Relations between the judiciary and the elected authorities (i.e. the legislative and the executive) in each country and at all times are among the most sensitive from the point of view of statehood. There is an obvious truth expressed in the famous saying of Lord Acton: ‘Power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely’2. The universal calling of judges is to restrain executive and legislative branches of government in their efforts to increase their power, especially at the expense of individuals. A state where there is no sufficiently strong counterweight to the natural omnipotence of the people’s representatives is not in line with the principle of the rule of law, because there is no one to remind the elected powers that their mandate has its limits – contemporarily established in particular by constitutional norms and the international regime for the protection of human rights.3 Naturally, courts do not directly take part in a political discourse, even though some kind of judicial review of the acts of public authorities exists virtually everywhere; these should not be characterised as an interference in political matters.4 The mutual respect of the judiciary and elected authorities proves the maturity of the state constitutional system, regardless of how far-reaching the powers are of judges to examine the constitutionality of legislation.

Brexit – Withdrawal Agreement – Article 50 TEU – Negotiations – Legal character of agreement – Transition period – ‘New legal order’ – ‘Due regard’ – ECJ jurisdiction – Governance – Enforcement and supervision – Dispute settlement – Future relations

Constitution making – Disagreement – Principled constitutionalism versus unprincipled bargaining – Pragmatism – Church and state – Separation of religion and law – Maintaining religious peace – Drafting of the Irish Constitution of 1937 – Placating Irish Catholicism – Accommodation of protestant religious minority – Balancing religious freedom and religiosity – Balancing fundamental rights and religious influence – Flexibility and adaptability – Pragmatic assessment of constitutions and constitution making

Deliberative democracy innovations in constitutional amendment processes – Ireland’s experimentation with deliberative mini-publics on constitutional issues – Factors influencing the political take-up of recommendations – The significance of the support of the legislative majority –Deliberative mini-publics as an accountability mechanism.

Judicial review of EU soft law – Liberal-constitutionalism – Principle of effective judicial protection – The liberal-constitutional jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice – Action for annulment – Formalistic understanding of the concept of ‘legally binding effects’ – Preliminary ruling procedure – Limitations of the preliminary ruling procedure in granting effective judicial protection in relation to EU soft law – A plea for a liberal-constitutional reading of Articles 263 and 288 TFEU in relation to direct review of EU soft law