The centralised authorisation of GMOs in the European Union (EU) has received considerable academic attention in recent years, partly due to the fact thatMember States have not been able to agree on authorisation decisions in the comitology committee. As a consequence, these authorisations are given by the European Commission. These decisions are invariably in favour of authorisation despite the fact that Member States had been divided on this issue. Apart from the on-going discussions on a possible reform of the GMO authorisation (allowing for national restrictions or prohibitions), the new comitology rules brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of equal importance as they might affect the authorisation of GMOs. In this article we discuss some of the changes to comitology and present empirical material on the first authorisation decisions after the entering into force of the new comitology rules. By drawing on delegation theory we will argue that, for the time being, the level of politicisation ofGMOauthorisation is unlikely to change.

In this article a synthesis of formal models for the economic interpretation of the precautionary principle is presented, with their virtualities, limitations and measures to overcome them.

The concept of precaution has great relevance in environmental regulation in the European Union. On the one hand, and despite the somewhat vague nature of legislation, the interpretation of the precautionary principle has seen recent progress with the development of some economic models and their application. There is, however, a need for a regulatory framework for the implementation of this principle in environmental decision-making, i.e., to clarify concepts and management procedures that are appropriate to the nature of environmental risks.

It is therefore important to know the most relevant economic approaches and models with the aim of identifying their contribution to the debate on precaution in the context of environmental risk management and discuss their practical relevance in public decision-making.

Research in lifestyle risks is becoming more and more important, particularly with reference to what is generally known as “unhealthy diets”. The Law is now firmly established as a prominent instrument of Public Health. There are several distinctive methods of legal intervention targeted at counteracting overweight and promoting healthier lifestyles. In this paper we examine several measures that have been adopted and discuss whether Law should foster healthy diets. Our purpose is to examine the threats of falling into a paternalistic attitude when devising any regulatory intervention aimed at promoting a healthier lifestyle.

Although scholars have described and commented on the European New Approach to standardisation principles, they have paid much less attention to the ways in which this innovative process and its follow-on, i.e. the Global Approach, have been implemented. In many cases, this comes through the day-to-day activity of a very specific population of European experts, the notified bodies. Notified bodies, whose role it is to certify that products, for a given sector, comply with the essential safety requirements set out in the corresponding directive, originate from the Member States, but also compete against each other within a European certification market. This article examines the technical and political difficulties encountered by the Commission and the Member States in ensuring both the independence and the competences of these certifiers. It describes and questions the organisational architecture devised in response to these problems.

Traditionally, theories on regulation have suggested choosing the “right” regulatory tool for a given situation of desired behavioral steering, using a broad theoretical approach of understanding the factors involved in the regulatory realm and speculating from it toward the efficient choice.

By contrast, this paper will argue that the process of choosing the “right” regulatory tool should be guided by an opposite process, in which a searchable database of regulatory case studies (“Global-Regulation”) will be created. The institution (i.e., governments, regulation agencies, etc.) seeking to steer behavior using regulatory tools (“The Regulator”) will search Global-Regulation using the specific characters of its situation (i.e., industry, regulationmethod, country, etc.), to find relevant case-studies that will lead to the best regulatory solution.

It is assumed that this approach will establish regulation and regulatory tools as an empirical process of selection guided by a global accumulated body of knowledge, that will eventually create amore efficient and successful regulation and hence, desired behavior. The first part of this paper will provide an overview of regulatory learning. The second part will describe the Global-regulation database. The third partwill develop an example of the way in which case studies will be indexed into the Global-Regulation database. The fourth part will discuss the benefits of Global-Regulation to scholars and its symbiotic relationship with the research in the regulatory field. Finally, this paper will address possible problemswith the suggested system.

In Fra.bo, it was held by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) that “Article 28 EC must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-law body, where the national legislation considers the products certified by that body to be compliant with national law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are not certified by that body” (author's headnote).

In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., holding that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring”.

This case note gives an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, which is focused on the product of nature doctrine, and discusses its implications for the implementation of the criterion of isolation to DNA sequences and the United States Patent and Trademark Office's long-standing practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences (author's headnote).