This article considers the different ways in which judicial decisions use and narrate history. It distinguishes between several forms of judicial recourse to history, including the difference between decisions which refer to general history and decisions that refer to the history of legal documents; and the difference between decisions on factual controversies that have historical significance and decisions that take judicial notice of history. At the same time, this article recognises that the division between these categories is not clear-cut. An analysis of constitutional case law sheds light on the ways in which courts harness historical events in order to justify their normative choices. More specifically, while some judicial decisions cite history in order to justify continuity with the past, others regard history as a cautionary tale that calls for a change of direction. In between, some decisions opt for a middle route, supporting continuity with historical decisions but offering new interpretations of their lessons. This article concludes by examining decisions that try to ‘learn’ from history, illuminating the enduring challenge in drawing different and even conflicting lessons from the very same historical event.

This article analyses the normative structure of Australian administrative law through the prism of two distinct intellectual approaches to the law of judicial review: the ‘grounds approach’ and the ‘statutory approach’. We explore the development of both approaches and track the contemporary ascendance of the statutory approach in light of the political and constitutional context within which the practice of judicial review is situated. We then reflect on the ways that each responds to two central legitimacy problems which must be confronted by modern administrative law: the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and the legitimacy of the forms of law associated with contemporary administrative government.

This article, in three parts, suggests both why and how the courts ought to reconsider, and thereby update, the approach to the free exercise guarantee of s 116. First, having briefly outlined the current interpretation of the free exercise guarantee, it suggests the necessity for an update based upon the need for liberal constitutional democracies to provide what has been referred to as ‘“constitutional space” for investigation and pursuit of truth.’ Second, it proposes a ‘judicial interpretive update’ to the interpretation of s 116, outlining a two-stage approach which, in the first stage, sets the ambit of the right and, in the second, provides for a limitations standard by which to assess infringements of the right. Finally, the article concludes that the proposed update to s 116 ensures a robust protection for free exercise in its application to Commonwealth legislation and executive action.

The High Court's tentative moves toward adopting structured proportionality as a method of constitutional review have been hampered by concerns about the separation of powers. This article argues that the manner in which a court undertakes proportionality analysis is crucial to the question of whether it is acting within the domain of judicial power. In this regard, the concept of judicial deference plays a vital but thus far under-theorised role. Deference refers not to judicial submission or surrender to the legislature, which would abdicate judicial power to a non-judicial body. Rather, it refers to a court giving weight to the judgment or opinion of government in circumstances of normative or empirical uncertainty. Courts afford deference in this way for two reasons: the desirability of respecting decisions made by democratically legitimate decision-makers, and the practical advantages that inhere in relying on the institutional competence and expertise of the other branches of government. An increased understanding of these rationales for deference in the context of constitutional review would diminish concerns about the High Court straying outside the domain of judicial power. Proportionality and deference exist in a symbiotic relationship and should be addressed together by a coherent judicial theory; many of the concerns raised by the High Court about the former would diminish were it also to embrace the latter.

Unions engaged in enterprise bargaining under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) frequently exhibit considerable creativity in the forms of industrial action they take in order to pressurise employers to make concessions in bargaining. Examples of such conduct can include sending emails with the Caps Lock function turned on, wearing union campaign clothing or insignia whilst at work, and communicating with clients and customers of the target employer about the employees’ industrial campaign.

This creativity is pushing the definition of ‘industrial action’ in s 19 of the FW Act to its outer limits. This is important due to the fact that many aspects of the bargaining regime established under the FW Act turn upon whether particular conduct falls within the statutory definition. These include provisions concerning the lawfulness or otherwise of industrial action; access to orders to stop or prevent unprotected industrial action; payment of wages for periods when employees are engaging in industrial action; and employers’ capacity to stand down employees without pay where they cannot usefully be employed because of industrial action which does not involve the employer or its employees.

This article traces the current definition back to its origins in the system of conciliation and arbitration that operated in Australia throughout most of the 20th century. That system treated all industrial action as unlawful at statute and/or common law. The definition has not been significantly changed since the replacement of that system by one based on enterprise based bargaining, accompanied by limited recognition of the capacity lawfully to take industrial action in the course of such bargaining. Reviewing the current definition and its practical operation in its social, historical, and international context, the article concludes that the definition is not ‘fit for as purpose, and proposes that it should be revised in order better to accord with the purposes of the legislation and with the bargaining regime it establishes.

The taxation of sovereign wealth funds is an important issue for governments as they are both investors and need to attract investment. Operating in global markets, how these funds are taxed can affect investment location decisions. In Australia there are currently no legislative provisions for these investments and issues of residency, applicability and terminology hamper the use of tax treaties.

The basis of how sovereign wealth funds are taxed in Australia is administrative where tax exemptions are provided on the basis of private ruling applications. It is an inefficient and costly process which lacks certainty. Over the period 2009 to 2011 the government of the day proposed legislating its practices dealing with sovereign wealth funds. In 2010 Singapore introduced a fund exemption scheme, markedly different from that proposed in Australia. Yet it is a method that is able to be adapted to the Australian income tax legislation. It avoids definitional issues by targeting the entities the policy aims to cover, is compatible with a self-assessment system and provides flexibility in policy making. Recommendations with accompanying considerations are made with respect to incorporating Singapore's tax exemption for sovereign wealth funds into the Australian tax legislation.

The privative clause is dead, but there are other ways of reducing meaningful judicial scrutiny of government illegality. Pushed to the extreme, these threaten to hollow out judicial review's much-vaunted promise of protecting the rule of law, even on such a basic issue as the interpretation of an Act of Parliament. Other mechanisms for judicial supervision have also become more fragile. These include collateral challenge, and the potential for holding public officers to account through tort liability and criminal responsibility. ASIO officers, for example, have prospective immunities from tort law and criminal responsibility. Courts can act upon government evidence kept entirely secret from the opposing party. This article asks whether there is any stopping point for Acts that effectively remove government officers from legal controls.

The principle that the constitution derives its ultimate authority from the sovereignty of the people and the nationhood power were both developed by the High Court in the context of Australia's emergence as an independent nation. Although this shared provenance suggests the possibility of a more significant connection between the two doctrines, such a connection has not been developed in Australian constitutional jurisprudence. The heavily criticised judgment of French J in the Tampa decision appears to allude to such a connection, but the relevant reasoning is ambiguous and either left undeveloped or implicitly rejected in subsequent High Court cases. This paper critically examines the relationship between popular sovereignty and the nationhood power on two levels. In the first instance, the paper investigates whether it is even coherent to seek to provide a normative ground for the nationhood power in popular sovereignty. The paper then considers whether such a justification is consistent with Australian constitutional doctrine. Unsurprisingly, the weight of constitutional principle and doctrine supports the general subjection of the executive to prior legislative authorisation, rather than a robust non-statutory executive power grounded in popular sovereignty. While this conclusion is predictable in an Australian context, a detailed examination of the relationship between the weaker conception of popular sovereignty operative in the reasoning of High Court and the nationhood power nonetheless reveals some important underlying assumptions of current doctrinal orthodoxy.

The modern approach to statutory construction guides the judiciary, the legal profession, litigants, and academics in interpreting the myriad legislative provisions in Australian law. Yet what if critical sections have been construed in ways that are irreconcilable with the basic rules of modern statutory interpretation? One of the most important commercial statutes in the country is the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article exposes one instance of misinterpretation in respect of that statute, contained in a decision of a unanimous Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and makes proposals for resolving such quandaries.

The Australian Civil Space Industry is poised at a crucial moment in its history. Careful strategic decisions need to be made regarding whether Australia will continue to take a back seat in the space race or whether it will join the growing space technology industry, providing major opportunities for Australian innovators. This cannot occur if the current legal and regulatory frameworks do not facilitate research activities and investment. The Australian Government is currently reviewing the Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) and the Space Activities Regulations 2001 (Cth). This article will consider the unique role played by the Woomera Prohibited Area in the development and testing of launch technology and undertake an assessment of whether the Woomera Range (and by extension Australia) may once again play an important role in the research, development and testing of space technology. The article will place the legal restrictions regarding access to and use of the Woomera Range within the context of the proposed revision of the Australian legislation regulating civil space activities.

The Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) provides that foreign states are immune to the jurisdiction of Australian courts, and that their property is immune from execution. Those immunities are subject to important ‘commercial exceptions’. First, foreign states are not immune in Australian proceedings insofar as they concern a ‘commercial transaction’. Second, foreign states are not immune from execution in respect of ‘commercial property’. The distinction between the commercial and the non-commercial may be difficult to pin down. With reference to recent case law, including the High Court's decision in Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2015) 258 CLR 31, this article aims to articulate the scope of the commercial exceptions. It is argued that the scope of the commercial transaction exception is uncertain, and depends on courts’ approach to the task of characterisation. It is also argued that the commercial property exception is undesirably narrow, and will present a recurring impediment to the vindication of private rights.

It is elementary in administrative law that there is no such thing as unfettered discretion–yet, in a development that appears to have gone largely unnoticed, statutes increasingly confer ‘absolute discretion’ on public decision-makers. This article explores and evaluates these provisions and their judicial treatment in New Zealand. It surveys the range of contexts in which they are used and the various purposes or functions they appear to serve, and evaluates each against orthodoxy. It also surveys the judicial responses to such provisions, finding that these are mixed and too often muted. Of particular concern are the ‘absolute discretion’ provisions in the Immigration Act, and the lack of a consistently resolute judicial response to these.

This article considers the regulatory problems of online tracking behaviour, lack of consent to data collection, and the security of data collected with or without consent. Since the mid-1990s the United States Federal Trade Commission has been using its power under the United States consumer protection regime to regulate these problems. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), on the other hand, has yet to bring civil or criminal proceedings for online privacy or data security breaches, which indicates a reluctance to employ the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) in this field. Recent legislative action instead points to a greater application of the specifically targeted laws under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy Act’), and the powers of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), to protect consumer privacy and data security. This article contends that while specific legislation setting out, and publicly enforcing, businesses’ legal obligations with respect to online privacy and data protection is an appropriate regulatory response, the ACL's broad, general protections and public and/or private enforcement mechanisms also have a role to play in protecting consumer privacy and data security.

Although it is now generally accepted that s 51(xxxi) is a constitutional guarantee, it continues to be applied using characterisation analysis, the method of analysis used to apply grants of legislative power. This article argues that this is a mistake: if s 51(xxxi) is a constitutional guarantee, then it should be analysed like a constitutional guarantee. It takes to task the High Court's self-consciously comparative defence of characterisation analysis, which relies on the US Constitution's Fifth Amendment ‘takings clause’ as a foil. The article demonstrates that in some respects the differences between the two constitutional property clauses have been overstated, while in other respects they have been overlooked. From a broader comparative perspective, the most significant feature of s 51(xxxi) is not its use of the term ‘acquisition’, but its lack of reference to ‘compensation’ and use instead of the phrase ‘on just terms’. By resituating s 51(xxxi) in comparative perspective, the analysis provided in this article makes two important contributions. First, it deepens existing jurisprudential critiques by providing a more precise diagnosis of the problem with characterisation analysis. Second, it proposes and defends an alternative approach that is responsive to that diagnosis, that is better supported by the text and structure of s 51(xxx), and that is consistent with the High Court's commitment to the thesis that s 51(xxxi) is a constitutional guarantee.

The Australian Constitution constrains the scope of executive power that Parliament is capable of conferring in several ways. This article examines whether any constraints flow from the inherent requirements of ‘law’ itself. That is, is Parliament incapable of conferring executive power of a certain kind or breadth, because the statute that would be required to do so is simply not a ‘law’ for the purposes of the Australian Constitution? More broadly, the article explores the connection between constitutional doctrine and legal theory, and the ways in which statutory conferrals of very broad executive powers can diminish the rule of law.

This article examines the duty of full and frank disclosure of parties to family law financial proceedings in Australia, and the potential consequences of failure to comply with this fundamental obligation. The duty is briefly compared and contrasted with disclosure requirements in civil litigation and criminal proceedings to demonstrate the uniqueness of the family law position. The rationale and content of the duty is considered in light of recent cases including the High Court decisions of Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 and Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490. The article presents a three-pronged taxonomy of the consequences of non-compliance with the duty, namely evidential, procedural, and final orders/related consequences. We conclude that the absolute nature of the duty and the comprehensive nature of the potential consequences of failure to make full disclosure mean that parties and legal practitioners do so at their peril.

The Australian Superannuation Industry is generally seen as very strong and successful by global standards. However, three decades of legislative reform in the Australian superannuation industry have created a paradox: ongoing reforms but continuing dissatisfaction with areas of governance and outcomes. These include high levels of administrative and investment fees, and systematic problems around a culture of conflicted investment advice.

In seeking to further elaborate and then resolve this paradox, this article draws upon an extensive research project conducted by the authors within the Australian superannuation industry, including three voluntary and anonymous surveys of superannuation trustees/licensees. This research has revealed that fund members are vulnerable to significant and expanding private-interest rents generated by the financial services sector. This may be explained by regulatory capture mechanisms variously described as statutory, agency, corrosive and intellectual capture.

The article examines ways to better achieve public interest outcomes, and at a time when public sector integrity remains an area of particular attention, how more can be done to blunt the force of private interest rent seeking.

As Australia's population ages, increasing numbers of seniors move to a growing number of retirement villages. Unlike time shares, which are ‘managed investment schemes’ and therefore regulated as ‘financial products’ under corporate law administered nationally by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Commonwealth withdrew from the regulation of retirement villages in the 1980s on the basis that at that time they were local, usually run by religious bodies and charities and were not of national concern. The regulation of retirement villages was taken over by the states and territories under their non-uniform Retirement Villages Acts and the common law. Until then retirement villages, often indistinguishable from Commonwealth regulated timeshares, were regulated in the original State and Territory Uniform Companies Acts in 1961 as ‘interests’, and then in later Commonwealth legislation as ‘prescribed interests’ by the forebear of ASIC, the then National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) with the State and Territory Corporate Affairs Commissions as its ‘delegates’. Today retirement villages, which are largely owned and managed by the corporate sector, raise many issues of national concern such as accountability, fees and the rights of residents. Some aspects of retirement villages such as directors’ duties, fundraising, prospectuses and unregistered schemes are regulated as corporations by ASIC under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), but retirement villages are not regulated as ‘financial products’ under corporate law.

This article challenges the effectiveness of state and territory regulation of retirement villages and calls for federal regulation of retirement villages by bringing retirement villages into the definition of ‘financial product’ in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). As financial products, retirement villages would then be regulated by Commonwealth legislation which deals with financial services and financial markets, as regulated by ASIC. These laws include consumer protection provisions such as the prohibition of misleading or deceptive conduct, unfair contract terms, unconscionable conduct, licensing and high standards for those in the retirement village industry. This would result in a return to Commonwealth leadership of the regulation of retirement villages to harmonise and to consolidate the current mix of state and territory regulation with federal legislation including an enforceable Retirement Villages Code of Conduct.