On May 29, 1945, Charles F. Calhoun, a vice president of the Permanente Metals Corporation (PMC), composed a telegram to his fellow company officers that celebrated a long-awaited triumph. “This is to confirm delivery to Tokyo, May 26th, during high wind, of large Permanente shipment by way Marion, Ohio, and B-29 express,” Calhoun began. “It is reported there was no loss of goods in transit but that considerable damage resulted from cargo being jettisoned within Tokyo city limits.” He could not resist adding, tongue firmly in cheek, “All ... claims of property damage will be forwarded to Permanente claims adjustment department.”

In his Farewell Address, President Eisenhower warned that the military-industrial complex (MIC) threatened to dominate American research, crowding out commercial innovation. Ironically, a number of analysts point to spin-off benefits of the 1950s' military effort as a crucial source of American high-tech competitiveness, often citing the key example of the relationship between military jet aircraft and the Boeing's 707. But the huge military investment in jet aviation had both benefits and costs for the commercial industry. This article compares the development of the Boeing 707 and its relationship to military projects like the KC-135 tanker to the contemporary development of commercial jet aircraft by other companies that were also integral parts of the military-industrial complex (MIC), including Douglas Aircraft and its commercial DC-8 and Convair and its commercial 880 and 990. Using evidence from archives, interviews with retired company executives, contemporary trade press, and academic studies, the article concludes that membership in the MIC did not offer firms a leg up in commercial markets. President Eisenhower was generally right about the costs of the military effort, but military spending remained low enough to allow commercial industry to thrive in parallel to the defense industry.

Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, American organized labor emerged among the most enthusiastic supporters of the military–industrial complex. This study examines that emerging relationship, focusing on the efforts of a group of unionists to mold defense spending into a vehicle for promoting employment and addressing social and economic problems.

During the Korean War, labor representatives drafted, lobbied for, and helped administration Defense Manpower Policy #4, a policy channeling defense spending to areas suffering high rates of unemployment. With the advent of the Eisenhower administration, preferential policies fell by the wayside, but organized labor continued to press, with some success for defense spending as a general antidote to economic downturns. Late in the 1950s, the Construction Trades Department of Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO), reacting to double-digit unemployment in their ranks, became an active promoter of fallout shelter construction.

Despite some initial success in reimplementing preferential policies during the early months of the Kennedy administration, organized labor's defense agenda quickly ran afoul of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's plans to systematize and rationalize the defense sector.

In the end, resistance from military and business leaders greatly impeded labor's progress. At the very least, however, labor's defense agenda reflects a larger social vision and also suggests the very real attraction to many unionists of the military–industrial complex, a malleable economic realm, open to political influence and somewhat removed from the harsh forces of the market.

On January 8, 2008, executives at MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA), a systems engineering firm centered in Vancouver, British Columbia, triggered a political firestorm by announcing that, subject to regulatory approval by the governments of Canada and the United States, shareholders had approved the sale of the firm's space business to Alliant Techsystems (ATK), an aerospace company and manufacturer of land mines, cluster bombs, and missiles headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Daniel Friedmann, MDA's chief executive since 1995, argued the sale would “allow the company to focus management and financial resources exclusively on its rapidly growing information products business,” particularly the firm's property-information systems for those “involved in real estate-related transactions such as the buying, selling, conveyancing, mortgage financing, and insurance of properties.”

Dwight Eisenhower's farewell address continues to resonate, beyond this admirable special edition of Enterprise & Society. The term he employed to describe the influence of corporations and financial interests over national defense policy, the “military–industrial complex,” usefully summarized phenomenon of his time. It also depicts an ongoing and arguably even structural phenomenon within contemporary American society. Ike would therefore appear in retrospect one part keen observer, another prophet. As the articles in this forum collectively suggest, the ideas embedded within his now-famous phrase continue to frame contemporary scholarship fifty years after his final Oval Office speech, though with a far narrower lens than Ike envisioned, and with less dire societal results than he feared. The military–industrial complex is both more real, and less frightening, than he foretold. At least, so far.

Today, in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, there is a foreboding sense that it is too easy for Americans to borrow. Living beyond our means on our cards and our mortgages, Americans borrowed at an unsustainable pace, and what put us here, the logic goes, was the unfortunate collision of lenders' greed and borrower's cupidity. Yet free-for-all borrowing defined another moment's economy as well, but without the ill consequences: the postwar period. After World War II, cheap credit underpinned the suburban prosperity, through government-insured loans, auto financing, and even department store Charga-Plates.