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Why Science Cannot Tame Politics: The New EU Comitology Rules and the Centralised Authorisation Procedure of GMOs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Christoph Klika ,
Jinhee Kim  and
Esther Versluis
Christoph Klika
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Maastricht University
Jinhee Kim
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Maastricht University
Esther Versluis
Affiliation:
European Regulatory Governance at the Department of Political Science, Maastricht University
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Abstract

The centralised authorisation of GMOs in the European Union (EU) has received considerable academic attention in recent years, partly due to the fact thatMember States have not been able to agree on authorisation decisions in the comitology committee. As a consequence, these authorisations are given by the European Commission. These decisions are invariably in favour of authorisation despite the fact that Member States had been divided on this issue. Apart from the on-going discussions on a possible reform of the GMO authorisation (allowing for national restrictions or prohibitions), the new comitology rules brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of equal importance as they might affect the authorisation of GMOs. In this article we discuss some of the changes to comitology and present empirical material on the first authorisation decisions after the entering into force of the new comitology rules. By drawing on delegation theory we will argue that, for the time being, the level of politicisation ofGMOauthorisation is unlikely to change.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 327 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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