The Conseil constitutionnel has spoken again. In a decision of 27 July 2006, no. 2006-540 DC, the French constitutional court has further and significantly elaborated on earlier rulings on the status of Community directives in the French legal order. In the summer of 2004, it had ruled, in cases in which it was asked to declare unconstitutional an act of parliament implementing Community directives, that ‘the transposing of a Community directive results from a constitutional requirement with which non-compliance is only possible by reason of an express contrary provision of the Constitution’ (decisions of, inter alia, 10 June 2004, no. 2004-496 DC and 29 July 2004, no. 2004-498 DC). Very recently, the Conseil d'Etat, France's highest administrative court, took a similar stance in a case in which the constitutionality of a government decree implementing a directive was at stake (Decision of 8 February 2007, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres).

No competence to review EC regulations implementing Security Council resolutions, according to the Court of First Instance – Worst of both worlds: critique from the perspectives of international law and Community law – Alternative approach on the basis of the firmly established European solange tradition.

At the time this issue of EuConst goes to the press, May 2007, the German presidency is nearing the climax of its efforts to solve the conundrum of the future EU treaty or constitution. There is no way of even guessing what the outcome will be, as every day brings a new set of circumstances and proposals.

Without doubt, the European Union has come to a crossroads. Following the failure of the proposed Constitution in the referendums in France and The Netherlands, it is now vital to take stock of the situation in order to develop an overall concept for how European integration can and should progress from this point. Germany's EU Council Presidency provides an opportunity to hold this discussion. However, the fair-weather talk about Europe, currently being heard from all political sides, is no help at all. People are ill-at-ease and increasingly reserved and sceptical about the European Union, because they can no longer make sense of the integration process, because they can't shake off the feeling of an ever stronger, increasingly inappropriate centralisation of competencies, and because they cannot see who is responsible for which policies. These concerns must be taken very seriously, particularly because they are not simply imaginary.

Integration in the European Union jeopardizes our democracy; the European Constitution will not stop the substantial erosion of the constitutional institutions of the member states, in particular the parliaments. It will not put an end to the lack of democracy and of separation of powers, nor to inappropriate centralization. Its rejection in France and the Netherlands creates the opportunity to assign to the Union appropriate and transparent structures close to the citizens.

This is heavy stuff. It is presented to us by authors who are not known to be Euro-phobes or populists. They don't lose themselves in well-meaning clouds of criticism concerning the length of the Constitution, or in putting the blame on ‘the people in Brussels’. Their concerns have to be taken seriously. That is why their suggestions need to be addressed, both as to principle and detail.

Constitutional reform in Germany – Modernization of the German federal system is only a first step – Why reforming German Federalism was necessary – Steps and factors in the constitutional reform process – Substance – Issues and agenda for future reform on financial relations.

The Framework Decision to establish the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) entered into force on 1 January 2004. Since the adoption of the Italian law on 22 April 2005 transposing the Decision, it has been operational throughout the European Union. In its evaluation report of January 2006, the European Commission welcomes the arrest warrant as an ‘overall success’, as it provides for an effective and swift surrender procedure whilst guaranteeing judicial control and the observation of fundamental rights. National evaluation reports, such as the 30th report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, show that the arrest warrant is widely used to secure the arrest and surrender across the Union. The European Arrest Warrant seems to have largely taken over traditional extradition procedures.

Review of the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in England and Wales – Introduction to the Extradition Act 2003 – The European Arrest Warrant in practice – Assessing the Extradition Act 2003.

Limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – Changing the fundamentals of the EU constitutional order through the conclusion of accession treaties – The case of Turkey – Caveats, precautions and fallback strategies in the ‘Negotiating Framework for Turkey’ – Enforcing the limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice before ratification and after entry into force.

Historical development of the Finnish system of government – A semi-presidential system necessary in the oppressive post-Civil War atmosphere – Reinforcement of the Presidency during World War II and the Cold War – 1982-1995: A reform process of partial revisions – ‘The Constitution of the year 2000’: a considerable step towards a genuine parliamentary form of government – The challenges of European integration for the dual executive.

On March 16, 2006, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its final judgment in the case of Tatjana Ždanoka against the Republic of Latvia. Although not the first decision under Article 3 of the first Protocol, the Ždanoka v. Latvia case was important, because it allowed the Court to come to a decision on an aspect of Article 3, first Protocol, which in earlier case law had not extensively been dealt with by the ECtHR: the right to be elected. Moreover, the case allowed the Court to make some statements of principle on another question with which numerous member states of the Council have been dealing throughout the 20th century: how far may a democracy go in protecting itself from (allegedly) undemocratic parties, groups or individuals?

You may not have noticed, but 2006 was the European Year of Workers' Mobility. The symbolism was prompted by concerns that a genuine European ‘mobility culture’ still does not exist. As the Commission has observed, rates of mobility remain extremely low despite initiatives to promote the free movement of workers: ‘Many obstacles of a legal or administrative nature, but also of a linguistic or socio-cultural nature, continue to hamper workers’ freedom of movement and to discourage them from taking advantage of the opportunities for mobility.