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Getting a Job in Finance. The Strength of Collaboration Ties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2014

Olivier Godechot
Olivier Godechot*
Affiliation:
Sciences Po, MaxPo et OSC-CNRS, Paris [olivier.godechot@sciencespo.fr].
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Abstract

“Weak ties”, a valuable aid in getting a job, are generally work ties. One reason for this feature is not that former colleagues increase one’s information but rather that they value the pursuit of past collaboration. We examine the consequence of the collaboration ties hypothesis in the financial industry labor market. In finance, the labor market values the assets that financial operatives take with them from one firm to another, such as knowledge, know-how and customers. Since assets are to a certain extent shared among co-workers, it is worth hiring business relations and former colleagues or moving in teams: this enables a better transfer of assets such as idiosyncratic work routines, distributed knowledge, or joint customers. To demonstrate our claims we rely on an online survey launched with eFinancialCareers.fr collected in September 2008 among French financial employees. This questionnaire shows that working at the core of financial markets favors the accumulation of key moveable assets on the one hand and of collaboration ties on the other. That is, collaboration ties and key moveable assets are strongly correlated. The moving of key assets, collaboration ties and notably the combination of those two dimensions all result in increased wages.

Résumé

Les liens faibles, une aide appréciable pour trouver un emploi, sont en général des relations de travail, moins parce que les anciens collègues augmentent l’information personnelle que parce qu’ils valorisent la poursuite d’une collaboration antérieure. Cette hypothèse des liens de collaboration est ici testée dans le cas du marché du travail financier. Ce dernier valorise les « actifs » que les opérateurs peuvent emporter avec eux en allant d’une firme à une autre, c’est-à-dire, le savoir, le savoir-faire et les clients. Ces « actifs » étant plus ou moins partagés entre collègues travaillant ensemble, recruter des anciens partenaires d’affaires, des anciens collègues ou partir en équipe est une bonne stratégie.

La base empirique est une enquête en ligne conduite en septembre 2008 avec eFinancialCarreers.fr auprès de salariés Français travaillant dans la finance. Cette enquête montre que travailler au cœur des marchés financiers favorise l’accumulation d’actifs clés transférables d’une part et de liens de collaboration d’autre part. Déplacer ces actifs, les liens de collaboration et plus encore une combinaison des deux contribuent à l’élévation des salaires.

Zusammenfassung

Arbeitsbeziehungen sind meist „schwache Beziehungen“, die bei der Arbeitssuche eine nützliche Hilfe sein können, weniger weil die ehemaligen Arbeitskollegen die Egoinformationen erhöhen, als dass sie den Erhalt der früheren Zusammenarbeit stärken. Diese Hypothese der Arbeitsbeziehungen wird hier speziell im Finanzbereich überprüft. Letzterer betont die Aktiva, die die Angestellten von einem Unternehmen zum nächsten mit sich nehmen, nämlich Wissen, Know-how und Kunden. Da diese Aktiva mehr oder weniger unter Arbeitskollegen ausgetauscht werden, erweisen sich die Einstellung ehemaliger Geschäftspartner, früherer Kollegen oder der geschlossene Weggang eines Teams als eine gute Strategie.

Diese Untersuchung basiert auf einer internetgestützten Befragung von frz. Mitarbeitern im Finanzbereich, die im September 2008 von eFinancialCarreers.fr durchgeführt worden ist. Diese Befragung verdeutlicht, dass die Arbeit im Herzen der Finanzmärkte sowohl die Ansammlung übertragbarer Aktiva als auch die Arbeitsbeziehungen selbst fördert. Sie zeigt darüberhinaus, dass die Verschiebung der Aktiva, der Arbeitsbeziehungen und mehr noch die Verknüpfung beider zu einer Gehaltserhöhung führt.

Keywords

Labor marketsNetworksFinanceWagesEconomic SociologyMarché du travailRéseauxFinanceSalaireSociologie économiqueArbeitsmarktNetzwerkFinanzenGehaltWirtschaftssoziologie
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , April 2014 , pp. 25 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © A.E.S. 2014 

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