The difference

On 13 December 2007, after a remarkable acceleration of the process under the German and Portuguese presidencies, representatives of the member states put pen to paper and signed the Treaty of Lisbon. Much of the ensuing debate, both in legal circles and among the general public, has centred on its abandonment of the ‘constitutional concept’.

Institutional shortcomings of the Third Pillar: efficiency, effectiveness, complexity, legitimacy – Genesis of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon – Communitarisation of the Third Pillar – Some special institutional arrangements – Quid pro quos: stricter delimitation of the Union competencies and extension of the ‘opt out/opt in’ regimes – (New) foundations for Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Prosecutor's Office

Provisional or interim measures before the European Court of Human Rights – Historic judgment in the case of Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain – The non-compliance by a State with an interim measure leads to a violation of Article 34 ECHR, irrespective of the subsequent finding of a violation of other material provisions of the ECHR by the Court – Remaining (loopholes for) recalcitrant states – Lack of reasoning of interim measures – Lack of clarity as to applicants' unwillingness to abide by an interim measure and currently untenable, extremely narrow scope ratione materiae of situations in which interim measures are indicated by the Court – Codification of the institute of provisional measures by including it as a separate provision into the European Convention through an additional protocol.

Directly elected, but in constitutional terms not the central authority of the Romanian political system – A ‘trailblazer’ role in parliamentary elections – Political neutrality constitutionally required, but hard to realise in practice – Comparison with the French Presidency – Limited powers making the President in theory ‘a colossus with clay feet’ – Ambivalent relationships with Parliament and Government – Gap between the constitutional and the real powers on account of ‘active’ Presidents – A hard-to-qualify political system

Crisis of '65–'66, Europe's first constitutional crisis – transition to majority – Hallstein's convictions and comportment – De Gaulle's Europe of States – Commission agricultural package – Debate in the Council 28–30 June 1965 – Hallstein overplays his hand – De Gaulle seeks out a confrontation with the Five – Founding treaty not to be changed – De Gaulle faces farmers – Crisis ends in a draw – Interpretations of outcome – Europe stronger for it – Consecration of founding pact – Disdain for the compromise – Interest, time, authority

Belgian Constitutional Court beats all in referrals to EU Court – How come? – Origin and evolution of Belgian federalism – Permanent reform – Modest origins of present constitutional court – Use of Belgian and EC law to widen its channels – Identification of Belgian constitutional rules with EC rules – Statutory extension of Court's powers – Use of techniques in referral of Advocaten voor de Wereld – Translation of national constitutional issue into a European one – EC law-driven constitutional evolution in Belgium – Eventual undermining of Belgian constitutional principles

Listening carefully, one might have heard the sigh of relief breathed in Brussels and other EU capitals on 3 May 2007, when the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ or Court) eventually delivered its first judgment on the European arrest warrant (EAW), giving the green light to this flagship instrument of EU judicial co-operation in criminal matters. However, what came as a relief for executive-branch officials, quite likely disappointed some of Europe's judges and legislators, as well as many academics and independent observers. For them, it must have seemed as if a long, tension-filled story had come to a bitter end.

What is a ‘European’ Parliament and who should vote for it? Should it be the ‘citizens’ of the European Union alone? If so, should it be all EU citizens, or only those who are resident in the member states? Or should the electorate include potentially all residents in the member states which comprise the EU and who are thus affected by decisions taken in the Parliament? Does anyone have a ‘right’ to vote for the European Parliament? And who should decide who votes for the European Parliament – the member states, or the EU itself? In other words, is there a single European concept of the European Parliamentary demos, or twenty-seven separate, but overlapping, national concepts?

On 19 December 2006 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal delivered an interesting ruling on the division of powers between national courts and the Court of Justice in the interpretation of EU law. The Tribunal declined jurisdiction to answer a question on the conformity of the Polish law on excise duty with Article 90 EC and ruled that the issue at stake was the interpretation of EC law, thus falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. At the same time, however, the Constitutional Tribunal reserved its jurisdiction to handle EU-related matters with constitutional implications. This development fits nicely into the growing list of the Tribunal's decisions touching upon important legal issues linked to Poland's membership in the European Union.