The seal of the confessional is often described as ‘inviolable’. The idea that what is said or done in furtherance of private confession may be subjected to scrutiny as part of litigation is often considered to be absurd. But what is the legal basis for such forthright rejection? The revised Canons of the Church of England do not address the issue at all; instead the matter falls to be covered by the unrepealed proviso to Canon 113 of the Code of 1603. In England and Wales there is no primary legislation which clearly and coherently deals with the question of the admissibility of matters said in private confession before courts and tribunals. Contrast that with the United States of America, where every single state has enacted statutory provisions which provide safeguards to admissibility, albeit to differing degrees. Recent developments in Australia have, conversely, involved the enactment of legislation making it a crime for a priest to withhold, in certain circumstances, matters said to him or her in the course of private confession. In 1990, Judge Bursell QC reviewed the existing case law on the subject (sparse though it is) and found it to be contradictory, with judgments appearing to be based upon personal opinions as opposed to legal analysis. There have been some interesting ‘post-Bursell’ developments, in terms of both legislation and case law, which are discussed in this article. In Ecclesiastical Law, Mark Hill QC suggests that ‘it is likely that a trial judge would exclude evidence of a confession made to a priest’. This article is essentially an analysis of that conclusion with a view to determining whether it is right to assume that, even if not adequately protected by legislation, things said or done in furtherance of private confession are likely to be excluded from secular criminal proceedings.

This article describes the changes in criminal law and procedure that the author saw take place during 50 years of practice, turning a criminal justice system in which it was difficult to prosecute cases involving multiple child witnesses into one much better adapted to cases alleging sexual assault and the needs of vulnerable witnesses. The article reviews, decade by decade, the major developments in people's understanding and perception of the prevalence of physical and sexual abuse, touching on a number of high-profile events. It traces the development of the Church of England's safeguarding policy, noting how it tracks the development of secular policies. In parallel it identifies a number of significant cases of sexual abuse by clergy which were/are the subject of ‘lessons learned’ reviews. A note of caution is however sounded arising from the cases of Carl Beech and Bishop Bell, in particular the danger of not following well-established investigative procedures but jumping to judgement. The article concludes by suggesting how investigation and fact-finding might take place in the future, independent of the bishops, but under the supervision of a ‘judge’, and argues that effective risk assessments can only be based on findings of fact.

To preserve the integrity and purity of the church, the policies of churches commonly provide for the enforcement of discipline whenever a cleric errs. The concern is that despite these provisions in the governing documents of churches, disputes challenging churches’ disciplinary exercise over their clergy are increasingly finding their way into the civil courts for adjudication. These disputes have implications for the reputation, governance and flourishing of a church. Against this backdrop, this article analyses a number of case studies to examine some legal issues arising from the churches’ exercise of disciplinary powers over their clergy within the Nigerian and South African contexts. From the analysis of the cases, a wide variety of legal issues associated with implementing church disciplinary procedures are identified to offer some lessons that may enhance the quality of legal risk management for churches.

There have been a number of tribunal decisions on the admissibility of discrimination claims concerning ‘belief’ as a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010. Some have favoured the claimant, establishing, inter alia, that opposition to fox hunting and hare-coursing, a belief in the ‘higher purpose’ of public service broadcasting and a commitment to vegetarianism constitute ‘philosophical beliefs’ for the purposes of the Equality Act. Others do not, such that a belief in wearing a poppy or, in contrast with an earlier decision, a commitment to vegetarianism do not qualify. The admissibility of these claims tended to turn on the extent to which the belief in question was considered cogent or was sufficiently weighty and substantial. In Forstater v CGD Europe & Anor, whether or not a belief fell into the protected category focused on the rather different issue of whether or not it was worthy of respect because of its compatibility (or otherwise) with the dignity and rights of others.

Readers of the Journal will recall the Ecclesiastical Law Society's long tradition of serious ecumenical engagement, embodied in the biennial Lyndwood Lecture with the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland, and recall that a number of members of the Society are regularly engaged with the Colloquium of Anglican and Roman Catholic Canon Lawyers. Moreover, ecumenical agreement and disagreement have canonical consequences, as, for example, in the debate about Anglican orders. In moral theology, particularly Roman Catholic moral theology, the relation between moral teaching, the confessional and canon law is obvious to any practitioner. My own interest in the Ecclesiastical Law Society was a direct consequence of my involvement in Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue as successively co-secretary, member and consultant of the various embodiments of the Anglican–Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) from 1974 onwards. An ecumenical conversation with Canon Graham Routledge, a founder member, led me to seek membership of the Society in its early days.

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in the conjoined cases of Miller and Cherry that the advice given by the Prime Minister to Her Majesty that Parliament should be prorogued from a date between 9 and 12 September until 14 October was unlawful, and that the resulting Order in Council and the prorogation itself were also unlawful, void and of no effect – so it was back to the constitutional drawing-board. Parliament was subsequently prorogued from 8 to 14 October, sat until 5 November and was dissolved at 00.01 am on the following day.