant impact on standard of care). Suggested measurements used to gauge a quantifiable component of surge capacity and adaptive strategies for staff and supply challenges are proposed. The use of refined definitions of surge capacity as it relates to space, staffing, and supply concerns during a mass casualty incident may aid phased implementation of surge capacity plans at health care facilities and enhance the consistency of terminology and data collection between facilities and regions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S59–S67)

The role of hospitals in the community response to disasters has received increased attention, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Hospitals must be prepared to respond to and recover from all-hazards emergencies and disasters. There have been several initiatives to guide hospitals’ role in these events and to assist hospitals in their effort to prepare for them. This article focuses on the efforts of 4 distinct groups: The Joint Commission (TJC), the executive branch of the US government, the US Congress, and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Despite the different approach each group uses to assist hospitals to improve their emergency management capabilities, the initiatives reinforce one another and have resulted in increased efforts by hospitals to improve their disaster preparedness and response capabilities and community integration. The continued progress of our medical response system in all-hazard emergencies and disasters depends in large part on the future guidance and support of these 4 key institutions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S68–S73)

In the United States, recent large-scale emergencies and disasters display some element of organized medical emergency response, and hospitals have played prominent roles in many of these incidents. These and other well-publicized incidents have captured the attention of government authorities, regulators, and the public. Health care has assumed a more prominent role as an integral component of any community emergency response. This has resulted in increased funding for hospital preparedness, along with a plethora of new preparedness guidance.

Methods to objectively measure the results of these initiatives are only now being developed. It is clear that hospital readiness remains uneven across the United States. Without significant disaster experience, many hospitals remain unprepared for natural disasters. They may be even less ready to accept and care for patient surge from chemical or biological attacks, conventional or nuclear explosive detonations, unusual natural disasters, or novel infectious disease outbreaks.

This article explores potential reasons for inconsistent emergency preparedness across the hospital industry. It identifies and discusses potential motivational factors that encourage effective emergency management and the obstacles that may impede it. Strategies are proposed to promote consistent, reproducible, and objectively measured preparedness across the US health care industry. The article also identifies issues requiring research. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S74–S82)

No standard exists by which to evaluate a hospital’s compliance for the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The instruments available and in use today for the evaluation of hospital preparedness have variable adherence to the principles and elements set forth in NIMS. This is especially evident in the areas of command and management and communications and information management. The use of NIMS as a standard remains itself in question because of its lack of focus on the health care environment and incomplete list of pertinent elements. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S83–S89)