[Political representation] is the basis of modern representative democracy. Older and less sophisticated forms, such as direct democracy, subsist marginally, even if they keep exerting a certain attraction. But representative democracy does not carry the self-evident authority it once had. Like every modern institution it is under challenge and consequently needs to be defended. In actual politics, the defence often takes the form of discussion of the merits of one system over the other and of proposals for change. The part of this defence appertaining to constitutional scholarship is not concerned primarily with proposals and changes. It is, before all, to brush up the fundamentals underlying representative democracy, on the basis of topical issues.

There are three current issues upon which we would like to draw attention. They are: equality in structuring electoral systems, the processes of electoral reform and the rise of non-majoritarian institutions versus parliamentary democracy.

Populism and time – Democracy and representation – The open mandate and party democracy – Democracy and non-majoritarian institutions – Populist challenge as symptom of constitutional democracy's malaise

Parliamentary and executive immunity – Italian Corte Costituzionale – Constitutional versus ordinary lawmaking – Comparative perspective to other EU member states – Italian situation unique

European Court of Human Rights – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – ‘Hate speech’ – Féret – Le Pen – Keegstra – Commonalities between Canadian and ECtHR jurisprudence –Development of uniform test of incitement – Sharp distinction from US Supreme Court jurisprudence on freedom of expression

Treaty of Lisbon – Fundamental Rights Charter – European Convention on Human Rights – Partial incorporation of Convention in Charter – Incorporation of Charter into EU law with Lisbon – Questions of loss of autonomy for the EU legal order – Gain in direct effect of Convention in EU member states

Lisbon decisions of the constitutional courts in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Poland from a comparative perspective – Democracy, sovereignty and identity – Permeability of national and supranational law – Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its constitutional foundations – Procedural background and legal outcome of the Lisbon decisions – Differences of institutional self-conception – Parliamentary responsibility for integration – Prior parliamentary assent to the future application of ‘dynamic treaty provisions’ – Different conceptions of national and multi-levelled democracy – Popular vote – Constitutional limits to European integration – Limits indicating the necessity of an amendment and limits protecting the inalienable substantial core of a constitutional order – German Bundesverfassungsgericht only court in Europe spelling out an eternity clause in a detailed, catalogue style manner – Judicial restraint – Ultra vires and identity review – Article 4.2 TEU as an integration clause of EU law and not a derogation clause – Comparative dialectics

This reference for a preliminary ruling raises for the first time the question of the extent of the discretion available to the Member States to determine who their nationals are. In so far as citizenship of the European Union, which depends, admittedly, on enjoyment of the status of national of a Member State, is established by the Treaty, can the powers of the Member States to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality still be exercised without any right of supervision for Community law? That is, in essence, the point at issue in this case. This case therefore calls for clarification of the relationship between the concepts of nationality of a Member State and of citizenship of the Union, a question which, it need hardly be emphasised, to a large extent determines the nature of the European Union.

After the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) issuance of the Lisbon decision, a judgment that is generally considered to be a verdict critical of European integration as well as a measure to widen the scope of constitutional review of EU acts, many observers wondered what would happen next. Would the German court finally begin to look for an open conflict with the EU, or would the court's bark once again be worse than its bite? This had already seemed to be the case after the Maastricht decision, the slimmer and legally more coherent predecessor of the Lisbon judgment, after which the court deliberately missed the opportunity to take a shot at the Banana conflict between the EU and the WTO.