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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
Are legislators’ subjective motives relevant to the constitutional validity of an Act? In the USA, an Act may be found to be unconstitutional because legislators were motivated by a desire to discriminate against religion or interstate trade. The High Court has rejected such an enquiry in cases concerning ss 92 and 116 of our own Constitution. This article examines how, with substantially similar constitutional protections, the courts of these two countries have arrived at opposing views on the relevance of ‘motive evidence’. The High Court can avoid recourse to motive evidence because, when compared with its US counterpart, it applies a clearer test in the religion cases, and a more nuanced approach to proportionality testing in the interstate trade cases. This is the preferable approach.
I thank Matthew Groves for his assistance with this paper, Alex Lee for many fruitful conversations, and Duncan Wallace and Shawn Rajanayagam for reviewing an earlier draft. I am similarly indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. All errors are my own.
1 I am not concerned here with the question of judicial review of administrative decisions.
2 The courts also use such evidence in cases involving denial of the equal protection of the laws through racial discrimination, discussed further below.
3 J, Morris Clark, ‘Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law’ (1978) 15 San Diego Law Review 953, 961Google Scholar. See also John, Hart Ely, ‘Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law’ (1970) 79 Yale Law Journal 1205, 1217–21Google Scholar; Theodore, Eisenberg, ‘Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication’ (1977) 52 NYU Law Review 36, 41Google Scholar.
4 Jeffrey, Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality (Greenwood Press, 2001) 145Google Scholar.
5 This example is given by Richard, H Fallon Jr, ‘Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent’ (2016) 130 Harvard Law Review 523, 557–8Google Scholar. See also Francis, J Beckwith, ‘The Court of Disbelief: The Constitution's Article VI Religious Test Prohibition and the Judiciary's Religious Motive Analysis’ (2006) 33 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 337, 347Google Scholar.
6 Fallon Jr, above n 5, 536.
7 See, eg, Fletcher v Peck, 10 US 87, 130 (1810); United States v O’Brien 391 US 367, 384 (1968); Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217, 224–5 (1971). Motive evidence gained acceptance only from the 1970s onwards: see generally Caleb, Nelson, ‘Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose’ (2008) 83 NYU Law Review 1784Google Scholar.
8 Ely, above n 3, 1207, 1211.
9 Calvin, Massey, ‘The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review’ (2007) 59 South Carolina Law Review 1, 35Google Scholar. See also Fallon Jr, above n 5, 533; Eisenberg, above n 3, 36, 113.
10 See generally Ely, above n 3; Fallon Jr, above n 5; Nelson, above n 7; Massey, above n 9.
11 Nelson, above n 7, 1786. See also, Shaman, above n 4, 156–7.
12 Nelson, above n 7, 1854–5.
13 (1988) 165 CLR 360.
14 Ibid 394.
15 Ibid 399.
16 Ibid 394.
17 Susan, Kenny, ‘Constitutional Fact Ascertainment’ (1990) 1 Public Law Review 134, 162Google Scholar.
18 Susan, Kiefel, ‘Section 92: Markets, Protectionism and Proportionality—Australian and European Perspectives’ (2010) 36(2) Monash University Law Review 1, 8, 15Google Scholar.
19 (1990) 169 CLR 436.
20 George, Williams, Sean, Brennan and Andrew, Lynch, Blackshield and Williams’ Australian Constitutional Law: Commentary and Materials (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2014) 1216Google Scholar [27.48].
21 (1990) 169 CLR 436, 458.
22 Ibid 474–6.
23 (2012) 249 CLR 298.
24 Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 186 FCR 226, 239–40 [44].
25 The case was brought under s 49 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), which mirrors s 92 of the Constitution.
26 Racing New South Wales v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (2010) 189 FCR 448, 483 [112]; quoted with approval in Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2012) 249 CLR 298, 320 [24]. The fact that this is an ‘essentially objective inquiry’ had earlier been noted in Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (2012) 249 CLR 217, 265 [36] (‘Betfair No 2’) citing APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of NSW (2005) 224 CLR 322, 394 [178] (Gummow J), 462 [424] (Callinan J) (concerning the intercourse limb of s 92).
27 A-G (Vic); ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 579, 584 (Barwick CJ), 598 (Gibbs J), 609 (Stephen J), 615–6 (Mason J), 563 (Wilson J) (‘DOGS Case’); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 40 (Brennan CJ), 86 (Toohey J), 132 (Gaudron J), 160 (Gummow J).
28 DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 584 (Barwick CJ).
29 Luke, Beck, ‘The Case Against Improper Purpose as the Touchstone for Invalidity Under Section 116 of the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 44 Federal Law Review 505Google Scholar.
30 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 132. Gaudron J (at 133) and Toohey J (at 86) noted that a law with multiple purposes will be invalid if even one of these purposes is proscribed by s 116. See also, DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 579 (Barwick CJ) arguing that only laws whose sole purpose is contrary to s 116 will be invalid. The view of Gaudron and Toohey JJ must be preferred for the reasons given by: Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 123 (Latham CJ); Luke, Beck, ‘Higgins’ Argument for Section 116 of the Constitution’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 393Google Scholar.
31 DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 581.
32 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 160. His Honour then noted that, on another set of facts, evidence extraneous to the text could indicate ‘a concealed means or circuitous device’ also proscribed by s 116, but that this question was for another day.
33 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 273; cited in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 86 (Toohey J), 160 (Gummow J).
34 Fairfax v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1, 14.
35 Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169, 202. See also South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373, 424 (Latham CJ).
36 This extends also to the interpretation of other legal texts: see Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, 282–90 [95]–[115] (Heydon and Crennan JJ).
37 Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455 [28].
38 Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 [44]. See also Michael, Kirby, ‘Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts’ (2003) 24 Statute Law Review 95, 98–9Google Scholar.
39 See, eg, Frank, Easterbrook, ‘Statutes’ Domains’ (1983) University of Chicago Law Review 533, 547–8Google Scholar; Max, Radin, ‘Statutory Interpretation’ (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 863Google Scholar. In reply, see, eg, Richard, Ekins and Jeffrey, Goldsworthy, ‘The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 39Google Scholar; Fallon Jr, above n 5, 537–41.
40 See, eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB.
41 Art III, § 8, cl 3.
42 Pike v Bruce Church Inc, 397 US 137, 142 (1970).
43 Vicki, C Jackson and Susan, Low Bloch, Federalism: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution (Praeger, 2013) 218Google Scholar.
44 Richard, A Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2014) 231Google Scholar.
45 See Massey, above n 9, 25.
46 252 F 3d 316 (4th Cir, 2001).
47 Ibid 336–7.
48 Ibid 337–338.
49 Ibid 340.
50 Ibid 336.
51 468 US 263 (1984) (‘Lemon’).
52 Ibid 270.
53 Ibid 271 (emphasis added).
54 Shaman, above n 4, 156.
55 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 532 (1993) (‘City of Hialeah’).
56 Ibid 533.
57 403 US 602, 612–3 (1971) (citations omitted).
58 I note that this casts doubt on the distinction often drawn by the High Court between the ‘purposive’ inquiry relevant to s 116, and the supposedly wider phrasing of laws ‘respecting’ religion in the First Amendment: see, eg, DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 579 (Barwick CJ), 598 (Gibbs J), 609 (Stephen J), 615–6 (Mason J), 653 (Wilson J).
59 508 US 520 (1993).
60 Ibid 534–5.
61 Ibid 541.
62 Ibid 541–2.
63 Ibid 542.
64 Ibid 547.
65 See also Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor J, concurring) promoting an inquiry into ‘actual’ purpose. Perhaps reflecting the inconsistency noted earlier, O’Connor J has on another occasion disavowed inquiries into motivation: see Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools (Dist 66) v Mergens, 496 US 226, 249 (1990).
66 472 US 38 (1985) (concerning a statute which allowed schools to set aside one minute of silence for voluntary prayer or meditation).
67 Ibid 56.
68 Ibid 59–60.
69 Ibid 63 (emphasis in original).
70 482 US 578 (1987).
71 Ibid 586. See, however, at 594, where the Court outlines a number of more objective considerations in determining purpose.
72 Ibid 611, 613. Scalia J's attack on the majority's judgment is made more interesting by the fact that the majority's use of motive evidence in Aguillard is far more restrained than in many of the other cases discussed here.
73 Ibid 613.
74 545 US 844 (2005) (‘McCreary County’). Though the authors conclude that the test ultimately remains a subjective inquiry, see Boris, Bittker, Scott, Idleman and Frank, Ravitch, Religion and the State in American Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 167–8Google Scholar.
75 545 US 844, 861 (2005).
76 Ibid 861.
77 Ibid 862.
78 Ibid 862, quoting Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe 530 US 290, 308 (2000) and Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 76 (1985).
79 545 US 844, 863 (2005).
80 This, however, does provide some support to the County's charge that the Court acts selectively in having recourse to motive evidence.
81 545 US 844, 863 (2005) (emphasis added).
82 Ibid 862. Nelson, above n 7, 1853 notes that such evidence may be available to an objective observer.
83 545 US 844, 861–2 (2005), citing cases discussed in this article.
84 Ibid 865.
85 ACLU of Ohio Foundation Inc v Board of Commissioners of Lucas County, Ohio, 444 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 (ND Oh, 2006).
86 Bittker, Idleman and Ravitch, above n 74, 168 consider the test to remain subjective.
87 Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 US 252, 265 (1977) (‘Arlington Heights’). See also, Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239–42 (1976); Hunter v Underwood, 471 US 222, 227 (1985).
88 426 US 229 (1976). Douglas and White JJ had previously reached the same conclusions in dissent: Palmer v Thompson 403 US 217, 238 (Douglas J), 240 (White J) (1971).
89 Ibid 244 n 11. The Court's comments were directed to the decision of the majority in Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971), which had interpreted two previous decisions as based on effects, rather than any notion of motive or purpose. Those two cases were: Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339 (1960); Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218 (1964).
90 426 US 229, 244 n 11 (1976).
91 429 US 252 (1977).
92 Arlington Heights, 429 US 252, 267–8 (1977).
93 Ibid 268.
94 Ibid 267.
95 471 US 222 (1985) (‘Hunter’).
96 Ibid 223.
97 Ibid 227.
98 Ibid 228.
99 Ibid 228–9, discussing United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 383–4 (1968).
100 471 US 222, 228–31 (1985).
101 Ibid 233.
102 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 913 (1995); see also, Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US 541, 546 (1999).
103 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 916 (1995).
104 Nelson, above n 7, 1879.
105 See, eg, the citation of Lemon in the equal protection context (Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 244 n 11 (1976)) and the citation of both dormant commerce clause and equal protection jurisprudence in the first amendment context: McCreary County, 545 US 844, 861 (2005).
106 Fallon Jr, above n 5, 533.
107 See, Arlington Heights, 429 US 252, 265–6 (1977); Bacchus Imports Ltd v Dias, 468 US 263, 270 (1984). Each case state that improper motive makes judicial deference improper, but it is unclear whether this results in the application of strict scrutiny or automatic invalidity. Fallon Jr, above n 5, 578–9, reads Arlington Heights as falling into neither category and supporting a ‘but for’ test, but I can find no support for this in the Court's reasons.
108 See, eg, Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985); Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987); McCreary County, 545 US 844 (2005).
109 Bittker, Idleman and Ravitch, above n 74, 161; McCreary County, 545 US 844, 865 (2005).
110 Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 43 (1985).
111 471 US 222 (1985).
112 Ibid 228.
113 There are theoretical and practical problems in the proof of competing motives. These are discussed below as hurdles placed in the path of plaintiffs, but appear to apply equally to state defendants in this setting.
114 I do not intend to engage in technical debates about the nature of deference here, and use the term simply to denote US judges’ general reluctance to impinge on political judgments.
115 Shaman, above n 4, 71.
116 Ibid 79. See also, Larry, Simon, ‘Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination’ (1978) 15 San Diego Law Review 1041, 1113Google Scholar (the test ‘is largely a sham’).
117 I pass over ‘intermediate scrutiny’ here (though it is noted further below), because it is not common in the substantive areas of constitutional law discussed in this article. In those areas, the Court continues to switch between minimal and strict scrutiny in a dichotomous fashion.
118 Shaman, above n 4, 72.
119 Gerald, Gunther, ‘The Supreme Court 1971 Term Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection’ (1972) 86 Harvard Law Review 1, 8Google Scholar. This wisdom remains influential despite being challenged empirically to some extent: see, Adam, Winkler, ‘Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 793Google Scholar.
120 Shaman, above n 4, 90; Ashutosh, Bhagwat, ‘Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis’ (1997) 85 California Law Review 297, 304Google Scholar.
121 Paul, Brest, ‘Palmer v Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive’ [1971] Supreme Court Review 95, 110Google Scholar.
122 Michael, Perry, ‘The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination’ (1977) 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 540, 556Google Scholar. See, eg, the statement in City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 531 (1993) that incidental effects attract only minimal scrutiny.
123 Amelia, Simpson, ‘Grounding the High Court's Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case for Improper Purpose as the Touchstone’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 445, 447Google Scholar.
124 Ely, above n 3, 1316; Eisenberg, above n 3, 46, 113; Robert, G Schwemm, ‘From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation’ [1977] University of Illinois Law Forum 961, 1050Google Scholar.
125 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 248 (1976). See also, Eisenberg, above n 3, 46.
126 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 240–1 (1976).
127 Massey, above n 9, 45. This problem is particularly acute in a country such as the US, where minimal legislative effort is required to maintain past discriminatory injustices: see Samuel, Issacharoff, ‘Making the Violation fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law’ (1982) 92 Yale Law Journal 328, 339–40 n 72Google Scholar.
128 Nelson, above n 7, 1785.
129 426 US 229, 242 (1976). See also, Hunt v Cromartie 526 US 541, 546 (1999).
130 252 F 3d 316, 334 (4th Cir, 2001).
131 508 US 520, 531–2, 542, 546 (1993).
132 Ibid 546.
133 The two are not the same thing, though there is no doubt that what a statute does (ie its effects) will, in most cases, be a good indication of its purpose. See, McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178, 205 [40] (‘McCloy’); APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of NSW (2005) 224 CLR 322, 394 [178] (Gummow J); Attorney-General (SA), ‘Submissions of the Attorney-General for South Australia (Intervening)’, submission in Brown v Tasmania, H3/2016, 27 March 2017, [11]–[17].
134 Stephen, McLeish, ‘Making Sense of Religion and the Constitution: A Fresh Start for Section 116’ (1992) 18 Monash University Law Review 207Google Scholar, 211.
135 Ibid.
136 (2012) 249 CLR 217, 269 [52].
137 Anthony, Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 109, 121Google Scholar. Mark Watts has argued that such a structure can be too rigid, and can lead the Court to covertly apply one standard while paying lip service to another: Mark, Watts, ‘Reasonably Appropriate and Adapted? Assessing Proportionality and the “Spectrum” of Scrutiny in McCloy v New South Wales’ (2016) 35(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 349Google Scholar.
138 Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 580–1 (‘Tajjour’); McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 238–9 [150]–[156]. Watts, above n 137, 353, notes that Gageler J's approach resembles a ‘spectrum of scrutiny’ more than the purely categorical approach of the US.
139 Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 551 [37] (French CJ), 575 [131]–[132] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
140 Adrienne, Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 842, 844Google Scholar. See also the judgments of French CJ and Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508.
141 Adrienne, Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 686Google Scholar.
142 Watts, above n 137, 356.
143 McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 220 [91] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
144 Mason, above n 137, 117.
145 Indeed, the problems with the bi-polar system led to the creation of ‘intermediate scrutiny’ in the US cases in the 1980s, providing a more reasonable middle ground between minimal and strict scrutiny. That standard is used in gender discrimination cases, but does not figure in the areas of trade, religion and race discussed in this paper, where the minimal/strict dichotomy remains. See Thomas, Lundmark, Power and Rights in US Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 193Google Scholar; Shaman, above n 4, 95; Schwemm, above n 124, 1050.
146 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Executive Order 13769), 82 FR 8977 (27 January 2017).
147 United States Constitution amends I, XIV § 1.
148 Donald J Trump, ‘Statement by Donald J Trump on Preventing Muslim Immigration’ (Press Release, 7 December 2015); Washington v Trump (9th Cir, No 17-35105, 9 February 2017) 25–6; Aziz v Trump (D Va, No 1:17-cv-00116, 13 February 2017) 7–9, 13–19; Hawaii v Trump (D Haw, CV No 17-00050, 15 March 2017) 10–12, 28–40.
149 Clark, above n 3, 977.
150 Massey, above n 9, 5.
151 Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia J, dissenting). See also, Simon, above n 116, 1070. A related problem is that of futility—a law struck down on the basis of motive could be re-enacted for different reasons: Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217, 225 (1971). This, however, is no different from correctly re-making an administrative decision on different grounds: Brest, above n 121, 125.
152 Schwemm, above n 124, 1031–4, 1050–1.
153 Difficulties in evaluating subjective intentions do not necessarily mean that none exist, but only that inquiries should be limited to objective indicia: Ekins and Goldsworthy, above n 39.
154 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 6(2)(c), (d).
155 See Wong v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 1271, [33]–[37]; ACCC v Global Prepaid Communications Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 409, [9] (Gyles J).
156 But see Mark, Aronson, Matthew, Groves and Greg, Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 325–6Google Scholar [5.580], noting that proof of individuals’ motives remains difficult, while courts have nevertheless admitted motive evidence in respect of multi-member bodies (eg, councils) with an ‘apparent lack of concern’.
157 Ely, above n 3.
158 Ibid 1235.
159 Ibid 1208.
160 Stigmatic injury arguments are also made by Clark, above n 3; Fallon Jr, above n 5, 530.
161 Massey, above n 9, 45–6.
162 Ibid 50–2.
163 Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217, 238 (Douglas J, dissenting), 240 (White J, dissenting) (1971).
164 Eisenberg, above n 3, 101. The point is also made by Kent, Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution vol II (Establishment and Fairness) (Princeton University Press, 2008) 168–9Google Scholar.
165 DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 584 (Barwick CJ).
166 Simpson, above n 123, 447.
167 Parkes’ advocacy for s 92 relied on the US experience, and s 116 has been described as ‘a fairly blatant piece of transliteration’ of the First Amendment: Gonzalo, Villalta Puig, ‘Intercolonial Free Trade: The Drafting History of Section 92 of the Australian Constitution’ (2011) 30(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 1, 9–11Google Scholar; Clifford, L Pannam, ‘Travelling Section 116 with a US Road Map’ (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 41, 41Google Scholar.
168 See Hon, Stephen Gageler, ‘The Constitutional Dimension’ in M, Groves (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 179Google Scholar.
169 Puig, above n 167, 20.
170 Nelson, above n 7, 1880.