There have been two major periods of judge-driven constitutional transformation in Australia. The first spanned the High Court's successful transformation over the course of the last century of the strongly federalist 1901 Constitution into a weakly federalist one. The second took the form of what is generally thought to have been the less than fully realized ‘Mason Court revolution’ – the Court's attempt, from 1987-1995, to turn the Constitution into a device for expressing core Australian political values. What explains these different outcomes – why was the first transformation so successful and the second only partially achieved? This article proposes an answer to this question based on a generalisable account of the role of constitutional courts in processes of constitutional transformation. In short, the argument is that the seminal Engineers decision triggered a self-reinforcing trajectory of institutional development that led to a stable politico-legal equilibrium by the middle of the last century. The judges responsible for the second attempted transformation sought to break free of this equilibrium in order to respond to what they thought were pressing social needs. In the absence of a significant exogenous shock to the system, however, the equilibrium structured and constrained what they were able to do.

The community store licensing regime was first introduced as part of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) and subsequently expanded under the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth). The legislation introduced a new penalty regime with a range of sanctions that may be imposed if community stores have not complied with their licence conditions.

It is the penalty regime that is the focus of this paper, as a credible sanctioning strategy to deal with breaches of the licensing regime is not currently in place. Such a strategy is essential to ensure that the penalty regime leads to greater compliance with the spirit of the law — ensuring food security — and not just the letter of the law — ensuring that the terms of community store licence conditions are met. Consequently, the article considers the strengths and weaknesses of the new penalty regime and proposes a regulatory approach that may be used by the Secretary to deal with breaches of licence conditions.

Although the High Court has never ruled on the issue, the prevailing view has been that unless parliaments enact bills of rights, the principle of proportionality does not and cannot play a role in judicial review of administrative decisions in Australia. Yet in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, a majority of the High Court hinted that this may not be the case. This article analyses the reasons for Australia's longstanding reluctance to embrace proportionality in the administrative law context, and whether the decision in Li has altered this position. It then explores overseas developments in proportionality review which reveal that the principle may take on many forms in the administrative law context, with differing implications for the separation of powers. The article finds that it might be possible to accommodate certain methods of applying proportionality within Australia's judicial review framework, but not without significant broader changes to judicial review of administrative action in Australia.

Traditionally, statutory provisions prohibiting direct discrimination have employed a test of less favourable treatment. This test is controversial since it requires the use of a comparator, which is widely regarded as giving rise to a range of serious problems. It is commonly assumed, both by academics and legislators, that reliance on a comparator, and the problems to which such reliance gives rise, can be avoided by employing a test of unfavourable treatment instead of a test of less favourable treatment. In this article, we subject this assumption to critical scrutiny. We acknowledge that, on what is probably the most common understanding of the test of unfavourable treatment, employing that test does avoid the need to rely on a comparator. However, we argue that this understanding renders the test of unfavourable treatment radically over-inclusive. We then consider alternative approaches to understanding the test of unfavourable treatment, and investigate whether these approaches avoid the need to rely on a comparator whilst also avoiding the over-inclusiveness problem. We argue that this depends, ultimately, on what the value is that underlies prohibitions on discrimination.

The Australian federation is built upon an enduring respect for the independence of the judicial arm of government. This is reflected in the principle that the judiciary should be kept separate from the legislature and executive. A practice seemingly at odds with these values is the appointment of senior judges to vice-regal offices. Despite this, the practice has attracted scant academic attention, and has never been challenged in the courts. In this article we examine the conferral of vice-regal roles on serving federal, state and territory judges. We ask, first, whether such appointments ought to continue to be made and, secondly, whether they are constitutionally permissible.

Payday loans are small-amount, short-term, unsecured, high-cost credit contracts provided by non-mainstream credit providers. Payday loans are usually taken out to help the consumer pay for essential items, such as food, rent, electricity, petrol, broken-down appliances or car registration or repairs. These consumers take out payday loans because they cannot — or believe that they cannot — obtain a loan from a mainstream credit provider such as a bank. In recent years there has been a protracted debate in Australia — and in several overseas jurisdictions — about how to regulate the industry. Recent amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) — referred to in this article as the 2013 reforms — are designed to better protect payday loan consumers. While the 2013 reforms provide substantially improved protection for payday loan consumers, further changes to the law may be warranted. This article raises several law reform issues which should be considered as part of the 2015 review into small amount credit contracts, including whether the caps on the cost of credit are set at the right level, whether the required content and presentation of the consumer warnings needs to be altered, whether more needs to be done to protect consumers who are particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable and whether a general anti-avoidance provision should be included in the credit legislation.