There has been much talk about regulatory reform around the world in the wake of the financial crisis but relatively little action. As a major international financial centre, the UK is very much at the heart of the debate and has a particular interest in the ultimate outcome. The financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of ‘light touch’ regulation and ‘principles-based’ regulation, which characterised the UK system in the pre-crisis phase. Changes to the institutional structure of regulation recently announced by the new coalition government, combined with changes to regulatory style, are likely to have far-reaching consequences for the practice and intensity of regulation in the UK. This article reviews and assesses recent and proposed regulatory changes and considers the relationship between corporate governance and regulation. It evaluates the impact on the UK system of initiatives undertaken at international and EC levels as well as various interests and incentives within the UK that are likely to be influential in shaping the regulatory regime in years to come.

The financial crisis has severely hit the Austrian banks and the financial market as a whole. Austrian banks sold ‘Lehman-products’ to a disproportionate extent, banks invested far too high amounts in Iceland, and finally and most importantly, Austrian banks did and are doing their main business in CEE countries, which have been heavily affected by the crisis.

The Austrian government and parliament have reacted by taking different measures to support the near-collapsing banks. Apart from granting guarantees and promoting interbank business through different measures, the main instrument has been to improve the capital ratio by issuing so-called participation capital subscribed for by the government. Although generally the holders of participation capital do not have membership rights, the state is entitled to exercise control rights via a special company.

As most states, France has been affected by the global financial crisis and has quickly taken appropriate steps to tackle its worst effects. Thus, France immediately took measures to respond to the liquidity crisis and recapitalised the most important banks in order for them to continue to finance the ‘real economy’. Some measures have been aimed directly at the ‘real economy’, such as the creation of a mediator for the distribution of credit and the establishment of a French sovereign wealth fund aimed at investing in strategic companies facing difficulties and in medium-sized companies. After the first wave of the crisis, France took a preventive measure concerning the remuneration of traders and a punitive measure by creating an exceptional taxation of traders' remuneration. But the crisis has also provoked a long-term reform of the French supervisory landscape, merging the supervisory authorities of the banking and the insurance landscape into a single body, the Authority for Prudential Control (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel).

Financial markets have increasingly grown cross-border, this having important implications for the design and conduct of prudential regulation and the provision of safety nets, such as deposit insurance or crisis management structures (lender of last resort operations).

The financial crisis has evidenced a number of weaknesses specific to cross-border banking. The study of regulation on the basis of recent cases of banking failure during the crisis allows developing conclusions about the evolution of cross-border banking and the challenges present in the current EU regulatory and supervisory framework. In particular, attention is paid to the impact that legal structures used in cross-border banking may have on financial stability.

This paper analyses the way in which cross-border banking has evolved during the last years, focusing on the legal structures and their impact on competition and financial stability. Thought is given to the specific changes in regulation and supervision that may lead to sustainable cross-border banking within the EU. Finally, the current EU regulatory proposals as well as the changes in the EU supervisory architecture are critically analysed, and final conclusions are drawn on the way forward.

Dutch company law is undergoing tumultuous times. Much is changing in the legislation, for example, a major revision of private limited company law is imminent. The courts are constantly presented with an increasing number of difficult issues. It is precisely in such times that there is a need for guiding ideas, and I went searching for them. In this paper, I have relied on the American theory of pragmatism to help find a method to trace principles of law (section 1). I present nine principles of Dutch company law (section 2) and finally enlist the aid of these principles to solve a problem of present Dutch company law (section 3). Based on these principles, I take a fresh look at Dutch company law. In my search, I came to the conclusion that, as a result of the increasing importance of ‘duties of care’, it is becoming less important who does and who does not belong to the company. To ensure that courts review the actions of corporate executives with restraint, I consider it important to make a distinction between standards of conduct and standards of liability.