The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) routinely publishes details of the evidence and reasoning underpinning its recommendations, including its social value judgements (SVJs). To date, however, NICE's SVJs relating to equity in the distribution of health and health care have been less specific and systematic than those relating to cost-effectiveness in the pursuit of improved total population health. NICE takes a pragmatic, case-based approach to developing its principles of SVJ, drawing on the cumulative experience of its advisory bodies in making decisions that command respect among its broad range of stakeholders. This paper aims to describe the SVJs about equity in health and health care that NICE has hitherto used to guide its decision making. To do this, we review both the general SVJs reported in NICE guidance on methodology and the case-specific SVJs reported in NICE guidance about particular health care technologies and public health interventions.

Tackling health inequalities (HI) has become a key policy objective in England in recent years. Yet, despite the wide-ranging policy response of the 1997–2010 Labour Government, socio-economic variations in health continued to widen. In this paper, we seek to explore why. We propose that a meta-narrative has emerged in which the health problems facing England's most deprived areas, and the solution to those problems, have increasingly come to be linked to levels of National Health Service (NHS) funding. This has been, in part, a response to key shortcomings in previous rounds of resource allocation. The very significant sums of money allocated with respect to ‘health inequalities’ reflects and reinforces the belief that the NHS can and should play a central role in promoting health equity. This medicalisation of HI focuses attention on the role of individual risk factors that lend themselves to medical management, but effectively sidelines the macroprocesses of social inequality, legitimising the kind of society that neo-liberal government has produced in the United Kingdom – one in which health (like other assets) has become a matter of individual and not collective responsibility.

Infectious diseases are among the main causes of death and disability in developing countries, and they are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor countries. One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a lack of lifesaving essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need improvements. In this article, we analyse which of the push and pull mechanisms proposed in the recent literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious diseases. A combination of push programmes that subsidise research inputs through direct funding and pull programmes that reward research output rather than research input may be the appropriate strategy to stimulate research into neglected diseases. On the one hand, early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push mechanisms, such as research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the other hand, pull mechanisms, such as prize funds that link reward payments to the health impacts of effective medicines, have the potential to stimulate research into neglected diseases.

Ireland's private health insurance market operates on the basis of community rating, alongside open enrolment and lifetime cover. A risk equalisation scheme was introduced in 2003 to bolster community rating. However, in July 2008 the Irish Supreme Court set aside this scheme, on the basis of the interpretation of community rating in Irish legislation. This decision has significant implications for the Irish private health insurance market. This paper reviews the development of the market, focusing in particular on community rating. The breakdown of community rating in a market with multiple insurers with differing risk profiles is discussed. Applying this to the Irish market, it can be seen that the Irish Supreme Court judgment has significant implications for the application of community rating. Specifically, while community rating operates within plans, it no longer operates across the market, leading to high-risk lives paying more, on average, than low-risk lives. It has also led to greater opportunities for insurers to engage in market segmentation. This may have relevance for the design and operation of other community rated markets.

As more and more clinical trials are conducted in developing countries, concerns arise about non-trial medical care available to study participants. Recent work argues for ancillary care – medical care not part of the clinical trial per se – to be formally incorporated into these studies. Although the provision of ancillary care is often justified on ethical grounds, a number of crucial implementation issues remain unresolved, including its scope, duration and financing. Drawing on lessons from health insurance benefit design, we highlight two overlooked challenges for ancillary care adoption – adverse selection and moral hazard – and offer recommendations that could attenuate their consequences. Specifically, adverse selection and moral hazard could be reduced by offering a choice between ancillary medical care and monetary compensation or rewarding low ancillary care utilization. Alternatively, researchers’ financial risk due to ancillary care could be shifted to a third-party insurer. Recognizing participants’ behavioral responses to prospective offers of ancillary medical care would allow funders and research teams to forecast the demand for ancillary care more accurately and to prepare for its provision more adequately.