This article examines the misrepresentation of American beef in the British market between c. 1890 and c. 1913. We examine the complaints voiced by British consumers, producers, and retailers and we discuss the response of the British government and the United States Department of Agriculture. A new dataset is employed to calculate the price premiums that could be earned from the misrepresentation of beef according to geographic origin. While considerable premiums could be earned by “passing-off” American beef as British in the 1890s, these premiums declined during the 1900s. Particular emphasis is placed on the inability of the British government to act unilaterally on meat marking. This article also considers origin as a means of distinguishing between categories of nonbranded goods. Yet “origin” has many dimensions. Not only does it indicate provenance, it sometimes signals quality associated with provenance while also serving as the basis for protectionist responses. This article therefore contributes to the broader debates surrounding origin marking as a commercial and legal phenomenon.

This article studies the strategy developed by the Benedictine Community at the Monastery of Montserrat to conceal their patrimony through the constitution of a public limited company. The singularity of this case lies in the opacity that the Benedictines created regarding their properties in the eyes of the government and in the fact that the public limited company was, rather than just a simple mechanism to conceal the Community's assets, a real tool for business management. This instrumental character included a strategy for the enlargement of the patrimony, a line of improvement in the use of rented estates and services, and the execution of the Community's decisions concerning its assets. The business analysis of Larsa is focused on the development of the firm compared to that of its geographical environment, Catalonia, so as to show the similarities and differences between the Benedictine public limited company, managed by members of a religious order, and those run by laymen. Larsa's strategy was based, as that of similar firms, on organic growth and a low level of indebtedness, although a break occurred in that strategy as the result of an exogenous shock (the October 1934 Revolution) that forced the company to modify its objectives from longevity and solvency to profit maximization, dividend distribution, and even business decapitalization.

Naval shipbuilding was one of the most ambitious industrial undertakings of World War II. A marginal business, in 1939 employing only twelve shipyards, it expanded over the course of the war into a massive network of shipbuilding firms, engineering works, steel mills, and specialty producers that built the world's largest fleet. At its peak in 1944, warship building employed one million shipyard workers, a million others in collateral industries, and consumed one-fifth of the nation's steel output in the construction of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and thousands of smaller combatants.

The article presents some new evidence concerning the conversion program in Socialist Hungary that constituted an exceptional case not only in the Socialist Bloc, but also in the early period of the Cold War. The Hungarian military industry—step by step—was reintegrated into the civil economy between 1953 and 1961. The war plants developed a dual production structure, which helped them stand the storms of the lengthy transitional period. Companies with a double profile diversified their production with a wide scale of civilian goods, new constructional and R&D departments were established. The article examines at the firm level the strategies, the changes in behaviours of the top-managers, and the consequences—what did the switch-over have for Hungarian society, to what extent contributed the increase in consumer goods to political stabilization of the system.

This article analyzes the long-term strategies employed by multinational oil corporations in a late industrializing country with powerful business groups when faced with economic nationalism. I study the case of Royal Dutch-Shell in Chile from 1913 to 2005, where two oil multinationals controlled 100 percent of the Chilean market until forced by the government to accept a domestic private company, COPEC, into a new three-member cartel. The multinationals accepted this arrangement reluctantly, but in the long term it proved beneficial. COPEC's involvement in Chilean business groups protected the multinationals from hostile actions by the government and gave legitimacy to the cartel. These benefits ended when Chile abandoned its import substitution industrialization strategy in the 1970s.