Democracy is far less fragile than we sometimes imagine. Although hard to establish, it is remarkably robust and is corrupted only by dint of persistent effort. Yet, as Rousseau wrote of freedom, once lost, democracy is nearly impossible to regain. Today, the forces of democracy face a new source of corruption all the more sinister because it appears so innocuous, often even identifying itself with the liberty it undermines. Having survived the nation-state and in time subordinated it to its own liberal purposes, can democracy now survive globalization? Only if democracy is globalized.

At present, the encompassing practices of globalization have created an ironic and radical asymmetry: we have managed to globalize markets in goods, labour, currencies and information without globalizing the civic and democratic institutions that have historically comprised the free market's indispensable context. Put simply, we have removed capitalism from the institutional ‘box’ that has (quite literally) domesticated it and given its sometimes harsh practices a human face.

It was one of the defining features of the soviet system that it allowed no legal challenge to party dominance. Elections took place at regular intervals; but from an early stage they were based upon a single slate of candidates, the ‘bloc of Communists and nonparty people’. Voting was not compulsory, but it was difficult to avoid – canvassers went from house to house, ballot boxes were set up in hospitals, long-distance trains and polar observatories, and constituency officials competed with each other for the highest turnout. In theory it was possible to vote against, but this meant using the screened-off booth in the polling station, since a vote in favour, with a single candidate system, could be cast without marking the ballot paper or even looking at it. Some called these ‘Elections Paradise-style: as God said to Adam, “Here is Eve, the woman of your choice”’. Bertolt Brecht, commenting on the leaf lets that had been distributed in East Berlin after the rising of 1953 which announced that the people had forfeited the government's confidence and could ‘only win it back by redoubled labour’, put it more directly. ‘Wouldn't it be simpler,’ he asked, ‘if the government dissolved the people and elected another?’

The publication of the report of the royal commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, provides an occasion to look at second chambers and bicameralism in Anglo- American democracies. This limited focus is not for want of subject matter: the Inter-Parliamentary Union reports that of 178 parliamentary democracies in 1996, 58 were bicameral. Nor is the subject of second chambers, while never popular, a neglected area of inquiry at present. In fact, more has been published on the topic in the past four years than at any time in recent memory. The reason for focusing on Anglo-American countries is that they are the democracies where upper chambers are being transformed today. In response to events unique to themselves, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom have of late looked beyond responsible government as traditionally defined and begun to examine the role of their second chambers. The United States warrants inclusion because it is the founder of the theory of modern bicameralism.

The transition to democracy in bangladesh after the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in 1990 began with the formation of a non-political caretaker administration (NCA) to prepare the ground for the transfer of power to a popularly mandated government. Its other important purpose was to manage the affairs of the state during the interlude that separated the dissolution of the authoritarian regime (December 1990) and the complete installation of the democratically-elected government (September 1991) to rule the country in its own right.

The need for this NCA was imperative in the wake of the dismantling of authoritarian rule. The attempts of the ousted regime to conduct a third election, while still in power, were not acceptable to its political adversaries, given the former's proven tendency to unduly inf luence the electoral process in the past.

Despite the dramatic final breakthrough in summer 1987, the democratization of South Korea (hereinafter Korea) displayed the hallmarks of a gradual or continuous transition from authoritarianism. These included: liberalization emanating from within the regime; continuity of personnel from the authoritarian ruling elite; continuity in economic and foreign policy; and the exclusion from power of the representatives of the economically disadvantaged groups. Such features of democratic deficit have been observed for Korea and for Brazil, two countries whose experiences of authoritarian developmentalism are commonly compared.

Events in recent years suggest the possibility of more fundamental reform of Korea's economic and political institutions. The financial crisis of late-1997 led to the most serious economic recession for 40 years. Held in the middle of the financial meltdown, the presidential election of December 1997 resulted in a victory for Kim Dae-Jung (or DJ as he is commonly known), a veteran dissident associated with the excluded constituencies (not only his own underdeveloped home region but also labour and progressivelyminded intellectuals and activists).