The use of incentives to encourage individuals to adopt ‘healthier’ behaviours is an increasingly popular instrument in health policy. Much of the literature has been critical of ‘negative’ incentives, often due to concerns about equality; ‘positive’ incentives, however, have largely been welcomed as an instrument for the improvement of population health and possibly the reduction of health inequalities. The aim of this paper is to provide a more systematic assessment of the use of incentives from the perspective of equality. The paper begins with an overview of existing and proposed incentive schemes. I then suggest that the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ incentives – or ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ – is of limited use in distinguishing those incentive schemes that raise concerns of equality from those that do not. The paper assesses incentive schemes with respect to two important considerations of equality: equality of access and equality of outcomes. While our assessment of incentive schemes will, ultimately, depend on various empirical facts, the paper aims to advance the debate by identifying some of the empirical questions we need to ask. The paper concludes by considering a number of trade-offs and caveats relevant to the assessment of incentive schemes.

This paper reviews current research and literature on the issue of informal payments for health care and its context and suggests a new perspective for a better understanding of this phenomenon. This perspective, based on political culture and behavior and on wider social processes, is already used to explain various phenomena from different fields of public policy. The paper explains the impact of a specific type of political culture, called ‘alternative politics’ (AP) in the Israeli literature, on healthcare policy and institutional healthcare settings. AP is based on a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach adopted by citizens to address their dissatisfaction with governmental services. When such a mode of political culture is diffused to all sectors and levels of society, all players, including bureaucrats and politicians, are guided by short-term considerations and apply unilateral strategies that bypass formal rules either through illegal activity or by marginalizing formal rules. Explaining informal payments by analyzing social processes and political culture and behavior has some disadvantages, but it provides us with a better understanding of the phenomenon while covering most of its characteristics and configurations.

Health financing reforms have recently received much attention in developing countries. However, out-of-pocket payments remain substantial. When such payments involve expenditures above some given proportion of household resources, they are often deemed ‘catastrophic’. The research literature on defining catastrophe leaves open a number of important questions and as a result there still exists a lack of consensus on the issue. This paper argues that there is a need to examine the question of what might constitute fair indices of catastrophic payment, which explicitly recognize diminishing marginal utility of income as reflected in some principle of vertical equity. It proposes the use of rank-dependent weights to allow variations in threshold payment levels across individuals on the income ladder. These are then applied to a Nigerian data set. It emerged that the catastrophic headcount (positive gap) obtained using a fixed threshold – weighted or not by the concentration index – is lower (higher) than that predicted by the rank-dependent threshold. More fundamentally there is a need for more research effort to take the ideas in this paper further and examine in various different contexts what a fair construct of catastrophe might look like.

Both professionals and politicians may affect expenditures for highly professional services provided in the public and private sector. We investigated Danish publicly financed child dental care with a special focus on the influence of politicians and dentists on the expenditure level. By studying spatial patterns in expenditure levels across municipalities, we are able to test the influences of these two main actors and the networks through which learning is achieved. Four hypotheses on the existence of different spatial spillover effects are tested. The empirical analysis is based on annual data from 1996 to 2001 for 226 Danish municipalities, thus allowing for the control for heterogeneity between municipalities and for intra-municipal correlations across time. The results point to differences in expenditures between municipalities with privately and publicly produced dental care. Furthermore, dentists appear to be the most important actors for the spatial spillover effects, and these effects are especially strong for municipalities situated in the same county that use private dental clinics. There is no evidence of political spatial spillover effects between municipalities.

The period from 1996 to 2008 was one of rapid economic and social change in Ireland, with one of the most significant changes being the transition from a situation of net emigration to one of substantial net immigration. Although research on the impact of immigration on Irish society, as well as the labour market characteristics and experiences of immigrants in Ireland has increased in recent years, comparatively little is known about the health status of immigrants to Ireland. An extensive international literature has documented a ‘healthy immigrant’ effect for large immigrant-receiving countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, whereby the health status of immigrants is better than comparable native-born individuals. There is also evidence to suggest that immigrants’ health status deteriorates with time spent in the host country. However, the Irish immigration experience differs considerably from that of countries that have been the focus of research on the ‘healthy immigrant’ effect. Using microdata from a nationally representative survey of the population in 2007, this paper finds only limited evidence in favour of a ‘healthy immigrant’ effect for Ireland, although the distinctive features of the Irish immigrant population, and the nature of the data available, may partly explain the results.

In markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition. For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States, where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account. We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.