Medical biotechnology offers vast opportunity for the treatment of human genetic conditions, including the development and improvement of drugs, diagnostic capabilities and therapeutic techniques. Australian health and medical research has a rich and proud history. This has been recognised in numerous federal government reports, which examine the sustainability of research momentum and the ability of the Australian industry to capitalise on this research base. Australia‘s increasing $1 billion trade deficit in pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and other health and medical industries has been a major impetus for the push to develop Australia's medical research base.

Many domestic and export market opportunities for the Australian biotechnology industry exist. These opportunities have been taken up for the most part by the existing research sector, and by small companies, whether spin-off companies from research institutions, or companies independently conducting research. The industry is highly competitive and motivated to participate in the biotechnology revolution on an international level. To enable them to do this, intellectual property protection is crucial as a tool to enable trade, collaboration, and competitive advantage.

A decade ago, members of the High Court recognised an implied guarantee of procedural due process in the exercise of federal judicial power. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth, Leeth v Commonwealth and Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration were the leading cases. Thus in Lim’s Case, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot require or authorise a Chapter III court ‘to exercise judicial power in a manner which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the nature of judicial power.’ Opinions about the content of this due process principle varied. Most judges accepted that federal judicial power must be exercised consistently with the rules of natural justice. Deane and Gaudron JJ went further, however. They argued that the due process principle guaranteed the fair trial of a federal offence, a requirement that, among other things, would prevent abolition of the inherent power of a court to stay an unfair criminal trial.

It may be true that morality cannot be legislated, but behaviour can be regulated. The law may not change the heart, but it can restrain the heartless.

In a recent issue of the Australian Law Journal Enid Campbell argued that both the length of High Court judgments and the number of multiple separate High Court judgments has increased and that this is counterproductive. This view echoes similar concerns expressed by some judges and others in the profession. This argument is based on several assumptions about the High Court that are widely held among lawyers, but which have not been subject to any detailed empirical research. Those assumptions are:

1. (a) High Court judgments have become significantly longer in recent times.

2. (b) There is an increase in the number of concurring judgments on the High Court.

3. (c) There is an increase in the number of dissenting judgments on the High Court.