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Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Fiona Wheeler
Fiona Wheeler*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, ANU
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Extract

A decade ago, members of the High Court recognised an implied guarantee of procedural due process in the exercise of federal judicial power. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth, Leeth v Commonwealth and Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration were the leading cases. Thus in Lim’s Case, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot require or authorise a Chapter III court ‘to exercise judicial power in a manner which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the nature of judicial power.’ Opinions about the content of this due process principle varied. Most judges accepted that federal judicial power must be exercised consistently with the rules of natural justice. Deane and Gaudron JJ went further, however. They argued that the due process principle guaranteed the fair trial of a federal offence, a requirement that, among other things, would prevent abolition of the inherent power of a court to stay an unfair criminal trial.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 205 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 The Australian National University

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References

1 (1991) 172 CLR 501 ('Polyukhovich'), 607 (Deane J), 685, 689 (Toohey J), 703-4 (Gaudron J).

2 (1992) 174 CLR 455 ('Leeth'), 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 486-7 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 502 (Gaudron J).

3 (1992) 176 CLR 1 ('Lim's Case'), 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).

4 But see also, eg, Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 22 (Gaudron J); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 ('Kable'), 98 (Toohey J), 108 (Gaudron J). See generally, Parker, Christine, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341Google Scholar; Zines, Leslie, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166Google Scholar; Winterton, George, 'The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 185Google Scholar; Wheeler, Fiona, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248.Google Scholar

5 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (footnote omitted).

6 Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 487 (Deane and Toohey JJ) referring to 'the obligation to act judicially'; Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J).

7 Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J) and 362 (Gaudron J).

8 See generally, Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia', above n 4, 263-79. See also Lacey, Wendy, 'Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 612-14 (Deane J), 704-8 (Gaudron J). See also at 689 (Toohey J).

10 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 487 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 502-3 (Gaudron J); Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107 (Gaudron J).

11 Cf the judgments of Mason CJ, Dawson J and McHugh J in Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501 and the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ in Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455.

12 See, eg, Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 201-4.

13 (1989) 168 CLR 461.

14 (1992) 177 CLR 106.

15 Williams, George, 'Implied Rights under the Gleeson Court' (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 44.Google Scholar

16 In relation to the implied freedom of political communication, see Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. On the implied guarantee of equality recognised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, see Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 ('Kruger'), 63-8 (Dawson J), 112-13 (Gaudron J), 142 (McHugh J), 153-5 (Gummow J).

17 (1999) 198 CLR 511.

18 See Zines, Leslie, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law' (2002) 5 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21Google Scholar, especially 26-9 (referring to Chief Justice Gleeson's extra-judicial observations); Sir Mason, Anthony, 'The Centenary of the High Court of Australia' (2003) 5 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41, 45Google Scholar. See also Justice Heydon, J D, 'Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law' (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 1Google Scholar (noting, however, that this paper does not deal directly with constitutional and statutory interpretation: at 4).

19 Zines, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric', above n 18, 26.

20 Sir Mason, Anthony, 'Trends in Constitutional Interpretation' (1995) 18 University of New South Wales Law Journal 237, 245.Google Scholar

21 Zines, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric', above n 18, 28.

22 Ibid 26.

23 (2000) 205 CLR 337 ('Ebner').

24 New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Wheat Case') (1915) 20 CLR 54 and Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434. In relation to the 'first' and 'second' 'limbs' of the separation doctrine, see Cheryl Saunders, 'The Separation of Powers' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 3, 11.

25 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Boilermakers' Case') affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529.

26 For a constitution that adopted an express doctrine of separation of powers, see the discussion of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 in M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 119.

27 This has been repeatedly recognised by commentators. See, eg, Zines, Leslie, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 169-70, 212-18.Google Scholar

28 Justice Kirby, Michael, 'Australia' in Shetreet, Shimon and Deschênes, Jules (eds), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) 8, 12.Google Scholar

29 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.

30 Wheeler, Fiona, 'The Boilermakers Case' in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 160, 168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 Winterton, George, 'Judges as Royal Commissioners' (1987) 10 University of New South Wales Law Journal 108, 124.Google Scholar

32 See generally Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case', above n 30. See also Wheeler, Fiona, 'The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A Decade in Overview' (2001) 20 Australian Bar Review 283, 284.Google Scholar

33 Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 381-5 (Isaacs J).

34 There were signs in the 1970s and 1980s that the High Court might overturn the second limb of the separation doctrine, but subsequent developments have affirmed it: see Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case', above n 30, 172-3.

35 (1996) 189 CLR 1.

36 (1999) 198 CLR 511.

37 See, eg, Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 382-3 (Isaacs J); Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434, 469-70 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380-2 (Kitto J); Boilermakers' Case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267-8 and 275-6 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) and in the Privy Council A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540-1; R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 390-3 (Windeyer J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 10-13 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

38 Parker, Stephen, 'The Independence of the Judiciary' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 62, 67-71Google Scholar; Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 382-3 (Isaacs J discussing the views of Sir William Blackstone).

39 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 212.

40 (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

41 I have previously discussed Deane J's approach to derivation of the due process principle in Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 250-1, 254.

42 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (footnote omitted).

43 Ibid. To the same effect, see Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-7 (Deane and Toohey JJ).

44 Cf Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 354. See also Blackford, Russell, 'Judicial Power, Political Liberty and the Post-Industrial State' (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 267, 283.Google Scholar

45 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703-4 (Gaudron J); Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501-3 (Gaudron J); Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362-3 (Gaudron J). See also Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 22 (Gaudron J).

46 Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton (1953) 87 CLR 144.

47 See Parker, , 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 346-7, 354-5.Google Scholar

48 (1998) 193 CLR 173 ('Nicholas').

49 Ibid 208 (footnote omitted).

50 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357.

51 Zines, , The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 171-2.Google Scholar

52 Parker, , 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 347, 354-5.Google Scholar

53 Zines, , The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 173Google Scholar. See also Elliott, E D, 'Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal' (1989) 57 George Washington Law Review 506, 527.Google Scholar

54 Adapting Parker, , 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 354.Google Scholar

55 See R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ), 102 (Mason J); Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57.

56 Winterton, , 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 202 n 117.Google Scholar

57 (1956) 94 CLR 254, 314-15 (referred to in Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', ibid).

58 (1996) 189 CLR 51. See also Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703 (Gaudron J).

59 For a brief comparison of the Australian and United States doctrines, see Williams, George, 'Due Process' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 226-7.Google Scholar

60 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J), 704 (Gaudron J). See also, eg, Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496-7 (Gaudron J).

61 See the authorities above n 6. See also Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 394-5 (Gummow J); Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 (Brennan CJ), 208 (Gaudron J); Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 ('Bass'), 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 101 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362-3 (Gaudron J), 372-3 (Kirby J); Justice Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as Well as Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 238-9.

62 Wheeler, , 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 253-4.Google Scholar

63 The finding in Lim's Case that s 54R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was invalid is best regarded as an application of the principle that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot interfere with the exercise of federal judicial power: see Winterton, , 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 193-4Google Scholar. This is the same principle that was applied by the Privy Council in Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259.

64 McHugh, above n 61, 237 and 238-9. See also at 241.

65 (1998) 193 CLR 173.

66 (1999) 198 CLR 334.

67 (2000) 205 CLR 337.

68 (2002) 209 CLR 339 ('Cameron').

69 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 207-9 (Gaudron J), 232 (Gummow J). Hayne J, also in the majority, was silent on the issue. Kirby J, one of the dissentients in Nicholas, has also recognised the generalised due process principle: see, eg, Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 592 and Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 372-3.

70 (1995) 184 CLR 19 ('Ridgeway').

71 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 191, 193 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 208, 210-11 (Gaudron J), 236, 238-9 (Gummow J), 276-9 (Hayne J). McHugh J dissented finding that s 15X infringed Chapter III by interfering to an unacceptable extent with the capacity of a Chapter III court 'to protect the integrity of its processes' (at 222-6). Kirby J dissented on a similar basis (at 264-6).

72 Ibid 208-9.

73 Ibid 209.

74 (1999) 198 CLR 334.

75 Ibid 359 (footnotes omitted).

76 Above, text accompanying n 72.

77 (1999) 198 CLR 334, 357.

78 Ibid 359.

79 Ibid 363-71.

80 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 189-91 (Brennan CJ), 202-3 (Toohey J), 234-6 (Gummow J), 273-4 (Hayne J). See also, albeit in dissent, at 225 (McHugh J).

81 See generally Campbell, Enid, 'Rules of Evidence and the Constitution' (2000) 26 Monash University Law Review 312.Google Scholar

82 See also ibid 315.

83 (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359.

84 See generally Mark Aronson and Dyer, Bruce, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed, 2000) 435-6, 438-41.Google Scholar

85 (2000) 204 CLR 82.

86 Ibid 101. See also Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 63 (Dawson J).

87 Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208. See also Justice Drummond, Douglas, 'Towards a More Compliant Judiciary? - Part I' (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 304, 306.Google Scholar

88 (2000) 205 CLR 337.

89 Ibid 344, 350.

90 Ibid 356.

91 Ibid 396.

92 Ibid 366-7.

93 Ibid 390 quoting Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 75 (Deane J) (footnote omitted).

94 Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 368.

95 Ibid 362-3.

96 Ibid 363.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid 363-4.

100 Ibid 368. Cf at 359 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

101 Ibid 373.

102 Ibid (footnote omitted). See also Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 500 (Kirby J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 206 CLR 128, 147 (Kirby J); Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 55 n 196 (Kirby J); Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 195 ALR 321, 392, 401, 409 (Kirby J).

103 See also Campbell, Enid, 'Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias – A Constitutional Issue' (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41Google Scholar; Campbell, Enid and Lee, H P, The Australian Judiciary (2001) 144-5, 151.Google Scholar

104 In addition to the authorities collected above n 61, see also R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 588-9 (Dixon and Evatt JJ).

105 See, eg, Parker, , 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, especially 88-92.Google Scholar

106 (1995) 184 CLR 348.

107 Ibid 394 (footnote omitted).

108 Ibid.

109 A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 542. See also McHugh, above n 61, 240.

110 (1997) 189 CLR 520.

111 See also the discussion in Campbell, 'Rules of Evidence and the Constitution', above n 81, 328-9.

112 Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386, 395 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J) describing the power of the High Court to deal with contempts as deriving from s 71 of the Constitution.

113 (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363.

114 Ibid 364.

115 For a good example, see the joint judgment of Dixon CJ and McTiernan J in R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353. See also, eg, Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ); Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386, 395 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).

116 Campbell, , 'Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias', above n 103, 42.Google Scholar

117 Ibid 42. See also Campbell and Lee, above n 103, 146, 151.

118 (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363, 364, 368.

119 Ibid 368.

120 See also ibid 393 (Kirby J).

121 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J).

122 Ibid 103 (Gaudron J), 116 (McHugh J).

123 Ibid 103 (Gaudron J).

124 Ibid 103, 106 (Gaudron J), 116, 118-19 (McHugh J), 126, 128 (Gummow J).

125 Ibid 106-8 (Gaudron J), 121-4 (McHugh J), 132-4 (Gummow J). The reasoning of the fourth member of the Kable majority, Toohey J, was somewhat narrower than the others. For a summary of his approach, see Zines, Leslie, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed, 2002) 244-5.Google Scholar

126 See the view of Zines, , Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 245Google Scholar ('It is clear that Kable would restrict State legislative power to control the judicial process so as to impair the principles of natural justice and due process'). See also Campbell, Enid, 'Constitutional Protection of State Courts and Judges' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 397, 416-17Google Scholar; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) (2000) 181 ALR 694, 701 (Spigelman CJ); Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40.

127 The scope of the Kable doctrine is currently before the High Court in the appeal in Fardon v A-G (Qld) (B104/2003 and B105/2003, judgment reserved 2 March 2004).

128 The present state of the law in this regard is discussed in Zines, , Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 172-86Google Scholar. There appears to be a growing acceptance that territory courts exercise some federal jurisdiction, however: see, eg, Putland v The Queen (2004) 204 ALR 455, 456 (Gleeson CJ), 472, 473-4 (Kirby J).

129 Cf North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2002) 192 ALR 701, 724-9 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J) rejecting an argument that Kable applies to territory courts. This was because Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 and Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591 established that territory courts do not exercise federal jurisdiction. The Federal Court noted it was bound by these decisions, despite recent suggestions from some High Court judges that territory courts may exercise federal jurisdiction.

130 Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 (Gaudron J).

131 Parker, , 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, 76-9, 89-90Google Scholar. Of course, s 72 of the Constitution protects the tenure and remuneration of judges of federal courts. Whether Chapter III of the Constitution impliedly protects the tenure and remuneration of state judges is discussed in Peter Johnston and Rohan Hardcastle, 'State Courts: The Limits of Kable' (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 216, 236-42. See also Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 195 ALR 321, 390 (Kirby J).

132 Parker, , 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, 79-81, 91.Google Scholar

133 Ibid 91.

134 Ibid 90.

135 A number of judges have indicated that 'open justice' is a requirement of the due process principle. However, the reasons for courts being open to the public are wider than the need to safeguard the appearance of impartiality in judicial proceedings. Thus, 'open justice' is probably a freestanding aspect of due process. See the authorities collected in Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia', above n 4, 261-3. See also McHugh, above n 61, 239; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) (2000) 181 ALR 694, 707 (Spigelman CJ), 721 (Priestley JA).

136 See, eg, Justice Kirby, Michael, 'Acting Judges – A Non-theoretical Danger' (1998) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 69, 72Google Scholar; Drummond, above n 87, 313.

137 Kirby, , 'Acting Judges', above n 136, 72-5.Google Scholar

138 (2002) 192 ALR 701.

139 Ibid 729-31 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J).

140 (1999) 200 CLR 322 ('Eastman').

141 Ibid 333 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ), 340 (Gaudron J), 348-50 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf at 356, 383-4 (Kirby J) (dissenting).

142 Ibid 340. See also at 353 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 364-5 (Kirby J).

143 On this principle see Zines, , Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 204-9, 242-3Google Scholar. See also Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 102 (Gaudron J), 110, 115 (McHugh J) and the expressio unius argument based on s 72 of the Constitution discussed in Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 131, 241. This expressio unius argument seems to have been accepted by the Federal Court in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2002) 192 ALR 701, 730 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J).

144 D2/2003 (judgment reserved 8 October 2003).

145 See, eg, Drummond, above n 87, for a discussion of whether the movement towards externally imposed 'judicial performance' standards offends core aspects of the due process principle, especially the natural justice requirement.

146 Wheeler, , 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 263-70.Google Scholar

147 McHugh, above n 61, 240-1. See also KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221, 227 (McHugh J).

148 See, eg, Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443, 483; Crampton v The Queen (2000) 206 CLR 161,208; KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221, 254; Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 370; Ng v The Queen (2003) 197 ALR 10, 27.

149 On the retroactivity aspect of the due process principle, see the judgments of Mason CJ, Dawson J and McHugh J in Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501. On Gaudron J's view that 'equal justice … is fundamental to the judicial process', see Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469-70 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 502 (Gaudron J).

150 Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 343 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ) (footnote omitted).

151 Ibid 343-4 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), 350-1 (McHugh J), 358-61 (Kirby J).

152 Ibid 343-4 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), 350-4 (McHugh J).

153 Ibid 352-3 (emphasis in third and fourth sentences added).

154 At the end of the quoted passage, he referred to Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

155 Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 368.

156 Ibid 369.

157 Ibid 353.

158 See also Milat v The Queen (2004) 205 ALR 338, 342-3 (McHugh J).

159 (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-8, 490-3.

160 Ibid 493.

161 Ibid 487.

162 Ibid 502-3.

163 Ibid 467-71. See Wheeler, , 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 281-2Google Scholar; Parker, , 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 353Google Scholar; Winterton, , 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 203Google Scholar; Zines, , The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 205-6.Google Scholar

164 (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469-70; Wheeler, , 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 281-2Google Scholar; Parker, , 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 353Google Scholar; Winterton, , 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 203Google Scholar; McHugh, above n 61, 251; Zines, , The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 205-6.Google Scholar

165 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 63-8 (Dawson J), 112-13 (Gaudron J), 142 (McHugh J), 153-5 (Gummow J).

166 Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ said in Leeth that even assuming the existence of Gaudron J's equal justice due process requirement, the legislation in question was not relevantly discriminatory: (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470-1. See also at 493 (Deane and Toohey JJ). Speaking extra-judicially, Justice McHugh seems to have expressed at least some support for Gaudron J's equal justice due process guarantee (see McHugh, above n 61, 251: 'the more limited Ch III doctrine proposed by Gaudron J, and at least partially endorsed in Kruger by Dawson J and myself, appears to be still open'). The judgments of Dawson J and McHugh J in Kruger support a procedural due process guarantee, but reject a doctrine of substantive due process. It may be then that McHugh J supports a guarantee of procedural equality in the exercise of federal judicial power. As he has acknowledged, however, the distinction between procedure and substance is far from clear: McHugh, above n 61, 237.

167 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107-8 (Gaudron J); Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 112 (Gaudron J); Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 (Gaudron J).

168 See his comment in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ngoc Tri Chau v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1995) 132 ALR 430, 445. See also Putland v The Queen (2004) 204 ALR 455, 484-5 (Kirby J) and, for a more specific commitment, Muir v The Queen [2004] HCA 21 (Unreported, McHugh, Hayne and Kirby JJ, 2 April 2004) [28] (Kirby J). Cf, however, Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 369 (Kirby J).

169 (2004) 204 ALR 455.

170 Ibid 462 (Gleeson CJ), 470-1 (Gummow and Heydon JJ), 486 (Callinan J). Cf at 483-5 (Kirby J) (dissenting). The case arose from the trial by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Gleeson CJ said that the Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction here (at 456). Kirby J said that 'the existence of federal jurisdiction was not challenged by either party to this appeal' (at 474). The other members of the High Court did not directly comment on whether federal jurisdiction was attracted.

171 However, Gleeson CJ observed that '[s]ection 68 of the Judiciary Act reflects a permissible legislative choice, and one which, for a century, has resulted in some differences in the sentencing of federal offenders according to where they are sentenced': ibid 462 (footnote omitted).

172 Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 282-3. See also Kennett, Geoffrey, 'Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution' (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 581, 603Google Scholar where a similar argument is made; Kirk, Jeremy, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 39Google Scholar; Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 66 (Dawson J), 155 (Gummow J); Muir v The Queen [2004] HCA 21 (Unreported, McHugh, Hayne and Kirby JJ, 2 April 2004) [23]–[28] (Kirby J).

173 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 112 (footnote omitted). See also Kennett, above n 172, 594; Melissa Castan and Sarah Joseph, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2001) 159.

174 See Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 68 (Dawson J). Cf Kennett, above n 172, 604 commenting on the application of the broader equality guarantee recognised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth.

175 (2002) 212 CLR 1.

176 Ibid 55 (footnote omitted).

177 Ibid (footnote omitted).