In this editorial article, we aim to map out the central features of algorithmic regulation and its conceptual basis – seeking to bring together different strands of the literature relating to the topic that have often remained apart. We then reflect on the ways through which algorithmic law could evolve to address the challenges of artificial intelligence in the legal domain, particularly by examining the potential of applying a “prudential” test in order to determine whether automated decision-making systems are suitable to adequately support legal decision-making.

This paper introduces the notion of legal tech solutionism and argues for how in an age where the development of legal tech is seen as a panacea for all ills it is important to evaluate the use and lifecycle of the technology before introducing it as a solution to the complex and structural problems that plague legal systems. It explores the framework of legal design and argues that legal design provides for a grounded and contextual approach to the development of legal products, content and services. To do this, the paper develops an approach that operates at three levels, including the value of building for usability, the importance of collaboration and community and the value of designing for many worlds to ensure an engagement with a plurality of contexts in the development of legal tech through evolving a grounded approach.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has strongly promoted a human-centric and trustworthy approach to artificial intelligence (AI). The 2021 proposal for a Regulation on AI that the EU seeks to establish as a global standard is the latest step in the matter. However, little attention has been paid to the EU’s use of AI to pursue its own purposes, despite its wide use of digital technologies, notably in the field of border management. Yet, such attention allows us to confront the highly moral discourse that characterises EU institutions’ communications and legislative acts with a concrete example of how the promoted values are realised “on the ground”. From this perspective, this paper takes the case study of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), an EU information technology system (planned to become operational in May 2023) that will provide travel authorisation to visa-exempt third-country nationals using a profiling algorithm. The paper shows, on the one hand, that ETIAS constitutes another piece in the massive infrastructure of digital surveillance of third-country nationals that the EU has been building for years. On the other hand, ETIAS’s algorithmic process is shown to be an instrument of differential exclusion that could well have an adverse impact on certain groups of foreign travellers. Ultimately, this paper argues that far from falling outside the scope of the trustworthy approach to AI championed by the EU, ETIAS – and more broadly the systematic risk evaluation predominant in the EU’s use of AI – is a constitutive part of it.

Under what conditions can artificial intelligence contribute to political processes without undermining their legitimacy? Thanks to the ever-growing availability of data and the increasing power of decision-making algorithms, the future of political institutions is unlikely to be anything similar to what we have known throughout the last century, possibly with parliaments deprived of their traditional authority and public decision-making processes largely unaccountable. This paper discusses and challenges these concerns by suggesting a theoretical framework under which algorithmic decision-making is compatible with democracy and, most relevantly, can offer a viable solution to counter the rise of populist rhetoric in the governance arena. Such a framework is based on three pillars: (1) understanding the civic issues that are subjected to automated decision-making; (2) controlling the issues that are assigned to AI; and (3) evaluating and challenging the outputs of algorithmic decision-making.

This article sheds light on cybersecurity risk disclosure practices, offering explanations based on the corporate governance literature. We argue that cybersecurity risk management poses particular challenges for corporations due to amplified agency problems. Cybersecurity risks are increasing in number and growing in complexity for companies worldwide. The financial sector in the Benelux region was already digitalising rapidly when, in 2020, enhanced remote-working requirements due to the COVID-19 pandemic further contributed to risk exposure. Substantiating our theoretical discussion, we present and discuss insights as to the most pressing cybersecurity risk management issues in the financial sector based on evidence from semi-structured interviews with Chief Information Security Officers/Chief Security Officers from financial sector leads in the Benelux region. We discuss contemporary factors that might induce management to dedicate more attention to cybersecurity. This apparent shift in companies’ approaches regarding cybersecurity is likely to encounter obstacles and should not be expected to be an even and linear process, given the challenges of processing and communicating information in an environment featuring high uncertainty and technical complexity as well as potentially misaligned incentives.

What type of enforcement is the most effective to punish violations of food law or to prevent them from occurring in the first place? This article examines the question of which mix of private and public enforcement exists in European Union (EU) food law and whether this mix corresponds to the recommendations of existing social science research. Based on this research, we contend that EU-determined enforcement mechanisms differ in effectiveness across Member States. New technologies have the potential to stimulate a novel mix of public and private enforcement tools at the EU and national levels.

Governments around the world are strictly regulating information on social media in the interests of addressing fake news. There is, however, a risk that the uncontrolled spread of information could increase the adverse effects of the COVID-19 health emergency through the influence of false and misleading news. Yet governments may well use health emergency regulation as a pretext for implementing draconian restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, as well as increasing social media censorship (ie chilling effects). This article seeks to challenge the stringent legislative and administrative measures governments have recently put in place in order to analyse their negative implications for the right to freedom of expression and to suggest different regulatory approaches in the context of public law. These controversial government policies are discussed in order to clarify why freedom of expression cannot be allowed to be jeopardised in the process of trying to manage fake news. Firstly, an analysis of the legal definition of fake news in academia is presented in order to establish the essential characteristics of the phenomenon (Section II). Secondly, the legislative and administrative measures implemented by governments at both international (Section III) and European Union (EU) levels (Section IV) are assessed, showing how they may undermine a core human right by curtailing freedom of expression. Then, starting from the premise of social media as a “watchdog” of democracy and moving on to the contention that fake news is a phenomenon of “mature” democracy, the article argues that public law already protects freedom of expression and ensures its effectiveness at the international and EU levels through some fundamental rules (Section V). There follows a discussion of the key regulatory approaches, and, as alternatives to government intervention, self-regulation and especially empowering users are proposed as strategies to effectively manage fake news by mitigating the risks of undue interference by regulators in the right to freedom of expression (Section VI). The article concludes by offering some remarks on the proposed solution and in particular by recommending the implementation of reliability ratings on social media platforms (Section VII).

Signed in 2009, the plant protection Commission Regulation EC No 1107/2009 created a new category of active substances, the low-risk substances, with specific status defined in Article 22. The initial and specific criteria, not suitable for microorganisms and natural substances, were modified in 2018, and the first low-risk substance, allocating Part D of Regulation EC No 540/2011, was granted in the same year. Since then, thirty-three low-risk substances have been granted with this specific status through approvals and renewals, while a larger list of potential low-risk substances from already-approved active substances was published. This list is only exploited during renewals, and this process would take another five years to complete. After four years of the implementation of this status, the number of such substances is still low, but is intended to increase slowly. Two more low-risk substances are already pending in 2021, which will bring the number of low-risk substances to thirty-five, while the initial list of potential low-risk substances (only renewals) included fifty-seven substances.