The present form of church establishment in England represents no more than the eroded residue of the original confessional state. The presence of non-Christian religions and the significant decline in Christian belief and observance call into question the validity of the remaining elements of establishment, though not necessarily a national mission. It is argued that, rather than wait passively on events that themselves may – carelessly – force uncomfortable outcomes, it would be better for the Church of England itself to consider its future policy and practice as a national church, should it wish to retain that role. Apparently declining to consider any unforced change, the Church shows a tendency to aimless drifting that makes it rudderless and vulnerable. Some examples of where it might constitutionally take initiatives are discussed. However, the position and behaviour of bishops in the House of Lords exemplifies a tendency to hold on, however untenably, to what it has without thinking through the implications of the politics of its situation. Now that the Church is, in practice, in charge of its own destiny, it should face up to the responsibility that its changed status implies.1

Must the state be neutral to all religious and philosophical positions? This article argues that that is an impossibility and that the most basic principles of our democratic society, such as our belief in the importance of individual freedom and equality, are Christian in origin and need their Christian roots. The relevance of recent judgments in the European Court of Human Rights and in English courts is discussed. In particular, exception is taken to views of religious belief that see it as subjective, irrational and arbitrary. It is argued that religion needs to take its place in the public arena, and that the national recognition of the Church of England through establishment is an important means to that end.1

In March 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reversed the decision of the Court's Second Section in Lautsi v Italy. The case clearly demonstrates how controversial the use of religious symbols in the public environment has become. This article sets out the complicated framework of the case, assesses the judgment and concludes that the Grand Chamber's decision is unfortunate and, in many respects, objectionable. It will be shown that this decision has implications regarding the malleable nature of the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and consensus, as well as the development of Strasbourg's application of double standards in its case law regarding the public display of religious symbols.

Religious product authentication laws, predicated on conceptions of doctrinal authenticity, risk curtailing the religious freedom of dissenting adherents engaged in non-orthodox forms of the regulated practice. They may also entail discrimination between, or even the ‘establishment’ of, competing doctrinal viewpoints within religions. This raises important constitutional and theoretical questions surrounding the conceptual necessity, to religious freedom, of state neutrality in religious controversies. Comparative church–state jurisprudence reveals strikingly different approaches to the question of the compatibility of religious product authentication laws with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and state neutrality. The religion clauses of the United States Constitution preclude regulatory schemes incorporating doctrinal concepts of authenticity, whereas a failed constitutional challenge in Ireland (to a law regulating the sale of Mass cards in Ireland) rejected the contention that such laws denied constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious grounds. This article argues that these contrasting approaches to the constitutionality of religious product authentication laws illustrate a deeper conflict surrounding the very concept of religious freedom. In particular, this comparative constitutional jurisprudence crystallises broader normative debates surrounding the competing claims of recognition and neutrality with regard to religion.

In recent years the application of, and discussion about, the faculty jurisdiction has come to focus largely on those aspects of the jurisdiction concerned with the making of changes to listed buildings. This Journal has recently carried two full-scale articles that have helpfully described, from a legal perspective and a practical one, respectively, the operation of the faculty jurisdiction within the context of listed buildings and the ecclesiastical exemption.

The European Court of Human Rights has upheld Italy's policy of displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms. In Lautsi v Italy, an atheist mother of two state school children challenged this policy, in place since 1924. After losing in the Italian courts, she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the presence of these crucifixes in schools violated her and her children's rights to religious freedom and to a secular education guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. On 3 November 2009, a unanimous seven-judge chamber of the European Court held for Ms Lautsi. On 18 March 2011, the Grand Chamber reversed this decision and held 15 to 2 in favour of the Government of Italy.

The long-awaited proposals for the final (?) reform of the House of Lords were published on 15 May. Though the draft Bill envisages a House with 240 elected members and 60 appointed members nominated by a statutory Appointments Commission and recommended for appointment by the Prime Minister, the White Paper states explicitly that ‘it is a draft and we will consider options including a wholly elected House’. Probably the key proposal for readers of this Journal is that a maximum of 12 Church of England bishops would sit ex officiis in the reformed House, in addition to the 60 appointed members. Unlike the other members, the bishops will not be paid in respect of their membership, and the provisions of the draft Bill on taxation, suspension and expulsion and the majority of the disqualifying grounds will not apply to them. Over time the number of bishops in the Lords will be reduced from the initial 12 to 7.