On December 23, 1991, the Federal Republic of Germany announced its intention to proceed with unilateral diplomatic recognition of the secessionist Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia, unquestionably one of the most precipitous acts in post-Cold War Europe. With it the Bonn government in effect renounced the legitimacy of the existing Yugoslav state and pressured other European governments to do the same. Within weeks the Yugoslav federation came apart at every seam, while its civil affairs degenerated into an anarchy of armed violence as convoluted in many respects as the Thirty Years' War.

In Germany's defense, it should be conceded at the outset that an alternative approach to recognition would not necessarily have produced a fundamentally more peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia. In light of the deepening political and economic cleavages with which the multinational state had been wrestling since the 1970s, the reasonable question is not whether the serial wars of the Yugoslav succession could have been avoided altogether, but whether Germany's action offered Yugoslavia and its populace the best chance for a more peaceful course of change given the circumstances. Did Bonn apply the best of its diplomatic and political brains to the issues of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights? Were its actions morally responsible with regard to Balkan, German, and European history?

The traditional realist paradigm holds that the sovereign nation-state is the principal political and legal unit in the world community. Reflecting this tradition, most studies of economic sanctions are state-centered. They assume that states exercise control over their national corporations to deny economic resources to other states. Within this framework, nongovernmental human rights organizations become involved only as interest groups, lobbying governments to regulate or ban private economic activity with designated malefactor. These groups, however, are generally unable to persuade states to mandate disinvestment from or socially responsible behavior within repressive regimes. As a result, they redirect their energies away from the central authorities and toward corporations-directly pressuring them through boycotts and shareholder activism-and local governments-persuading them to condition municipal contracts on human rights criteria.

This essay examines the degree to which these nonstate actors can provide an alternative center of authority to that of the state in imposing human rights accountability on corporate conduct abroad. The first section explains the logic of nonstate sanctions and establishes criteria against which one can judge their challenge to realism. The second section assesses the successes and limitations of the anti-apartheid movement, which is viewed as the role model for such efforts. The third and final section contrasts the South African case with recent campaigns against corporate investment in Burma and Nigeria. These cases have been chosen because most grassroots organizations have pressed for corporate withdrawal rather than for more socially responsible business practices. Each represents an attempt by citizens' groups to impose sanctions against repressive regimes beyond those enacted by governments.

How do governments deal with human rights violations committed by former regimes? South Africa's solution has been to set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which offers amnesty to perpetrators who tell the truth about the past and disclose their deeds to the victims; the goal is the reconciliation of former enemies. While the TRC has a clear political focus, it is at its heart a deeply theological and ethical initiative. At times, however, it appears that ethics and theology are at cross-purposes, that justice is less important than Christian mercy; this viewpoint springs from a narrow understanding of what constitutes justice. Does offering amnesty to perpetrators and forgiving enemies deny the victims justice? Or does the TRC embody a “different kind of justice,” as one commentator recently suggested? In this overview of the TRC—its establishment, procedures, and principles—special attention is given to the ethical and theological arguments for this unique approach.

The capacity to focus on the issue of humanitarian intervention represents what Joel Rosenthal has noted as the maturation of the field of ethics and international affairs. If nothing else, the debate surrounding this vexed issue has demonstrated that we have left behind the so-called oxymoron problem: there is no reason now to be defensive about bracketing the terms “ethics” and “international relations.” One can hardly talk about Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, or any cases of possible outside intervention, without recognizing from the very beginning that ethical dilemmas abound in the way we define our goals, our interests, and the means we use to pursue them. Even Samuel P. Huntington, not usually known to be a moralist, has asserted that “it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the [U.S.] armed forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another.” Whether or not one agrees with that assertion (I do not), one may note that Huntington speaks in terms of moral justification and regards his view of morality to be, in effect, self-evidently true. Thus even archrealists invoke morality in urging their preferred policies.

The discussion in this essay proceeds in three unequal stages. First, I present a brief and oversimple sketch of the objective and subjective changes in the broader milieu of international relations as they relate to humanitarian intervention. Second, and more substantially, I survey and analyze the arguments justifying or opposing the notion of humanitarian intervention from realist and liberal perspectives. Finally, I offer the beginnings of my own argument and consider the enormous difficulties of undertaking humanitarian intervention with any degree of effectiveness and consistency.

At a time when some informed Muslims believe Islam to be “set on a collision course with the West” and some Christians warn of a “perhaps irrational but surely historical reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage,” it may be helpful to ask what both traditions teach about current issues of joint concern. One of the most urgent of these issues is the question of forcible humanitarian intervention. Setting aside broader questions of interpretation, such as the extent to which Islam can be identified with political radicalism and Christianity with Western political interests, this essay compares Muslim and Christian teachings on this issue. Both traditions have had to confront questions of political violence, suffering, and war since at least the time of the conversion of Constantine in one case (1,600 years ago) and the founding of the first Islamic state at Medina in the other (1,300 years ago). The central argument in this essay is that there is a surprising measure of agreement between the two traditions on the question of forcible humanitarian intervention, enough to provide the basis for a shared doctrine.

This essay explores several moral attitudes that undergird a commitment to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is usually understood to mean assistance or relief, often in the form of a rescue response by the international community to such emergencies as natural disasters, systematic human rights violations, or genocides that take place within the borders of sovereign states. But the term can equally mean aid before the fact, or prevention, as well as longer-term commitments to international justice that go beyond emergency relief. Whether the aid is relief or prevention, short- or long-term, and however it relates to broader questions of international justice, the same question applies: How do we come to feel the ethical imperative to ally ourselves with those outside our borders? If, as Kant puts it, “ought implies can,” then what makes the “oughts” of intervention psychologically feasible? Of course in international affairs the issue is, more typically, whether certain proposed interventions are politically feasible, Do they promote our national interest? Are they cost effective? Even more practically, will food relief get where it is intended to go? Do the rules of military engagement allow us to protect the victims we are trying to help?

Postmodern, poststructural, and critical theorists say that there are no universally valid foundations for norms. Whether or not we think that ethics exists in international life, or ought to, these theorists maintain that there are no firm grounds for any particular ethical belief. Rather, they argue, ethics is contextual.

Many, perhaps most, students of international ethics believe that such approaches have little to offer considerations of international ethics. Christopher Norris says postmodernists are nihilists: “Postmodernism is merely the most extreme (or as some would say, most consistent and consequent) version of this desire to have done with all truth-claims beyond what is presently and contingenty ‘good in the way of belief.‘” Ken Booth argues: “If one scratches a committed post-modernist one will almost certainly find a comfortably well-off Western urban liberal. Those who live against the wall, or who have emancipated themselves from such a position, do not hold these views.… The reason for this is obvious, and relates to the fact that post-modernism—certainly that of a doctrinaire variety—does not deliver an ethics for the emancipation of victims across the world.”

From British debates over the 1832 New Poor Law to the near present, the notion of “desert” has long had a clear referent in discussions of social welfare policy. The designation “deserving poor” was reserved for those with legitimate grounds for not supporting themselves through paid employment. Invariably among them were the very young, the very old, and the mentally and physically very disabled—people who literally could not work for a living. Also included were various categories of people who, according to the varying conventions of the day, were socially excused from paid labor—widows in the Victorian era, students in the postwar era, and so on. Anyone who could and should work for a living but refused to do so was traditionally deemed to be among the “undeserving poor.” Those were the people whose “welfare dependency” has long been the target of welfare reformers, most recently Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.

The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment brought world leaders together for the first time to discuss the environmental challenge. Since Stockholm, environmental diplomacy has addressed many issues, with varying results. Some success has been achieved, but in general the record shows the inadequacy of international cooperation to meet the environmental challenge.

Twenty-four former presidents and prime ministers, representing five continents and calling themselves the InterAction Council, have produced a landmark proposal for global ethics. Reflecting this year's 50th anniversary of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, their document is called the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities (a text of it is appended to this article). A key point of interest is that these ex-leaders of governments sought advice from a range of religious leaders and philosophers.