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Frustration and preference change in international migration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Gerry Mackie
Gerry Mackie
Affiliation:
University of Chicago(Chicago).
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Abstract

Given equal income incentives, why does migration from poor countries to rich countries vary ? I apply Boudon's logic of relative frustration and Elster's model of interactions among desire, opportunity and action to interpret sociological findings on the self-sustaining nature of the migration process. I conclude that migration does not occur in the absence of initial opportunity, but that once begun tbe migration process itself increases, both the opportunity and the desire to migrate.

L'attraction monétaire, en termes de revenus, étant supposée égale, pourquoi les flux migratoires d'un pays pauvre vers un pays riche varient-ils ? En appliquant le modèle de la frustration relative dans la version de Boudon et le modèle de l'interaction entre souhait, opportunité et action, on peut mettre en évidence la nature auto-entretenue du processus migratoire. L'auteur conclut qu'en l'absence d'opportunité initiale, le processus ne se déclenche pas, mais qu'une fois lancé, il développe de lui-même à la fois l'opportunité et le désir de migration.

Warum variiert die Wanderung von armen zu reichen Ländern bei gleichbleibender monetärer Anziehungskraft der Einkommen ? Ich wende Boudons Logik der relativcn Frustration und Elsters Modell der Interaktion zwischen Wunsch, Gelegenheit und Handlung an, um die soziologischen Elemente dieses sich selbst tragenden Wanderungsprozesses zu interpretieren. Ich schließe mit der Behauptung, daß ohne eine erste Gelegenheit Wanderung nicht entsteht, aber einmal ausgelÖst, entwickelt der Wanderungsprozeß sowohl die Gelegenheit als auch den Wunsch der Auswanderung.

Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , November 1995 , pp. 185 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1995

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References

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(19) Boudon shows that if the poor are more risk-averse than the rich, then inequality reduces frustration. A parallel effect, not reported by Boudon, is that the more dispersed is any unimodal distribution of income gains straddling his ‘curve of maximum discontent’ the less the average frustration. This latter effect is unlikely at the lowest percentage of winners, likely for lower percentages of winners, and unlikely again for higher percentages of winners.

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