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A New Period in the Cyprus Conflict: Can Anastasiadis and Akıncı Change the Status Quo?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 February 2016
Abstract
A new leading actor has been added to the Cyprus Conflict. The winner of the Presidential elections held on the morning of Sunday, 26 April 2015, in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti – TRNC) was the independent candidate Mustafa Akıncı. Both Nicos Anastasiades, who was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus in 2013, and Akıncı are rare leaders supporting the Fifth Annan Plan, which was rejected in a referendum by the Greek Cypriots in 2004. One of the most vital catalysts that could play a role in the resolution of the Cyprus Conflict is a charismatic leader who aims for the resolution of the conflict. Whether the current Presidents have this personality and can change the current balances that are monopolized by the conservatives-nationalists on the Island will be revealed as a result of the negotiations. This article briefly tackles the UN parameters relative to the Cyprus Conflict and addresses the problems awaiting Presidents Anastasiades and Akıncı during the peace negotiations that have started anew.
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- Erasmus Lecture 2014
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- © Academia Europaea 2016
References
References and Notes
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