The Brexit referendum highlights the apparently anomalous role of the “people” in the constitutional order of the United Kingdom. Politically speaking, its verdict is acknowledged as unassailable and unaccountable, yet this “sovereign” status has no legal grounds. In turn, some commentators have argued that this discrepancy between “political” and “legal” understandings of popular sovereignty—or the failure to properly institutionalize popular sovereignty in a legal-constitutional form—represents a distinct site of constitutional crisis in its own right. However, I argue that such claims of constitutional anomaly, or of British exceptionalism in this regard, are misplaced. While the Brexit scenario seems to express the destabilizing and disruptive potential of a popular sovereign that exceeds or evades constitutional recognition, this is in no sense a peculiarity of the British constitutional order. By its nature, popular sovereignty is inexhaustible by constitutional recognition, and so it tends to retain such disruptive potential regardless of whatever constitutional form it is assigned. Thus, critics of the British constitutional status quo overestimate the capacity of constitutional law in general to regulate or domesticate the expression of popular sovereignty via referendums.

The rise of referendums has led to the concern that they could lead to liberticide and discriminatory results. This article intends to determine whether the concept of popular sovereignty would immunize constitutional provisions that are passed through a constitutional referendum from any human rights limitation. In answering the question, I formulate a theoretical framework called “constituent-constituted duality,” while also distinguishing “the constituent people,” which is mythical, and “the constituted people,” which is empiric. In the end, this article argues that the only possible form of limitation from the perspective of popular sovereignty is an ex ante limitation. Meanwhile, an ex post facto limitation remains unacceptable from the angle of popular sovereignty, which implies that a judicial review of popularly-enacted constitutional amendments is conceptually illegitimate.

In this article, I bring together three recent ideas from political theory and constitutional law. The first is the notion developed by Jürgen Habermas and Markus Patberg of a pouvoir constituant mixte. Complex polities such as supra-state federations should be understood as constitutional entities that combine two or more authorizing subjects. The default “mixed” conception is that of dual sovereignty, split between the federations’ member collectives and member individuals. The second idea is that of Stephen Tierney, that sub-state national societies should be seen as involved in struggles over constituent power. The third is the idea and practice of sovereignty referendums, which I illustrate by looking at the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum. I contend that, at a minimum, sovereignty referendums, especially lost ones, should be understood as strategies to bring about, shift or complement constituent powers, in achieving compound or mixed sovereignty. Finally, I venture into some ideas about the criteria of legitimacy for such endeavors, in distinguishing the activation of constituent powers from their articulation and exercise.

The democratic dialogue model is a domestic constitutional model of rights protection, which is used to explain and evaluate the relationship between domestic courts and legislatures. It is characterised by there being some capacity on the part of the legislature to respond to a court decision and it claims, among other things, to produce a ‘better protection of human rights’. This paper examines whether the democratic dialogue model can be, and should be, applied to the relationship between state legislatures and, respectively, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the European Courts). The paper first demonstrates that this proposed application of the model differs from other accounts of dialogue hitherto applied at the transnational level. It examines how exactly the model can be applied to the relationship between national legislatures and the European Courts and it demonstrates that the model provides an explanatory framework for the interactions between the institutions. It argues that the normative claims of the domestic dialogue model are achieved when the model is applied in the proposed way, but it acknowledges that the achievement of those normative claims might not always be desirable at the transnational level.

EU institutions have argued on several occasions that national and EU citizenship should not be awarded without any genuine link with the Member State concerned. Some scholars have adopted the same position, justifying their position referring to the genuine link requirement established by the International Court of Justice in Nottebohm. This has prompted criticism from legal scholars, who point out that Nottebohm was wrong as a matter of international law and moral principle. This paper shows that supporters and critics have failed to recognise that they have been talking with different conceptions of the genuine link requirement in mind. The question of whether to apply a genuine link requirement for the recognition of nationality is altogether different from the question of whether to apply a genuine link requirement for the acquisition of nationality. Nottebohm concerns the first; the arguments of EU institutions the second. The argument of EU institutions cannot therefore be dismissed by dismissing Nottebohm. I subsequently explore the normative arguments for predicating the boundaries of national membership on a genuine link requirement. There are weighty moral reasons for member states to condition the acquisition of national and EU citizenship on the presence of a genuine link. Finally, moving from the normative to the practical, I argue that such a requirement would have far-reaching consequences (targeting not just investor citizenship schemes) and cannot be enforced as a requirement under EU law.

The recent global growth of anti-democratic sentiment has renewed the question of when a political party should be barred from the electoral arena. In modern democracies, even explicitly militant ones, constitutional mechanisms for banning political parties are rarely used. The recent decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) not to ban the National Democratic Party, despite its neo-Nazi platform, is an example of this restraint, with the BVerfG introducing a new, stricter criterion called “potentiality” for the dissolution of a political party under the German Basic Law. This article draws on neo-institutionalism and comparative constitutional law to explore the democratic ramifications of three different European thresholds for banning an anti-democratic political party: the presumptive test previously used by the BVerfG, the new potentiality criterion introduced by the BVerfG, and the European Court of Human Rights’ requirement for the party in question to be an imminent threat before it can be dissolved.

My article aims to analyze the conflict between the duties deriving from the supranational deontological codification under a philosophical point of view. Specifically, I will discuss both rules implying the independence of a lawyer and the obligation to ensure that the legitimate interests of the client and the proper administration of justice are protected. I will conduct an analysis about the relationship between moral and juridical duties through a few parts from The Metaphysics of Morals, published by Immanuel Kant in 1797. Afterwards, I will try to verify if Kant’s conception of moral and juridical duties can provide a lawyer with the guidelines for the conflict resolution. I will suggest a meeting point capable of satisfying at the same time those interests whose protection is conflictingly established by the ethical code, and which is represented by the Alternative Dispute Resolution, precisely by the Assisted Negotiation procedure. Ultimately, I will propose an approach based on the identification of an agreement as a way to solve the conflict between the lawyer’s duties.