The establishment and rise of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is, on balance, a story of the successful development of an executive-based institution for cooperative governance in the Australian federal system. By contrast, the Council of the Australian Federation (CAF), created in 2006 as a forum for interstate co-operation and policy development, has been far less effective. This article explores the reasons behind CAF's difficulties after a very short-lived initial impact. Integral to this account is the significance of Canadian experience of horizontal intergovernmental relations, which directly inspired the Australian Premiers to found CAF. The numerous indications of political congruence – some temporary, others systemic – between the Canadian and Australian settings obscured a deeper constitutional incongruence between the two jurisdictions and this is fundamental to appreciating CAF's failure as a transplant. CAF's ability to operate effectively as a significant institution was inevitably constrained by the parameters of the Australian federal system that its establishment was, in many ways, seeking to transcend.

Five years ago the global financial crisis threatened the world's financial system and its aftermath wreaked devastation across many parts of the globe. Mis-selling of home mortgages to consumers unable to repay their loans and global sales of financial products linked to residential lending were at the heart of the crisis. Financial reforms governing housing credit frameworks and the selling of complex financial products have ensued within domestic and international spheres. This article reviews the regulatory structures in Australia governing the provision of residential housing mortgages and credit assistance and the provision of financial advice. Its analysis focuses on customer suitability processes, client duties, and remuneration provisions because these legal features significantly influence, and can adversely impact, consumer outcomes. It suggests specific reforms to ensure adequate consumer protection and enhance the consistency and efficacy of the credit framework. It also calls for renewed debate on the remuneration structures of mortgage brokers.

The Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) (the Act) explicitly enables the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal to make orders that can impose binding requirements on all the participants in the road transport supply chain, including consignors and consignees at the apex of the chain, for the pay and safety of both employee and independent contractor drivers. The tribunal is also specifically empowered to make enforceable orders to reduce or remove remuneration related incentives and pressures that contribute to unsafe work practices in the road transport industry. Recently the tribunal handed down its first order. The article considers whether, and the degree to which, the tribunal has been willing to exercise its explicit power to impose enforceable obligations on consignors and consignees – such as large supermarket chains – at the apex of road transport supply chains. It examines the substance and extent of the obligations imposed by the tribunal, including whether the tribunal has exercised the full range of powers vested in it by the Act. We contend that the tribunal's first order primarily imposes obligations on direct work providers and drivers without making large, powerful consignors and consignees substantively responsible for driver pay and safety. We argue that the tribunal's first order could have more comprehensively fulfilled the objectives of the Act by more directly addressing the root causes of low pay and poor safety in the road transport industry.

There has been limited research into the relevance of public benevolent institutions (‘PBI's) to the management of native title benefits. Despite this omission, a new, tax-effective, structure was proposed in 2013, being the ‘Indigenous Community Development Corporation’ (‘ICDC’). PBI characterisation is also becoming more relevant as native title determination numbers increase, such that there is a suitable and interested body, the prescribed body corporate (‘PBC’) that can pursue a variety of functions in fulfilling its statutory duties and in seeking to realise the economic, social and cultural objectives of Indigenous groups. This article asserts that a purpose of addressing Indigenous disadvantage is a PBI purpose and that it permits a broad range of activities in order to meet that end. Accordingly, PBI status should be available for many PBCs and other benefits management structure institutions. As a result, the proposed grounds for introducing the ICDC are significantly less compelling and it is argued that a more cautious approach is warranted, being one that better recognises ICDC limitations and that does not over-emphasise the potential benefits.

A ‘functional’ approach to constitutional interpretation is well-accepted in many other jurisdictions, including the United States, and offers a promising middle path between the extremes of pure formalism and pragmatism. It is, however, under-developed as an approach to constitutional interpretation, rather than doctrine, in Australia. The article offers an exploration of what it would mean to adopt a more explicitly functionalist approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, drawing on constitutional cases decided by the High Court in 2014.