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Proportionality and the Separation of Powers in Constitutional Review: Examining the Role of Judicial Deference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Caroline Henckels
Caroline Henckels*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Monash University
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Abstract

The High Court's tentative moves toward adopting structured proportionality as a method of constitutional review have been hampered by concerns about the separation of powers. This article argues that the manner in which a court undertakes proportionality analysis is crucial to the question of whether it is acting within the domain of judicial power. In this regard, the concept of judicial deference plays a vital but thus far under-theorised role. Deference refers not to judicial submission or surrender to the legislature, which would abdicate judicial power to a non-judicial body. Rather, it refers to a court giving weight to the judgment or opinion of government in circumstances of normative or empirical uncertainty. Courts afford deference in this way for two reasons: the desirability of respecting decisions made by democratically legitimate decision-makers, and the practical advantages that inhere in relying on the institutional competence and expertise of the other branches of government. An increased understanding of these rationales for deference in the context of constitutional review would diminish concerns about the High Court straying outside the domain of judicial power. Proportionality and deference exist in a symbiotic relationship and should be addressed together by a coherent judicial theory; many of the concerns raised by the High Court about the former would diminish were it also to embrace the latter.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 181 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

Thank you to Janina Boughey, Lisa Burton Crawford, Melissa Castan, Julie Debeljak, Patrick Emerton, Adam Fletcher, Triantafyllos Gkouvas, Sarah Joseph, Katie O'Bryan, Oscar Roos, Ronli Sifris, David Tan, Jamie Walvisch and the anonymous referees. All errors are mine.

References

1 SirAnthony, Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 109, 114–15Google Scholar.

2 (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’).

3 (2016) 90 ALJR 1027 (‘Murphy’).

4 See, eg, Alec, Stone Sweet and Jud, Matthews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 73–5, 87–8, 160–1Google Scholar.

5 On the stages of proportionality analysis, see, eg, Aharon, Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 32–133Google Scholar.

6 I use the term of ‘right or interest’ to signify that proportionality is used not only in the context of individual rights and freedoms.

7 Adrienne, Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 676–8Google Scholar.

8 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561–2 (‘Lange’).

9 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50–1 [92]–[96] (McHugh J), 77–8 [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 82 [211] (Kirby J) (‘Coleman’).

10 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ) (‘Castlemaine Tooheys’).

11 See, eg, Jeremy, Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 27Google Scholar: ‘Proportionality can potentially apply to protect a range of interests: human rights or fundamental freedoms; commercial rights, such as the freedom to carry on a trade or business; economic interests, in which case proportionality might represent a classical cost-benefit analysis; environmental interests; federalism matters, such as the interests of States in maintaining their areas of jurisdiction, or the “right” of citizens to be governed by the appropriate level of government’ (citations omitted).

12 (2004) 220 CLR 181, 266 [247] (Kirby J).

13 Ibid 266 [248] (Kirby J).

14 (2013) 249 CLR 92, 213 [345] (‘Monis’). Heydon J described the test as ‘mysterious’ and ‘amorphous’ at 182 [246]. See also Murphy (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1044 [64] (Kiefel J).

15 (2013) 252 CLR 530, 556 [44] (‘Unions NSW’).

16 (2014) 254 CLR 508, 570–2 [110]–[116] (‘Tajjour’).

17 Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 214 [347] (citations omitted).

18 Although it is not always clear from the High Court's reasoning, balancing has played a part in political communication and interstate trade and commerce cases from the outset: see, eg, Stone, above n 7, 681–2 (political communication); Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266, 306 (Stephen and Mason JJ) (‘Uebergang’); Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 409 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Castlemaine Tooheys (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ) (interstate trade and commerce).

19 McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis altered) (citations omitted). See also their reasoning at 217–19 [79]–[87]. One might argue that the terminology of ‘obvious and compelling’ involves an implicit form of balancing: see below Part III(B).

20 Ibid 218 [83], 218-19 [86]-[87] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

21 See, eg, Tor-Inge, Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158, 160–1Google Scholar; Jud, Matthews and Alec, Stone Sweet, ‘All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing’ (2011) 60 Emory Law Journal 797, 806Google Scholar.

22 Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579, 601 (Dawson J) (‘Leask’): proportionality relies on ‘essentially political rather than judicial considerations’. Toohey J argued extending proportionality to become a ‘general touchstone of constitutional power’ would result in the Court being ‘drawn inexorably into areas of policy and of value judgments’, at 616.

23 (1997) 189 CLR 579, 598 (Brennan CJ) (citations omitted) (‘Levy’); see also Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 325 (Brennan J).

24 (2004) 220 CLR 1, 31 [31] (Gleeson CJ).

25 Ibid 52–3 [100] (McHugh J); McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 217 [82]: ‘Once within the domain of selections which fulfil the legislative purpose with the least harm to the freedom, the decision to select the preferred means is the legislature’s’ (citations omitted). (This assumes, however, that there is a pool of equally burdensome measures to select from.)

26 (1990) 169 CLR 436, 473 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

27 Uebergang (1980) 145 CLR 266, 306 (Stephen and Mason JJ). See also Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418, 479 [110] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ): any alternative ‘must be effective’ at achieving the law's objective in order to be proportionate.

28 Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 214 [347].

29 Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 571 [114].

30 Ibid 550 [36]. See also Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1 [438] (Kiefel J) (‘Rowe’): this approach ‘avoids unwarranted [judicial] substitution’ for the choice of the legislature.

31 Stone, above n 7, 702–4; Adrienne Stone, ‘Constitutional Orthodoxy in the United Kingdom and Australia: The Deepening Divide’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 836, 856. The McCloy plurality does acknowledge that proportionality involves value judgment: McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [2], 216–17 [76]–[78], 219 [89] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Murphy (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1043 [61], 1044 [64] (Kiefel J); but see McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 287 [336] (Gordon J): ‘the question is not one of balance or value judgment but rather whether the impugned law impermissibly impairs or tends to impair the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government’ (emphasis altered).

32 Stone, above n 7, 702–4.

33 In the Australian context, see, eg, Kirk, above n 11, 55.

34 See, eg, Mark, Elliott, ‘Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach’ in Christopher, Forsyth et al (eds), Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford University Press, 2010) 264, 281Google Scholar; Grégoire, C N Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179, 185Google Scholar; Leighton, McDonald, ‘Rethinking Unreasonableness Review’ (2015) 25 Public Law Review 117, 122–3Google Scholar.

35 (1992) 177 CLR 1, 50 (Brennan J).

36 Ibid 52.

37 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 219 [89] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (citations omitted).

38 Ibid 236 [145] (Gageler J). In R v Spicer; Ex parte Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (1957) 100 CLR 312, 317, Dixon CJ, Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ observed that judicial discretion ‘must be governed or bounded by some ascertainable tests or standards’.

39 McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 238 [150]–[152] (Gageler J). Briefly, content-neutral restrictions on free speech attract an ‘intermediate scrutiny’: they must be substantially related to an ‘important governmental objective’. Content-based restrictions attract a ‘strict scrutiny’: they measure have a ‘compelling’ objective, be ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieving the objective, and be the least restrictive means of achieving the objective: Barak, above n 5, 509–13.

40 See Stone, above n 7, 688–9.

41 See Stone, above n 7, 686.

42 See, eg, E Thomas, Sullivan and Richard, S Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive Government Actions (Oxford University Press, 2008) 53–61Google Scholar; Stephen, Gardbaum, ‘A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 78, 83–4Google Scholar; Barak, above n 5, 506, 509, 521–2.

43 (2014) 254 CLR 508, 586 [164] (Gageler J) (emphasis added).

44 (2014) 254 CLR 508, 586 [163] (Gageler J) (emphasis added).

45 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 215 [72] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), 236–237 [146]–[148] (Gageler J).

46 On incommensurability and proportionality, see, eg, Virgílio, Afonso Da Silva, ‘Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273Google Scholar; Francisco, J Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 575Google Scholar. In Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 154 [146], Hayne J reasoned that ‘[t]he comparison to be made does not call for the balancing of incommensurables or comparing of the incomparable, as would be the case if the comparison was between the law's effect on freedom of political communication and the law's effect on some public interest or purpose wholly unconnected with the implied freedom’.

47 See Barak, above n 5, 349–51, 357, 363, 484. See also Cass, Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard University Press, 1990) 181Google Scholar which defines proportionality as requiring that aggregate social benefits be proportionate to aggregate social costs.

48 Barak, above n 5, 348.

49 Ibid 349. Alexy suggests that each right or interest should be compared in terms of its ‘importance for the constitution’, entailing an assessment of ‘what is correct on the basis of the constitution’ and the application of a scale for evaluating ‘the constitutional gains and losses’: Robert, Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433, 442Google Scholar. See also Kirk, above n 11, 61 (arguing that judges ought to rely on ‘community values’ in making this assessment, but noting that ‘it is doubtful that these can be identified without reliance on personal values’ (citations omitted)).

50 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 219 [88] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

51 Julian, Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Discretion in International and European Law’ in Nicholas, Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 107, 108Google Scholar; Aileen, Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 209Google Scholar; Paul, Craig, ‘Fundamental Principles of Administrative Law in Relation to Basic Principles of Constitutional Law’ in David, Feldman (ed), English Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 593, 608Google Scholar; Matthias, Klatt and Moritz, Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford University Press, 2012) 84Google Scholar. See also Murray, Wesson, ‘Crafting a Concept of Deference for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 101, 103Google Scholar.

52 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 144 (Mason CJ); Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 300 (Mason CJ); Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 648 (Kirby J); Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 52–3 [100] (McHugh J). See also McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 235 [143] (Gageler J); Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450, 483 [184] (Doyle CJ).

53 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 159 (Brennan J); Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 156 (Brennan J); Leask (1996) 187 CLR 579, 595 (Brennan CJ).

54 See, eg, Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262–3 (Fullagar J); Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 154 [45], 155 [48]–[49] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), 158 [59] (Gaudron J) (‘Enfield’) (but rejecting a United States-style general doctrine of deference to the executive in relation to the interpretation of a statutory provision: at 153–4 [44]. See also Peter, Cane, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 218–35)Google Scholar; Registrar of Trade Marks v Muller (1980) 144 CLR 37, 41; Eclipse Sleep Products Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1957) 99 CLR 300, 321–2; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, 655 [140] (Gummow J); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 291–2 (Kirby J). See also Justice, Stephen Gageler, ‘Deference’ (2015) 22 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 151, 154Google Scholar; Alan, Freckelton, ‘The Concept of ‘Deference’ in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Australia—Part 1’ (2000) 73 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 52, 66Google Scholar.

55 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 220 [91] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). See also Murphy (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1080 [304] (Gordon J) in relation to necessity testing: ‘Those observations are not to endorse particular labels such as “deference”, “margin of appreciation” or “zone of proportionality”. Rather, they are observations grounded in, and derived from, fundamental constitutional principle in this country’.

56 McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 216 [77] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

57 (2000) 199 CLR 135, 153 [44] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

58 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 122–3 [326] n 442 (Callinan J); Unions NSW (2013) 252 CLR 530, 556 [326] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

59 Mullholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 252 [204] (Hayne and Gummow JJ), 262–3 [237] (Kirby J); McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 220 [92] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

60 Justice Kenneth Hayne, ‘Deference—An Australian Perspective’ (2011) Public Law 75.

61 Ibid 83.

62 [2004] 1 AC 185, 240 [75].

63 Ibid [75]–[76].

64 T R S, Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “Due Deference”’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 671, 689Google Scholar. See also T R S, Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 249, 269, 275–6, 278Google Scholar.

65 Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review’, above n 64, 675, 688; Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, above n 64, 274–5.

66 Kavanagh, above n 51, 178–9; Aileen, Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 222, 241Google Scholar.

67 Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review’, above n 64, 675, 680; Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, above n 64, 241, 277.

68 See Tom, Zwart, ‘Deference Owed under the Separation of Powers’ in John, Morrison, Kieran, McEvoy and Gordon, Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition, and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) 73, 74Google Scholar.

69 Mason, above n 1, 120.

70 Ibid 123, observing also that ‘[t]he difference of opinion here may be no more than a nomenclature problem’.

71 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 235 [143] (Gageler J). As noted above, Gageler J preferred to approach this question by way of legal tests of differing stringency.

72 See, eg, Allan, above n 64, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review’; Paul, Craig, ‘Judicial Review, Intensity and Deference in EU Law’ in David, Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of Public Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 335Google Scholar; Janneke, Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 80Google Scholar; Harbo, above n 21; Jeff, A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 409Google Scholar; Julian, Rivers, ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in George, Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing, 2007) 167Google Scholar; Michael, Taggart, ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ (2008) 1 New Zealand Law Review 423Google Scholar; Alison, L Young, ‘In Defence of Due Deference’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 554Google Scholar; Alison, L Young, ‘Will You, Won't You, Will You Join the Deference Dance?’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37Google Scholar.

73 See, eg, Julian, Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 199, 203–4Google Scholar; Kavanagh, above n 51, 169–70. Deference arises in administrative law through the legality-merits distinction: see Justice Gageler, above n 54, 152, 156, describing this approach as the allocation of binding decision-making authority to the executive within its statutory zone of jurisdiction, whether in an absolute sense or bounded by considerations of (for example) reasonableness. See also Paul, Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 7–8Google Scholar.

74 Klatt and Meister, above n 51, 80.

75 Kavanagh, above n 51, 172–3.

76 Ibid 171.

77 Rivers, above n 73, 191, noting that in the context of proportionality analysis, the terms ‘discretion’ and ‘deference’ are ‘often used interchangeably’ (citations omitted).

78 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers trans, Oxford University Press, 2010) 388–425 [trans of: Theorie der Grundrechte (first published 1985)]. Alexy also refers to structural discretion which is relevant to situations where, in relation to the necessity and balancing stages, there are two or more alternatives that comply with the relevant stage and uncertainty as to which alternative should be preferred. In such cases, Alexy argues that a court should not invalidate the law: at 405–14. See also (in the context of UK public law) Alan, D P Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 67–73Google Scholar.

79 See, eg, Brady, above n 78, 68.

80 See Elliott, above n 34, 272–85.

81 See, eg, Aileen, Kavanagh, ‘Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Adjudication’ in Grant, Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 184, 200–3Google Scholar; Gerards, above n 72, 86.

82 See, eg, Murray, Hunt, ‘Sovereignty's Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of “Due Deference”’ in Nicholas, Bamforth and Peter, Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2003) 337, 353–4Google Scholar; Kavanagh, above n 51, 182–90.

83 See also Kirk, above n 11, 62: ‘there are two fundamental determinants of the intensity with which the High Court should apply the test of proportionality: the democratic legitimacy of taking a strict approach on any particular issue, and its ability to deal adequately with the assessments involved’.

84 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50–1 [92]–[96] (McHugh J), 77–8 [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 82 [211] (Kirby J).

85 Castlemaine Tooheys (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ).

86 See Gabrielle, Appleby, ‘Functionalism in Constitutional Interpretation: Factual and Participatory Challenges: Commentary on Dixon’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 493Google Scholar.

87 Electoral fraud: (2010) 243 CLR 1, 38 [75] (French CJ), 61 [167] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 120–1 [384] (Crennan J).

88 Corruption: (2013) 252 CLR 530, 557–8 [50]–[52] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

89 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 219 [89] (citations omitted).

90 Ie decisions that have implications for a large network of relationships so that change to any one relationship causes changes to the others: see, eg, Jeff A King, ‘The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity’ [2008] Public Law 101.

91 Kavanagh, above n 51, 223–4.

92 (2004) 220 CLR 1, 124 [328] (Heydon J). See also Kirk, above n 11, 55–6; Dan, Meagher, ‘The Brennan Conception of the Implied Freedom: Theory, Proportionality and Deference’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 119, 120, 122–3Google Scholar; Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43 [65] (French CJ): ‘A hypothetical [alternative] … would raise questions of administration, enforcement and supervision. Courts are not in a position to make comparative judgments on such issues, particularly where they may involve costs and the allocation of resources upon which there may be competing claims’.

93 (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1080 [303] (Gordon J) (emphasis altered).

94 Ibid (citations omitted). Gordon J also distinguished the context of the implied freedom from challenges to ‘an entire legislative scheme that the Parliament is required to enact to comply with ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution’ (emphasis altered).

95 See, eg, Brady, above n 78, 114.

96 See, eg, ibid; Tom Hickman, ‘The Substance and Structure of Proportionality’ [2008] Public Law 694, 698; Daly, above n 73, 87.

97 Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 572 [115] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ): ‘[the inquiry] does not proceed upon the premise that the legislature would adopt a measure which was not as effective in achieving its purpose. To approach the matter otherwise would involve the Court impermissibly substituting the legislative provision under consideration for something else’.

98 See, eg, Elliott, above n 34, 269–70, 278, 280. Elliott criticises this approach for confusing the rationale for deference (institutional competence and expertise) relevant to the necessity enquiry with the rationale (regulatory autonomy) relevant to the choice of objectives (both the principal purpose of the measure and other, broader considerations) that the decision-maker wishes to pursue.

99 See, eg, ibid 269.

100 Leaving aside the question whether proportionality should have been deployed at all—it is arguable that there was no burden on the implied freedom: see Murphy (2016) 90 ALJR 1027, 1080–2 [308]–[321] (Gordon J).

101 Ibid 1039 [39] (French CJ and Bell J).

102 (2013) 249 CLR 1, 42–3 [65] (French CJ).

103 (2014) 254 CLR 508, 571–2 [114]–[116] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Gordon J affirmed this approach in McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 285–6 [328], 287 [335].

104 The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights use this approach in certain circumstances.

105 See Elliott, above n 34, 283.

106 (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [3], 210 [57], 219 [87].

107 Mason, above n 1, 123.