Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T02:41:19.620Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Contractual Legitimacy in Organizations and Governments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Martin E. Spencer
Get access

Extract

In an essay on the Nambikuara of the Mato Grosso, Lévi-Strauss revives in an interesting fashion the problem of the Social Contract. Among the Nambikuara are found the most primitive forms of social and political structure. In the words of Lévi-Strauss: “No social structure is weaker and more fragile than the Nambikuara band” (I). The Nambikuara abandon their semi-permanent dwellings at the end of the rainy season in April or early May and divide into bands which are formed on the basis of free choice. The nucleus of the band is a leader who directs the movements and the hunting, fishing, and food-gathering activities of the group for the duration of its nomadic life during the dry season. The leader, however, disposes of no coercive power: he must derive his authority from the continual active consent of those subject to it. The price of leadership is the welfare of the group. If the band is badly managed and food is scarce the individual members of the group may leave to join other, more prosperous bands. Thus bands are always in the process of organizing and growing, or fragmenting and disappearing, with the vicissitudes of leadership. In return for his services the chief enjoys the privilege of having two or more wives, a prerogative shared only with the shamans. As Lévi-Strauss describes the situation of the leader, he appears to be a man forever hustling to provide his subjects with food and entertainment. He is in effect always running for office.

Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , May 1972 , pp. 18 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

(1) Lévi-Strauss, Claude, The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftainship in a Primitive Tribe: the Nambikuara of the Northwestern Mato Grosso, Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, VII (1944), 16–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Reprinted in Cohen, Ronald and Middleton, John (eds), Comparative Political Systems(Garden City, N. Y., Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 45–62Google Scholar.

(2) Xenophon, , Anabasis [transl. by Rouse, W.H.D.] (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 8Google Scholar.

(3) Bryce, James, The American Common-wealth (New York, Macmillan, 1889), Vol. II, ch. LXIIIGoogle Scholar.

(4) Commons, John R., Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924). chap. VIIIGoogle Scholar.

(5) Barker, Ernest, The Social Contract (New York, Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. xii–xivGoogle Scholar.

(6) For Locke the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that of a “fiduciary trust” in which the ruler holds power by a grant of the people (Locke, John, (1960), sees. 151–156)Google Scholar. Rousseau holds a similar view, i.e. “[…] the act as the result of which a government is set up is in no way a contract, but a law; that those who hold the executive power in trust are not the People's masters but its officers; that the people can appoint and remove them at will; that for them it is a question not of contract but of obedience, and that, in assuming the functions which the state lays upon them, they are merely carrying out their duties as citizens, and have no sort of right to dispute about the conditions” (Rousseau, J.-J., quoted in Barker, , op, cit. pp. 265–266)Google Scholar. Hobbes also denies the contractual relationship between sovereign and subjects, affirming the sovereign power to be held without condition and not subject to forfeit (Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (1651), ch. XVIII, p. 2)Google Scholar.

The concept of the social contract, as distinct from the political contract being developed here, has been recently applied to primitive society by Clastres, Pierre, in L'Are, et Panier, le, L'Homme, VI (1966) 2, 14–31. Where Lévi-Strauss applied the contractual principle to the relationship between leader and follower, Clastres has eloquently described the tensions developing from the contractual relationship of individuals with the social orderGoogle Scholar.

(7) Lésvi-Strauss, , op. cit. p. 54Google Scholar.

(8) Gluckman, Max, The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa, in Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E.E., African Political Systems (Oxford 1940), p. 34Google Scholar.

(9) I. Schapera, The Political Organization of the Ngwato of Bechuanaland Protectorate, in Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E.E., op. cit. p. 77Google Scholar.

(10) Schapera, , Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (New York, Schocken, 1967), p. 108Google Scholar.

(11) Ibid. p. 139.

(12) Ibid. p. 179.

(13) Rostovtzeff, M., Rome [transl. by Duff, J. D.] (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 267Google Scholar.

(14) Weber, Max, Economy and Society (New York, Bedminster Press, 1968) [3 vols], pp. 1015–1020Google Scholar.

(15) Truman, David B., The Governmental Process (New York, Knopf, 1960)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967)Google Scholar.

(16) Lowi, Theodore, The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism, American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), 5–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(17) Lowi makes clear that the “public philosophy” is the philosophy of “Public men”—that is the men who make policy, but he does not deal with the question of the public philosophy of the public—that is the American-people-at-large. The analysis offered below is not intended to refute Lowi in any way—indeed we are in complete agreement with his account of the prevailing political theory of men in public life. We explore here the political philosophy of the people-at-large which we contend is complementary to interest-group liberalism and which displays many of the characteristics of the political contract. We should also make clear that we do not claim to ‘prove’ that this popular public philosophy is based upon the political contract, but rather to see to what extent the ideal-type of the political contract makes intelligible contemporary American political behavior.

(18) E.g. Glazer, Nathan, America's Ethnic Pattern: “Melting Pot” or “Nation of Nations”, Commentary, XV (1953), 401–408Google Scholar; Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P., Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge 1963)Google Scholar; Baltzell, E. D., The Protestant Establishment (New York, Vintage Books, 1964)Google Scholar. If we accept the thoroughgoing pragmatism of American politicians we need only consider the undiminished tendency to balance tickets in local and national elections in terms of ethnic groups in order to recognize the continuing pluralistic character of the American nation. A Catholic Vice-Presidential candidate is considered an asset for a Protestant Presidential candidate, but an ‘ethnic’ candidate will also do nicely. In connection with this we note that not long after his 1968 election, President Nixon made conspicuous reference to Agnew's ‘Greek background’ in the process of affirming support for the Vice-President, whose public statements had drawn some adverse comment.

(19) Lowi, op. cit.

(20) Hacker, Andrew (Liberal Democracy and Social Control, American Political Science Review, LI (1957), 1009–1026) makes a similar point about manipulation as the contemporary basis of political control; however, he sees this as having come about because of the passing of political elites of high social status who ruled on the basis of deferenceCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(21) Nor should we be misled by the slogan “Economy in Government”, which usually means cutting items in the budget which are not of interest to the group advancing the slogan. The very same groups that call for pruning the budget will vigorously resist any attempts to curtail their benefits.

(22) Truman, op. cit.

(23) The intermediate term here is individualism. Durkheim noted the growth of individualism in his Division of Labor in Society and elaborated its moral consequences in his study of Suicide. Weber traced the economic consequences of religiously-inspired individualism in his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. We are here considering the political consequences of the individualism of industrial society, and argue that this involves the loss of a concept of political community and with it the transformation of political authority from a moral, to a utilitarian, i.e., contractual base. See also Nisbet, Robert A., Community and Power (New York, Oxford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

(24) Weber, , Economy and Society, op. cit. pp. 33, 36Google Scholar.

(25) Ibid. chs III, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.